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Has the relationship between the European Union and the United States become a sideshow or is it
still central to the global economy? Conflicting signals have been sent out since the outbreak of the
global crisis. The creation of the G20 suggests that priorities have moved away from the traditional G7
focus on the transatlantic economy. But many of the key policy debates, such as those on bank capital
ratios and reform of financial regulation, have retained a characteristically transatlantic flavour.
There are reasons for this. The global financial crisis has been mostly a transatlantic crisis, and in the
aftermath of the shock, the EU and US share common problems: deleveraging, unemployment, the
need for unconventional policy responses, reduced growth potential, high public debt, and political
pressures for protection. Furthermore, the EU and US still constitute a major part of the global
economy, and what happens to them matters for all.
The EU and the US however have not responded to the shock in the same way. Their policy space and
policy traditions are different and this portends significant divergence across the Atlantic. How far
this divergence will go and whether policymakers on the two continents will disagree or agree to
disagree are the subjects of this volume, based on a joint Banca d’Italia-Bruegel-Peterson Institute
conference, held in Rome in September 2009, with the support of the European Commission.
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1833 Oceans_8.3.11.qxp:oceans apart book  9/3/11  16:05  Page ivHas the eu-uS relationship become a sideshow or is it still central to the global
economy?Conﬂictingsignalshavebeensentoutsincetheoutbreakoftheglobal
crisis. The creation of the g20 and its designation as ‘the premier forum for
international cooperation’ suggest that attention and priorities have moved away
from the traditional g7 focus on the transatlantic economy. But most of the key
policydebatesofthelasttwoyearshaveretainedacharacteristicallytransatlantic
ﬂavour. This applies to the controversy about the pace of consolidation which
resulted in an open uS-german rift at the Toronto summit in June 2010; to the
discussion on the new bank capital ratios which again was essentially a euro-
American aﬀair; and to the broader conversation on the priorities of ﬁnancial
regulatory reform, for which the big action agendas have been the uS Dodd-Frank
Actandtheeuropeanendorsementofablueprintforcoordinatedsupervisionand
asingleeuropeanmacroprudentialbody.True,otherissues–theglobalrebalanc-
ing, or the creation of global ﬁnancial safety nets – have had a distinctive g20
scope. But at least a fair share of the international debate has been transatlantic.
There are reasons for this state of aﬀairs. To start with, what is known as the
global crisis has been ﬁrst and foremost a transatlantic crisis. As discussed in
several contributions in this volume, the wake of the crisis ﬁnancial integration
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settingtheagendaforﬁnancialreform.Second,theproblemstheyarefacinginthe
aftermathoftheshock–thetravailsofdeleveraging,unemployment,theneedfor
unconventional policy responses, the lowering of the growth potential, the rise of
public debt, political pressures for protection – are largely common. Third, while
theyarenotthemaincontributorstoworldgrowth,theeuandtheuSstillconstitute
the bulk of the global economy, and what happens to them matters considerably
forall.
TheuSandtheeuhoweverarenotrespondingtothesameshockinthesame
way and this is what makes the comparison interesting. It is telling that the
sovereigndebtcrisesdevelopedineuropeintheﬁrsthalfof2010andtriggereda
move towards consolidation while the uS ﬁscal situation is by most standards
worsethantheaggregateeuropeansituation.Itistellingalsothattheprioritiesof
ﬁnancial reform have not been the same. Clearly neither the policy space nor the
policy traditions are identical and this portends signiﬁcant divergence across the
Atlantic. How far this divergence will go and whether policymakers on the two
continents will disagree or agree to disagree is one of the key questions for the
futureoftheglobaleconomyintheyearstocome.
Allthisjustiﬁesarevivalofthetransatlanticeconomicconversation.Thejoint
Banca d’Italia-Bruegel-Peterson Institute conference, held in rome on 10-11
September2009withthesupportoftheeuropeanCommission,aimedtocontribute
to the conversation through research and policy discussions. We hope that the












The opening lines of robert Kagan’s celebrated pamphlet on the relationship
between America and europe read as follows: ‘It is time to stop pretending that
europeans and Americans share a common view of the world, or even that they
occupy the same world’. He goes on to argue that ‘on major strategic and inter-
nationalquestionstoday,AmericansarefromMarsandeuropeansarefromVenus:
they agree on little and understand one another less and less. And this state of
aﬀairsisnottransitory–theproductofoneAmericanelectionoronecatastrophic
event’(Kagan2003,p3).greatincipit,butthatwas2003;subsequentevents,like
the global ﬁnancial and economic crisis of 2007-09 and the election of Barack
Obama,seemtohavebroughtAmericansandeuropeansbackonthesameplanet,
downtoearth.
In fact Americans and europeans have always belonged on the same planet,




belonged to one nation since 1776, while europeans belong to a diverse group of
much older sovereign nations, some of which have embarked only recently on a
1. Director general of the Banca d’Italia. I am grateful to Juan Carlos Martinez-Oliva for his valuable
contributiontothepreparationofthispaper.
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transatlantic dialogue has never been easy, but the Americans have been
historically the ﬁrst at trying to establish a cooperative framework with willing
european nations, sometimes to counter the hostility of other countries from the
same Continent. France was the ﬁrst european country to enjoy a ‘special
relationship’ with the American States in their early years as British colonies, and
later as an independent nation. French political thinkers such as Montesquieu




The transatlantic relationship remained somewhat in the background during
thenineteenthcentury,astheuSconsolidateditselfasanation:itwastheperiod
of ‘isolationism’ initiated by the Monroe Doctrine; of the Civil War; and of the
expansionoftheuSpresenceinthewesternhemisphere,whichculminatedatthe
endofthecenturywiththewaragainstSpain,overuSinﬂuenceoverCubaandlatin
America more generally. The uS paid increased attention to europe during the
twentieth century, well before the uS established a new special relationship with
anothereuropeancountry,theunitedKingdom,duringthesecondworldwar.Afew
examples may suﬃce to support the argument. When, after the 1907 banking
crisis,theuSdecidedtoestablishacentralbank,Congressconductedhearingswith
majoreuropeancentralbanksinordertodrawfromtheirexperienceinthedesign
of what became in 1913 the Federal reserve System4. After the ﬁrst world war,
President Wilson launched the league of Nations project which was a basis for
2. Tousethefelicitousdeﬁnitionofellis(2001).
3. Franklin was ‘commissioner’ and, subsequently Minister Plenipotentiary, to France from September
1776 to the end of 1784. During this period, he negotiated several treaties covering national defence,
tradeandthegrantingofﬁnancialassistancebyFrancetotheunitedStates.Franklinalsoestablished
excellent relationships with French scientists and philosophers, in particular with Voltaire (Franklin,
1990). Jeﬀerson was Franklin’s successor in Paris from 1785 to the end of 1789 and he greatly
contributed to fostering the French-American alliance and friendship. He even collaborated with the
Marquis de lafayette – one of his closest friends – in drafting the Declaration of rights submitted by
lafayettetotheNationalAssemblyinJuly1789intheearlydaysoftheFrenchrevolution(ellis,1996).




ﬁnancial system as solid as that of great Britain or France’ (as reported by the New York Times on 29
September1909).SubsequentlySenatorAldrichaskedCanovaitowritefortheMonetaryCommission
a report on the history of banking and credit in Italy (see Canovai, 1911). The report was part of the
backgroundmaterialtothe‘SuggestedPlanforMonetaryreform’preparedbySenatorAldrichin1911.
4 OCeANSAPArT
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framework,therewereanumberofinternationalinitiatives,suchasthemonetary
genoaConferencein1922,wheretheestablishmentofa‘gold-exchangestandard’
was ﬁrst discussed; the establishment in 1930 of the Bank for International
Settlements; and the london economic Conference of 1933, which tried un-
successfully to deal with the consequences of the great Crash. Throughout this
period, transatlantic cooperation among central banks was particularly intense,
building on the close personal relationships between Federal reserve President
Benjamin Strong; the governor of the Bank of england, Montagu Norman; the
governor of the Banque de France, emile Moreau; and even the President of the
reichsbank,HjalmarSchacht(Ahamed,2009).
With the outbreak of the second world war the extraordinary season of
international cooperation started, of which the Anglo-American alliance was the
pivot. The uS leadership is to be credited for providing a strong impulse toward
multilateral cooperation and institution-building. In fact, the close collaboration
betweentheuSandtheuKduringwartimewasthetriggerforabroaderframework
for international economic cooperation, which beneﬁted greatly from the strong
intellectual leadership of John Maynard Keynes and Harry Dexter White. Anglo-
Americancollaborationlaidthefoundationsforthepost-warworldmonetaryorder,
paving the way for the Bretton Woods conference of 1944 where 730 delegates
from44alliednationsgathered5.
TheMarshallPlanlaunchedattheendofthewar,providesfurtherevidenceof
the uS desire to extend the range of its post-war assistance beyond the uK, to
includeformerenemiessuchasgermanyandItaly.europewasindirestraits,and
therewerenosignsofrecovery.In1947,therealoutputofeuropeancountrieswas
still much below the corresponding level of the pre-war period. The situation was
made more severe by discriminatory practices and bilateral arrangements in
internationaltrade,alegacyoftheprotectionistpoliciesadoptedduringthe1930s
and during wartime. In turn, the scarcity of gold and dollars in european central
banks’reservesmadethereturntotradeliberalisationimpossible.georgeMarshall
understoodthatitwasintheinterestoftheuSto‘saveeurope’(Behrman,2007).
The Marshall Plan led to the creation of the Organisation for european economic
5. TheBrettonWoodsConferencewasthestartofanewcourseintransatlanticrelations,butsincetheuK
and the uS had strongly diﬀerent views on the functioning of the international monetary system, the
job of the two leading negotiators, Keynes and White, was far from easy. They had met in 1935 for
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ofeuropeanintegration.Theremovaloftradebarriersbetweeneuropeancountries,
and the creation of the european Payments union (ePu), a well-functioning






view of european political and economic integration. Washington believed, very
much along the same lines of the proponents of the Common Market, such as
Monnet, Schuman, Adenauer, Spaak and De gasperi, that european integration
wouldstrengthentheprospectsofworldpeace.Balanceofpaymentsdisequilibria
andexchange-rateissueswerenotamongthecorecompetencesoftheeeCatthat
time, and thus the monetary disturbances of the 1960s and 1970s did not aﬀect






Community launched a plan to remove internal-trade barriers to achieve a Single
Marketby1992,manyforeignprivatecompaniesfearedthateuropewouldeven-
tuallyerectexternalbarrierstokeepcompetitorsout.Suchananxietywaswidely









additional problems for transatlantic cooperation, both in terms of substance and
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the next phase of the dollar decline. It is now widely agreed that the euro will become a major global
currency, perhaps eventually challenging the dollar for global ﬁnancial supremacy. That historic
developmentwillentailalargeportfoliodiversiﬁcationfromdollarstoeuro[...].’
eventually posing a threat to the supremacy of the uS dollar as the key reserve
currencyoftheinternationalmonetarysystem7.Atthesametime,itemphasised,
in the eyes of some Americans, the peculiarity of a situation in which a group of
countries, which had adopted a single currency and created a common central
bank,stillpretendedtoberepresentedontheinternationalstagebytheirnational
governmentsandcentralbanks.Thequestionof‘toomanyeuropeansaroundthe
table’ thus made its debut in transatlantic relations. It has become all the more


















union for Foreign Aﬀairs and Security Policy. Indeed, since the adoption of the
MaastrichtTreatytherehasbeenagradualstrengtheningoftheeu’sforeign-policy
infrastructure at the level of the european Commission, which has been provided
withsigniﬁcantﬁnancialresourcestofostertheeu’sforeignpolicyobjectives.Itis
a fact, however, that eu attention in recent years has been concentrated on its








has, however, changed in nature: it had initially a strong institutional connotation
astheuSandmajoreuropeancountriesworkedtogethertostrengthentheroleof,
and the instruments at the disposal of, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to
prevent and manage crisis situations. With the collapse of the Bretton Woods
system, transatlantic cooperation became more pragmatic and conducted on an
ad-hoc basis in the context of various ‘groupings’ outside the IMF’s institutional
framework.
The institutions created at Bretton Woods greatly contributed to the phase of
stronggrowthandstabilitythateuropeexperiencedinthe1950s.Theirtransatlantic
characterwasunderscoredbytheagreement–informalbutstillinforce–thatthe
IMF would be headed by a european, and the World Bank by an American. In the
1960s, the emergence of the problem of uS external-payments imbalances
prompted a strong cooperative eﬀort that involved monetary authorities on both
sidesoftheAtlantic(seeJamesandMartinezOliva,2009).ThegoldrushofOctober




the main source of international liquidity8. President Kennedy understood the
politicalimplicationsofthechallengeandhecloselysupervisedtheimplementa-
tionoftheuSstrategyofdefendingthedollar’sstability.
International cooperation among monetary authorities involved the use of a
number of measures designed to underpin the stability of exchange rates and of
the gold price, and to strengthen the IMF’s ﬁnancial resources. To this end, in
October 1962, ten major industrial countries (plus Switzerland) extended credit
linestotheIMFforatotalamountof$6billion,underthegeneralArrangementsto
Borrow. The agreement established de facto a new cooperative group, the g10,
which came to play a major role in international monetary diplomacy. Within the
g10,euro-Americanleadershippromotedpolicy-orientedanalysesandproposals
forreformingandstrengtheningtheinternationalmonetarysystem.Atatechnical
level, negotiations took place among the g10 Deputies, a body comprising top-
8 OCeANSAPArT
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10.ApicturetakenattheendoftheWashingtonmeetingthatratiﬁedtheso-calledSmithsonianAgreement
on new exchange-rate parities shows a stern President Nixon, ﬂanked by a proud Treasury Secretary
JohnConnally,asmilingrinaldoOssola,Chairmanoftheg10Deputies,andarelaxedPaulVolcker,then
the uS g10 Deputy, in a cloud of cigar smoke. The picture is reproduced on the cover of a conference
bookcommemoratingrinaldoOssola(Kenen,Papadia,Saccomanni,eds.,1994).
ranking oﬃcials from member country ﬁnance ministries and central banks.
leading members of the g10 Deputies were robert roosa of the uS, Otmar
emmingerofgermany,JacquesdelarosièreofFranceandrinaldoOssolaofItaly.
Ossola, who later became Director general of the Bank of Italy, was appointed
chairmanoftheDeputiesin1967,keepingthatpositionuntil1976.
A pro-active approach to international monetary cooperation continued to be
adopted under the Johnson administration. The uS government was indeed very
activeandresoluteinpursuinginternationalmonetaryreform,andinkeepingthe
dialogue with europe alive, in an open and straightforward attempt to reach a
commonagreementonamultilateralsolution.Johnson’syearscanbeseenasthe
natural evolution of the early intuition of the Kennedy administration, that the
supportoftheeuropeancountrieswithstrongbalance-of-paymentssurpluseshad




reserves and exchanges for the whole world is too much for one country and one
currency to bear’9. After proposals were elaborated by a g10 Study group on the
Creation of reserve Assets, under the Chairmanship of Ossola, the IMF governors
approvedin1969theintroductionofanewreserveasset,theSpecialDrawingright
(SDr). The creationof the SDr, whichcame too late to preventthe collapse of the
Bretton Woods system, represents the most courageous attempt to bring under
multilateral control the process of creation of international liquidity, as originally
envisagedbyKeynes.




in November and in Washington10 in December of that year. The negotiations to
rebuildanewmonetarysystemfromtheashesofBrettonWoodstookmuchlonger.
Thetaskwasentrusted,inJuly1972,toanewly-createdgroup,theCommitteeof
Twenty (C20), chaired, at a technical level, by Sir Jeremy Morse of the uK and
OCeANSAPArT 9




Already in April 1973, the uS Treasury Secretary, george Schultz, began
conductinginformaltalksintheWhiteHouselibrarywithhiscounterpartsfromthe
uK, germany and France. This so-called library group eventually was enlarged to
include Japan, and became a forum for discussing such topics as the persistent
weaknessofthedollar,the1974oilcrisisandthefailuretoreachagreementonthe
monetary-reform negotiations. When two former members of the library group
(Valerygiscardd’estaingofFranceandHelmutSchmidtofgermany)becamehead
ofgovernmentintheircountries,theideaofasummitmeetingrestrictedtoasmall
group of ‘like-minded’ countries to settle pending economic and monetary issues
tookshape.Francehosteditinrambouilleton15November1975,includingItaly
among the invitees. The meeting paved the way for the conclusion of the
negotiationsontheamendmentoftheIMFArticlesofAgreement,inJanuary1976
in Jamaica. Canada joined later at the insistence of the uS: the g7 was born. With
thecreationoftheg7aneraofvariable‘summitry’began,whichcontinuestothis
day. In parallel, international monetary cooperation gradually lost its institutional
characterandbecameincreasinglyinformal,pragmaticandadhoc.
The last attempt to deal with the structural deﬁciencies of the international
monetarysysteminaninstitutionalcontextwasthenegotiationin1978-80ofan
agreement to endow the IMF with a Substitution Account (SA), to replace excess
foreign-exchange reserves denominated in uS dollars with newly created SDrs
(MicossiandSaccomanni,1981).Theproposal,whichhadinitiallyreceivedstrong
support on both sides of the Atlantic, eventually failed to gain the necessary
consensusamongthebroadIMFmembership,particularlyfromemergingandoil-
producingcountries.TheuSﬁnancialindustryalsoexpressedstrongreservations.
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supportedbyconsistentmonetaryandﬁscalpolicymeasures.Asecondexample
is the reform of theinternationalﬁnancial architecture launchedby the g7 in the
aftermathoftheemergingcountriesdebtcrisesof1994-98.Americanandeuropean
leaderships combined at the 1999 g7 Summit in Cologne to produce a
comprehensive set of measures to strengthen ﬁnancial systems in emerging
countries.Thereformwassupportedbythecreationoftwocooperativebodies,the




are emblematic of the nature of the europe-uS relationship. The ﬁrst is the joint
interventionbytheFederalreserveandtheeuropeanCentralBank(eCB)tosupport












The conclusion that can be drawn from my brief historical survey is that trans-
atlantic cooperation has had a great past, particularly in dealing with crises. But
does it have any future? The question is particularly relevant if one looks beyond
the near term, which will be devoted to the implementation of the crisis-
management strategy agreed on by the g20, again under strong American-
european leadership. In the longer run, however, there is a risk that the uS may
reconsidertheusefulnessofthetransatlanticpartnershipandpaymoreattention
tocooperationwithChina,India,Brazil,andtoemergingcountriesinsouth-eastAsia
or latin America more generally. Some observers also have mentioned the
possibilitythatinthefutureag2,includingtheuSandChina,willbecometheonly
relevantinternationalcooperationforum11.Thisscenariomayappealtothemedia,
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buttherealityoftheglobaleconomicsystemismuchmorecomplicated.
The agenda in front of policy-makers today is daunting: promoting a sustain-
able economic recovery to revive growth of output, jobs and trade; strengthening
the world’s ﬁnancial system and its regulatory framework; adjusting global
paymentsimbalances.unfortunatelytheseagendaitemscannotbeaddressedin
sequence, or within a relatively long time span, because they are closely inter-
related. Insuﬃcient progress in achieving the ﬁrst two objectives may trigger a
disorderlyadjustmentofglobalpaymentsimbalances,withnegativerepercussions
forgrowthprospectsandformonetaryandﬁnancialstability.Inturn,awideningof




adjustments or reserve diversiﬁcation is bound to have implications for the
european economy and for the euro, and would require the involvement of the
eurosystem.Obviously,theuSandChinahavemanybilateralissuesandinterests
todiscuss,buttheirdialogueneednotbeattheexpenseofcooperationinbroader
multilateral forums. At the same time, past experience shows that it will require a





cooperation. After having tried all manner of informal, pragmatic, cooperative
arrangements, in an endless string of ‘g’ formations, the international community
seems to have gone full-circle to the long-neglected safe haven of the IMF. This is
not surprising: informal groupings cannot deal with ﬁnancial emergencies unless
they have an institutional arm with adequate instruments and resources. The
decisiontakenbytheg20inlondoninApril2009toendowtheIMFwithadditional
resourcesamountingto$1.1trillion(includingaverysigniﬁcantnewallocationof
SDr), under the leadership of the uK Chair of the g20, gordon Brown, provided a
much needed relief to seriously-strained ﬁnancial markets. The enlargement and
theformalisationoftheroleoftheFSF(anditsrenamingastheFinancialStability
Board), and the agreement about the division of labour between the IMF and the
FSB, were also welcome signs of a return to more balanced and transparent
12 OCeANSAPArT
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internationalcooperationprocedures.TheuS,eucountriesandthemajoremerging
economies (China, India, Brazil) are actively collaborating in negotiations to








As uS vice-president Joe Biden recently put it: ‘America will do more – that's the
goodnews.ThebadnewsisAmericawillaskformorefromourpartners’12.Itcould
be argued that the uS and the eu could each contribute something valuable to a
transatlanticpartnership.TheuShasastrongcultureofgrowth,withanemphasis
onsupportinginvestment,innovation,competitioninfreemarkets.Theeuhasan
equally strong culture of stability, with an emphasis on sound macropolicies and
eﬀectivemarketregulation,andattentionkeenlypaidtosocialsecurity.Thecurrent
crisis may provide an opportunity for redeﬁning the optimum mix of growth and






uS have shared interests. This may imply for the uS an eﬀort to extend its ‘soft
power’capabilitiesandforeuropetoreinforceits‘hardpower’resources(Nye,2006).




ﬁnancial resources to the world is proportionate to the size of the transatlantic
economy,anareawithapopulationofmorethan800millionandagrossproduct
that exceeds ᾬ25 trillion, nearly 60 percent of world output. In 2008, eu and uS
importsfromtherestoftheworldamountedtoᾬ1.6andᾬ1.2trillionrespectively,
almost 35 percent of global trade. The eu and the uS are also each other’s main
OCeANSAPArT 13
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world FDI activity between 2000 and 2008. In the same period, 31 percent of eu
investmentﬂowsweredirectedtotheuS,equivalenttomorethan58percentoftotal












of access within the rules of an open multilateral trading system and reasonable
protectionagainstﬁnancialinstabilityandexchange-ratevolatility.Thequestionof
monetaryandﬁnancialstabilityisofparticularrelevanceforAsiancountries.Since
2000, members of the Association of South east Asian Nations (ASeAN) have
cooperated with Japan, China and Korea under the so called Chiang Mai Initiative
(CMI) to promote regional ﬁnancial cooperation with the objective of achieving
currencyandﬁnancialstabilityandstableeconomicgrowth.TheCMIkeyﬁnancial
instrument is a network of bilateral-swap arrangements between member central
banks totalling $120 billion14. The CMI obviously draws from the experience of
regional cooperation in europe through the european Monetary System. More
recently, the governor of the People’s Bank of China has advocated an increased
role of the SDr in the international monetary system, with the aim of creating ‘an
internationalreservecurrencythatisdisconnectedfromindividualnationsandis
able to remain stable in the long run, thus removing the inherent deﬁciencies
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international monetary and ﬁnancial system back on the IMF’s agenda. In this
context, it is evident that the uS and the eurosystem will be directly involved in
shapinganynewarrangementthatwillhaveanimpactontheroleofthedollarand
the euro. The transatlantic partnership could provide a unique contribution to the
debate, based on the partners' shared experience in international monetary
cooperationsinceBrettonWoods.
Iseuropereadytomeettherequirementsofanewtransatlanticpartnership?
The answer, based on past experience, is uncertain. The eu has been too pre-
occupiedwithitsowninternalaﬀairs–political,economic,socialandinstitutional
–tobeabletoplayasigniﬁcantroleonaglobalscale.Ofcourse,theeucandothat
in some areas: trade, competition, monetary policy. But what is missing is a









In antiquity, Ovid, a roman poet, described an impossible love aﬀair with the
immortal words: ‘nec tecum, nec sine te vivere possum’ (neither with you, nor
without you, can I live). This need not be the fate of the transatlantic relationship.
TheuSandeuropeshouldbeabletolivetogether.Thereseemtobenofundamental
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sector linkages – in particular, the exposures of highly-leveraged ﬁnancial
institutionsineuropeandtheuStoprivately-issuedasset-backedsecurities(ABS)
backed by subprime mortgages. Financial-sector linkages were also crucial in
subsequent phases of the crisis – for example, emerging markets were severely
aﬀected by the process of deleveraging of ﬁnancial institutions in advanced
economies, which was triggered by the need to reduce the size of their balance
sheets.Bythesecondhalfof2008,theﬁnancialcrisishadspreadwithparticular
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oftheﬁnancialcrisisanditsimplicationsforexchangerates.Itstartsbyreviewing
the evolution and structure of cross-border borrowing and lending in the period
precedingthecrisis.Itfocusesinparticularonthesizeofcross-borderexposures,
their economic type and sectoral aspects, highlighting key diﬀerences between
advanced economies and emerging markets. These aspects help clarify the
subsequent denouement of the crisis. In particular, they help understand why
certain countries were more aﬀected than others and help identify the factors
driving the sizable exchange-rate changes that took place over the past year. We
conclude with a brief discussion of a few ‘lessons’ to be learnt from the crisis,





capital ﬂows, particularly among advanced economies. We discuss brieﬂy some
salientfeaturesofthesephenomena.
A.globalimbalances
While there is a very extensive literature analysing causes and consequences of
global imbalances, as well as possible adjustment scenarios, accounts of im-
balancesareoftensimplistic(uSvChina).AsarguedinBlanchardandMilesi-Ferretti
(2009),imbalanceswentthroughseveralphaseswithdiﬀerentdrivingforces:while
a large uS deﬁcit was a common element, its relative importance as well as its
counterpartschangedovertime(Figure1).
During the ﬁrst phase (1996 to 2000), imbalances were characterised by a
widening current account deﬁcit in the uS, driven by an investment boom and
surplusesinemergingAsiaandJapan,andbysharply-declininginvestmentrates.
Flows into the uS primarily took the form of FDI and portfolio equity investment.
From2001-04,theuSdeﬁcitcontinuedtowiden,driventhistimebyasharpdecline
indomesticsaving,withaﬁvepercentofgDPincreaseinﬁscalimbalanceplaying
a key role. Its surplus counterparts included not only Asian countries, but also oil
exporters and a number of countries in central and northern europe, including
germany. The ﬁnancing of the uS deﬁcit was primarily in the form of foreign
purchasesofuSbonds,withforeignoﬃcialinstitutionsplayinganimportantrole.
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Finally, during the ‘boom and bust’ phase of 2005-08 the composition of im-
balances changed once again. The uS deﬁcit declined but remained large, with a
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internationalinvestmentposition.Hereeuro-areacountriesareconsideredseparately.
dollar and disruptions to economic activity worldwide, potentially ampliﬁed by a
riseinprotectionistsentiment.
The current ﬁnancial crisis developed diﬀerently. As discussed in the next
sections,itinitiallypropagatedthroughgrossexposurestoparticularsegmentsof


















than ﬂows2. It shows that, for advanced economies, cross-border holdings
increased in all asset and liability categories. By the end of 2007, both external
assets and external liabilities exceeded 220 percent of the gDP of advanced
economies,twicetheratioofadecadeearlier.Intermsofportfoliocomposition,the




claims and liabilities of BIS-reporting banks almost tripled in uS-dollar terms
between the end of 2001 and the end of 2007. In both absolute terms and in
relationtotheeachregion’sgDP,bankpositionswithineuropeweredominant,while
20 OCeANSAPArT
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table1:internationalclaimsandliabilitiesofBiS-reportingbanksvis-￠-visspeciﬁc
regions(locationalbankingdata,2001and2007)
Bankclaims Bankliabilities Bankclaims Bankliabilities
2001 2001 2007 2007
uS$billions
Allcountries 11,364 10,115 32,840 28,284
DevelopedCountries 10,512 9,065 30,336 25,695
i) europe 5,902 4,628 19,269 15,291
ii) Other 3,138 2,413 6,998 5,213
iii) Oﬀshorecentres 1,472 2,024 4,070 5,191
emerginganddeveloping 851 1,049 2,504 2,589
countries
i) Africa 56 60 100 184
ii) Middleeast 106 283 361 689
iii) Asia&Paciﬁc 267 349 831 859
iv) europe 138 110 809 474
v) latinAmerica/Caribbean 285 247 404 383
ratioofregion’sgDP
Allcountries 36% 32% 60% 52%
DevelopedCountries 44% 38% 81% 69%
i) europe 69% 54% 116% 92%
ii) Other 20% 16% 34% 25%
emerginganddeveloping 11% 14% 15% 15%
countries
i) Africa 17% 18% 12% 21%
ii) Middleeast 13% 34% 21% 39%
iii) Asia&Paciﬁc 8% 11% 11% 11%
iv) europe 14% 11% 24% 14%
v) latinAmerica/Caribbean 14% 12% 11% 11%
reported data are claims and liabilities of BIS-reporting banks on a locational basis vis-￠-vis the
variousregions.Source:BankforInternationalSettlements.





cross-border bank assets and liabilities increased much more slowly – and are
much less important in absolute terms – in other advanced economies3. For
advanced economies as a whole, more than half of the increase in external-debt
assets and liabilities over the past decade is explained by the actions of banks.
The increased international role of banks is not fully captured by these
statistics, which are based on the residence principle4. In recent years, banks
expanded their international activity not just through cross-border borrowing and
lending, but also by setting up overseas aﬃliates and branches that would often
fund themselves on local markets. And european banks played a particularly
importantroleinthisrespect.Thistypeofinternationalbankingactivityiscaptured
by balance of payments statistics only to the extent that the aﬃliates fund
themselves on international markets. exposures related to this type of banking
activity played an important role in the transmission of the crisis, as discussed
furtherbelow.
Foremergingmarkets(alsoFigure3)totalcross-borderholdingsincreasedtoo,
but both the pace of the increase and the overall size of cross-border exposure
remained much smaller. For example, total external liabilities increased from 70
percentofgDPin1998to88percentofgDPin2007fortheaggregateofemerging
markets,whileexternalassetsincreasedfrom57percentofgDPto88percentof
gDP. But the most-striking diﬀerence is in terms of portfolio composition: for
emerging markets, capital ﬂows took increasingly the form of FDI and portfolio
equity investment, particularly on the inﬂows side, with a much-reduced role for
external debt liabilities. Indeed, between 1998 and 2007 total debt liabilities fell
from47to34percentofgDP.Thestabilityofdebtassetsandliabilitiesasashare
ofgDPisduetotheincreaseofforeign-exchangereservesontheassetsideofthe
balance sheet. Figure 4 shows how the net external-debt position improved
signiﬁcantly in latin America and especially emerging Asia, where hefty reserve
accumulationimpliesalargenetcreditorpositionindebtinstruments.Incontrast,
the net position in foreign direct investment and portfolio equity became much
morenegative(especiallyintheemergingeconomiesofeurope).
One key implication of the change in the structure of external liabilities in
emerging markets (as well as of the improvement in their net external position,
particularly in Asia and latin America) has been a reduction in their exposure to
24 OCeANSAPArT
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Figure4:emergingmarkets:externalportfoliostructure(%gDP)
Source:laneandMilesi-Ferretti,externalWealthofNationsdataset.
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foreign currencies. external debt liabilities, which declined, are typically denomi-
natedinforeigncurrency,whileFDIandportfolioequityliabilities,whichincreased,
are denominated in domestic currency. This change plays an important role in
explaining the eﬀects of the crisis on balance sheets in emerging markets, as
discussed in section D. exposure to BIS-reporting banks increased rapidly in
emerging europe (Table 1), while it remained low in relation to the region’s gDP in
bothAsiaandlatinAmerica.Thisisnotsosurprisinginviewofthereductioninthe
levelofexternaldebt.Banksfromadvancedeconomiesincreasedsigniﬁcantlytheir
presence in emerging markets during this period, but this was achieved primarily
byraisingfundslocally.
external vulnerabilities are, of course, not only aﬀected by the portfolio
structure, but also by the overall external position. Table 2 provides a regional
summaryofcurrent-accountbalancesandnetforeign-assetpositionsinemerging
marketsattheendof2007–theyearbeforethecrisis.regionaldiﬀerenceswere
substantial, with countries in emerging europe characterised by larger current-
accountdeﬁcitsandnetexternalliabilitiesthancountriesinotherregions.
table2:emergingmarkets:externalpositionandcurrentaccountbalances,2007
Asia latinAmerica emerging middleeast&
europe northAfrica
MedianCAbalance 1.8% -0.8% -7.4% 2.8%
MedianNFAposition -24.3% -33.6% -50.1% 25.0%
Numberofcountrieswith
CAdeﬁcit<-5%ofgDP 37 15 7
Numberofcountrieswith
NFA<-50%ofgDP 33 10 5
Totalnumberofcountries 21 21 20 25
Source: IMF statistics, national sources, and lane and Milesi-Ferretti, external Wealth of Nations
dataset.







net foreign purchases of uS bonds, the most important source of uS current-
account deﬁcit ﬁnancing over the past decade. Purchases of corporate bonds,
which include privately-issued ABS, had played a very important role in previous
years, but virtually dried up in the third quarter of 2007 and have not recovered
since. The decline in the demand for privately-issued uS corporate securities,
togetherwiththereductioninuSshort-terminterestratesbytheFederalreserve,
led to a weakening of the uS dollar, which by March 2008 was close to a 40-year
lowinrealeﬀectiveterms(Figure6).
Table 3 helps to explain the initial international transmission of the crisis. It
highlights that while total holdings of uS debt securities on the eve of the crisis
(June2007)wereparticularlyhighinChinaandJapan,holdingsofprivately-issued
mortgage-backed securities were instead concentrated in advanced economies
andoﬀshorecentres.Amongadvancedeconomies,thelargestholderswereFrance,
germany, Switzerland, and the uK, and banking centres such as Belgium and
Ireland5. Hence a portfolio shock which reduced the value of claims on the uS (in
principle not dissimilar to the ones considered in scenarios featuring a sudden
adjustmentinglobalimbalances)haddiﬀerentcross-borderimplicationstothose





5. Of course the actual exposures of banks domiciled in these countries could have been larger to the
extent that their aﬃliates in the uS or in oﬀshore centres were holders of these securities. For a
discussionofforeignexposurestouS-issuedABS,seeBeltranetal(2008).
6. Scenariosfeaturingadisruptiveunwindingofglobalimbalancesweretypicallycharacterisedbyadecline
in demand for uS portfolio instruments and a large dollar depreciation (Faruqee et al, 2007, lane and
Milesi-Ferretti, 2007), with stronger spillover eﬀects for countries ‘long’ in dollars (such as China and
Japan)ratherthanforeurope.
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table3:ForeignholdingsofUSbonds(inbillionsofUS$)
June302008 June302007
total treas. Agency Corpor. Corp. total treas. Agency Corpor. Corp.
bonds mBS bonds mBS
Total 7352 2589 1637 3126 458 6642 2194 1413 3035 594
Advanced 3646 1032 514 2100 234 3508 963 508 2037 350
Oﬀshore 810 115 107 587 196 762 85 111 566 204
emergingand
developing 2897 1442 1016 438 28 2373 1147 794 432 40
China 1106 535 544 27 6 894 477 387 29 9
Japan 1052 628 272 152 16 976 622 231 123 17
Korea 123 41 60 23 2 133 44 70 19 2
HongKong 118 65 31 22 9 107 57 24 26 15
Singapore 67 32 8 27 2 67 36 5 26 3
CaymanIslands 515 45 51 419 164 461 29 56 376 157
unitedKingdom 488 52 30 406 46 500 48 28 424 90
luxembourg 466 103 32 331 22 469 56 42 371 39
Belgium 436 15 25 395 11 372 15 33 323 19
Ireland 325 20 35 270 28 261 16 30 215 33
Switzerland 152 46 19 88 12 155 40 18 97 20
germany 176 52 12 112 31 166 46 15 105 33
Netherlands 123 18 18 88 21 136 17 24 96 32
France 89 16 19 55 24 90 17 11 62 31
Italy 16 11 320 24 14 462
Spain 21 92 10 0 16 6280
russia 223 95 127 0…147 34 114 0…
Mexico 115 41 38 36 0 89 34 33 22 0
Middleeastoil
exporters 251 140 65 46 5 169 111 34 24 4
Note:ThetablereportatotalforeignholdingsofuSlong-termbondsasofJune30,2008andJune30,
2007.Theseholdingsaredividedintothreecategories:Treasurybonds,bondsissuedbyuSfederal
agencies such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac; and corporate bonds. The table also provides the
amount of corporate bonds that are mortgage-backed securities (MBS). Source: uS Treasury, 2007
and2008SurveysofuSPortfolioliabilities.
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been the ultimate owners of some of these securities, ﬁnancial institutions
fromotheradvancedeconomieswerealsoexposed,throughtheirconduitsand
structuredinvestmentvehicles(SIVs).
2. Foreign banking systems had exposure to the uS mortgage market through
their‘local’uSactivitiesaswell.AsofJune2007,uSaﬃliatesofforeignbanks
had $3.66 trillion in dollar claims on uS residents, of which $3.2 trillion were
claims of aﬃliates of european banks. Swiss banks had the largest local
exposure (close to $1 trillion) followed by British, French and Dutch banks.
3. Finally, these data do not include exposures (or hedges) through derivatives
contracts–again,animportantfactorinthecrisis.
As has been already documented in the literature on the ﬁnancial crisis, initial




2009). Conduits (and to a lesser extent SIVs) ﬁnanced ABS holdings through





much smaller than those associated with, say, a stock-market decline, their con-
centrationinhighly-leveragedinstitutionsgraduallysetintrainaprocessofasset







increasingly evident, with signs of slowing or declining activity across the globe.
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programmes. The deleveraging process was associated with sharp depreciations
of most ﬂoating emerging-market currencies, with the selling by banking institu-
tionscompoundedbyhedgefundsreducingthesizeoftheirbalancesheetstomeet
redemptions. As shown in the top panel of Figure 9, foreigners were net sellers of
portfolioinstrumentsparticularlyinthefourthquarterof2008,andtherewasanet





• unprecedented deleveraging by ﬁnancial-market institutions and other
ﬁnancialintermediaries;








second factor, described in more detail by Mcguire and von Peter (2009), was a
‘dollarshortage’inthebankingsystem.Thecauseofthisshortagewasalludedtoin
the previous section. Non-uS ﬁnancial institutions had ﬁnanced their holdings of
uS asset-backed securities (directly or indirectly through their conduits and SIV)
through issuance of short-term dollar-denominated asset-backed commercial
paper.Thissourceoffundingdriedup,bothbecauseofconcernsaboutthesolvency
of the banks and the run on money-market funds, traditional holders of ABCP,
followingthelehmanbankruptcyandthenewsthatthereservePrimarymoney-





















2005Q1 2005Q3 2006Q1 2006Q3 2007Q1 2007Q3 2008Q1 2008Q3 2009Q1
FDI Portfolio Banks Other Total inﬂows
Capitalinﬂows, main advanced economies
Figure7:thecollapseincapitalﬂows–advancedeconomies(US$billions)
Source:IMF,BalanceofPaymentsStatistics.
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advanced economies led to a sudden stop in capital inﬂows, with net sales of






recovery. The prices of risky assets have rebounded, and in foreign-exchange
marketsthedramaticexchange-ratechangesthattookplacebetweentheautumn
of2008andMarch2009havebeenmostlyunwound,withtheuSdollardepreciat-
ing and most ﬂoating emerging-market currencies appreciating strongly (Figure
14). It is still too early to tell whether the global recovery will be sustained or
whether it is primarily driven by temporary factors such as sharply-expansionary
ﬁscal policies and the end of the process of de-stocking. But in any case, the
consequencesofthecrisiswillbelonglasting,intermsofitseﬀectontheeconomy
and the structure of the ﬁnancial system, and in terms of how economic thinking
willbeshapedinyearstocome.Thenextsectionturnstoaselectedsetofthemes





2009). The literature’s major emphasis is on the factors that caused the ﬁnancial
excesses and helped create the balance sheet vulnerabilities that the crisis has
brought so dramatically into the spotlight. Among these factors are, for example,
thearchitectureandscopeofdomesticﬁnancialregulation;theappropriatemech-
anismsforcross-borderﬁnancialsupervision;andtheconductofmonetarypolicy
in the presence of asset-price bubbles7. The aim of this section is more modest.
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Namely,itfocusesonalimitedrangeoftopics,primarilyrelatedtoexternalstability
and vulnerability to external shocks. At least some of these lessons are not new:
somefeaturedprominentlyinthedebateonemerging-marketcrisesadecadeago.
Indeed, this ﬁnancial crisis has shown that macroeconomic and ﬁnancial
weaknesses and exposures that were considered potential sources of external
vulnerability for emerging markets could become sources of vulnerability for
advancedeconomiesaswell8.
D.Theimportanceofsectoralexposures
A key factor in explaining the severity of the domestic and international reper-
cussions of the ﬁnancial-market shock was the sectoral exposure to losses. This
lessonisnotnew:theAsiancrisisprovidedcompellingevidenceoftheimportance
ofbalance-sheetlinkagesandcurrencymismatcheswhentherearelargechanges
in exchange rates and asset prices. Sectoral exposures played a key role in the
initial transmission of the crisis to countries whose ﬁnancial institutions were
exposedtoasset-backedsecurities.Moregenerally,theconcentrationofexposure
– and initial losses – in the highly-leveraged ﬁnancial sector led to much more
severemultipliereﬀects.Amongemergingmarkets,severalcountriesincentraland







There is no theoretical presumption that current-account deﬁcits and surpluses,
even if large, are necessarily bad. Indeed, capital should ﬂow to where it has the
highestrisk-adjustedreturn.Butthereareanumberofreasonswhylargecurrent-
account imbalances may also reﬂect a variety of domestic and international
problems and distortions. And it is remarkable to observe that virtually all crises
triggered by the world ﬁnancial turmoil happened in countries that were running
high current-account deﬁcits and had high external liabilities (Table 4). More
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inoutputgrowthratesandespeciallyindomestic-demandgrowthduring2008-09
waslargerincountriesthathadlargeexternalimbalances(laneandMilesi-Ferretti,
2010b). The boom period of easy credit was associated with a dramatic com-
pressioninspreads,asmarketstookaverybenignviewofexternalvulnerabilities.





imbalances and the risks an abrupt unwinding of such imbalances could pose to
the world economy. The crisis was not triggered by a run on the uS dollar and a
disorderly unwinding of global imbalances, one of the scenarios that had worried
policymakers and the IMF, but by failures within the ﬁnancial system, with a
cascading impact on underlying macroeconomic and ﬁnancial weaknesses. Still,
global imbalances clearly reﬂected ‘ﬁnancial excesses’ related to these failures
(such as low levels of private savings reﬂecting easy credit and booms in asset
prices,orhighresidentialinvestmentfueledbyinﬂatedhouseprices)andanumber
ofotherdistortions(fromexport-ledgrowthstrategiesrelyingondepreciatedreal
exchange rates to the globally-ineﬃcient accumulation of reserves for insurance
purposes).Andtheconcernsandpolicyrecommendationstoeasetheirunwinding
were justiﬁed (Blanchard and Milesi-Ferretti, 2009; Obstfeld and rogoﬀ, 2009). If
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table5:Changeingrowthrates:2008-2009v2005-2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependentvariable Change Change Change Changein Changein Changein
ingDP ingDP ingDP demand demand demand
growth growth growth growth growth growth
Sample All excl.oil excl.low All excl.oil excl.low
countries export. income countries export. income
gDPgrowth2005-07 -0.77*** -0.87*** -0.89***
(relativetolTgrowth) [0.12] [0.15] [0.15]
Totaldemandgrowth -0.80*** -0.95*** -0.81***
2005-07(relativeto [0.09] [0.10] [0.12]
lTdemandgrowth)
loggDPpercapita,2007 -1.23*** -1.48*** -1.56*** -1.77*** -2.05*** -1.91***
[0.25] [0.27] [0.42] [0.38] [0.37] [0.66]
CA/gDP,2007 0.05** 0.05* 0.05* 0.24*** 0.25*** 0.29***
[0.02] [0.03] [0.03] [0.05] [0.05] [0.06]
Tradeopenness -2.06*** -2.38*** -2.36*** -1.97** -2.57*** -1.87*
[0.58] [0.60] [0.68] [0.86] [0.83] [1.06]
logFinancialopenness 1.21** 1.56*** 1.75*** 1.91** 2.48*** 1.82*
[0.52] [0.56] [0.67] [0.79] [0.78] [1.10]
Shareofmanufacturing -0.09** -0.06 -0.06 -0.12** -0.05 -0.11
ingDP [0.04] [0.04] [0.05] [0.06] [0.06] [0.07]
Changeinpriv.credit -4.74*** -4.76*** -5.17*** -9.10*** -9.12*** -7.80***
togDP,2004-2007 [1.51] [1.55] [1.69] [2.39] [2.33] [2.90]
Oildummy -0.27 0.47 -1.39 -2.93
[0.90] [1.12] [1.43] [1.98]
Constant 10.74*** 12.65*** 13.25*** 15.98*** 17.69*** 16.92***
[1.99] [2.13] [3.62] [2.91] [2.88] [5.80]
Observations 146 126 112 130 112 96
r-squared 0.46 0.47 0.43 0.55 0.60 0.53
Note: Standard errors in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable is the
diﬀerenceintheaveragegrowthratebetween2008-9and2005-7(gDPgrowthforcolumns(1)-(3)
and total demand growth for columns (4)-(6)). The regressions in column (2) and (5) exclude oil
exporters,andcolumns(3)and(6)excludelow-incomecountries(deﬁnedashavingagDPpercapita
below$1000in2007).






on external accounts in the past because of balance-sheet eﬀects. even though
economic activity suﬀered, these economies were much more resilient this time,
especiallyconsideringtheextentoftheglobalrecession.Thechangesinportfolio






crises with the same eﬀects in 2008. While the ratio of external liabilities to gDP





Conversely, the aftermath of the crisis has further underscored the diﬃculty
and cost of closing current-account deﬁcits and unwinding appreciations caused
by(ex-post)unsustainablecreditboomsunderﬁxedexchange-ratearrangements
and particularly when inﬂation in trading partners is very low. The wrenching
recession in Baltic countries illustrates this point very starkly. A key policy issue
will be how to control booms – and contain current-account deﬁcits – when
monetary policy is tied to the mast. While an obvious policy lever is ﬁscal policy,
one potentially signiﬁcant problem, further discussed below, is that credit booms
tend to ﬂatter ﬁscal accounts. under these circumstances, countries may have
political diﬃculties running very large ﬁscal surpluses even if these were struc-
turally justiﬁed. The crisis suggests that countries susceptible to large capital
inﬂows and credit booms should consider a variety of macro-prudential and
regulatory tools to discourage excessive risk-taking and control foreign-currency
borrowing.
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uS – are prime examples of how declining asset prices can have very signiﬁcant
eﬀectsonpublicrevenues,wellabovethetraditionalcyclicaleﬀectsofautomatic









of the ﬁnancial bailouts, help explain the much-diminished outlook for public
ﬁnancesinseveraladvancedeconomies.
H.globalﬁnancialarchitecture





sudden stops in capital ﬂows through no fault of their own. reforms of the







resources, as well as the design of contingent mechanisms such as the Flexible
Creditline(FCl),arestepsintherightdirection,butofcoursetheydonotaddupto
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of stigma, and governance concerns, still make countries reluctant to access IMF
credit lines. Other cross-border insurance mechanisms, such as regional-reserve
poolingandreserve-swaparrangementscanalsoplayarole,butwillgenerallyhave
only a limited reach (see, for example, Mateos y lago et al (2009) for a more
comprehensive discussion of alternative options to reduce demand for reserves,
including private-sector insurance, and a discussion of the potential role of the
SDr).
unansweredquestionsremainalsoontheendogenousevolutionofthecurrent
system –namely, if demand for alternative reserve currencies will increase after
thecrisis.Ontheonehand,thefactthattheuSwastheepicentreofthecrisiswould
suggest some erosion of the role of the uS dollar as the main reserve currency, a
thesisconsistentwiththesteadydollardeclinebetweentheonsetofthesub-prime
crisisinAugust2007andthemiddleof2008.Ontheotherhand,duringthemost
acute phase of the ﬁnancial panic at the end of 2008 and early 2009 the dollar
reboundedstronglyonsafe-havenbuying.Onbalance,though,itishardtoescape
the notion that, in many emerging markets, the crisis – as well as their already
signiﬁcant holdings of traditional reserve assets – may encourage them to seek




past decade to the international transmission of the ﬁnancial crisis. Higher
international ﬁnancial integration broadens the scope for the cross-border
transmissionofshocks,asexempliﬁedbythedramaticimpactofthecrisisonlarge
ﬁnancial institutionsin advanced economies.But at the same time the change in
the structure of external balance sheets for many emerging markets has actually
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theasymmetriesinexchange-ratedynamicsbetweenﬂoating-ratecurrenciesand
those that are pegged to or follow closely the dollar (see again Figure 14). For
advanced economies, whose ﬁnancial balance sheets had expanded both
domestically and internationally to a much larger extent, a rapid return to the
volumeofcapitalﬂowsseenin2005-07seemsunlikely.Whileﬂowsfromadvanced
economies to emerging markets have resumed, capital ﬂows were dominated by
cross-border asset trade among advanced economies, with large ﬁnancial
institutions playing a particularly important role. With these institutions still
repairing their balance sheets, cross-border bank ﬂows could remain weak for a
while.
Withregardtonetﬂows,imbalancesnarrowedsubstantiallyin2009,reﬂecting






of potential output. To the extent that the crisis is associated with a permanent
outputloss–relativetothepre-crisistrend–incountriesthatwereexperiencing
creditboomsandrunninglargecurrent-accountdeﬁcits,imbalanceswillnarrowas
the imports of these countries are going to be lower than previously expected. At
the same time, however, several advanced economies with large current-account
deﬁcits are projected to experience very protracted declines in net public saving,
which will be particularly stark when compared to emerging-market creditor
countries.Finally,riskpremiumsoncross-borderborrowingarelikelytobehigher




among the main economic areas are still projected to widen. And even more
importantly,withdomesticdemandlikelytoremainweakintheuSandotherdeﬁcit
countries dealing with the aftermath of asset-price bubbles, the strength of the
globalrecoverywilldependcruciallyonasustainedincreaseindomesticdemand
elsewhere, and countries with surpluses have an important role to play in this
respect. given the pivotal importance of a sustained recovery and in light of the
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underlying macroeconomic and ﬁnancial fragilities in virtually all advanced
economies and several emerging and developing countries, addressing the well-
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do not necessarily reﬂect the position of the Federal reserve Bank of New York, the Federal reserve
System,oranyotherinstitutiontowhichtheauthorisaﬃliated.
gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti’s paper is detailed and insightful, as we have come to
expect from this author. There is much to agree with, and much to think about. In
this comment I echo some of main points emphasised in the paper, and brieﬂy
elaborateonthem.
In general terms, the recurrent theme of the paper is that, despite its very
speciﬁcandlocalisedorigins(intheuSinthesummerof2007),thecrisisrapidly
spread to the rest of the world through ﬁnancial-sector linkages. No country or
regionalblocgotawayunscathed,and‘decoupling’wasquitesimplynotafeasible
option. Nevertheless, some areas did better than others, depending on initial
conditionsandpolicystrategies.
These considerations go to the very core of any analysis of the crisis that
focuses on its international impact, that is, the relative role of country-speciﬁc
factors(transmittedfromoneregiontoanotherwithdiﬀerentdegreesofspeedand
severity)vis-￠-visglobalshocks(aﬀectingthesystemasawhole,simultaneously
and symmetrically). A narrative of the crisis that emphasises transmission and
contagion typically concludes that, by implementing the appropriate domestic
policiesinacontextofeﬀectivesupervision,acountrycanbesparedfrom(some
of) the devastating eﬀects of turmoil, almost regardless of what the rest of the
system does. A narrative of the crisis that emphasises global shocks concludes
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Thebalancingofthesetwoaspectsisverymuchthekeytoacomprehensive
interpretation of the 2007-08 events and their lessons, as a brief revisiting of the
ﬁrsthalfofthepaperreveals.erringonthesideofsimplicity,areconstructionofthe
crisis can be articulated in terms of a prologue and two acts (this being an
unﬁnishedstoryatthetimeofwriting,thethirdacthavingjuststarted...).
Theprologuetakesplacefromthemid-1990sto2007,aperiodthatwitnessed
a rapid expansion in world trade and, even more staggering, a boom in ﬁnancial




north-north cross-border holdings increased in all asset/liability categories, and,
bytheendof2007,bothassetsandliabilitiesrepresentedmorethan220percent
ofthegDPofadvancedeconomies,twicetheratioobservedtenyearspreviously.
In emerging markets, total cross-border holdings grew as well, but at a more
leisurely pace. Total external liabilities increased from 70 percent in 1998 to 88




and especially in Asia, driven by a spectacular upswing in the accumulation of




high in China and Japan, while holdings of privately-issued securities were




currency are down; FDI and equity liabilities mostly denominated in domestic
currency are way up. But substantial regional diﬀerences persisted: in particular,
countriesinemergingeuroperancurrent-accountdeﬁcitssigniﬁcantlylargerthan
countriesinotherareas.
like all dramatically-eﬀective prologues, the dynamics of the events therein
aﬀect to a large extent what goes on in the rest of the play. In our case, act one
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startedin2007(andendedwiththemajorcliﬀhangerofthelehmanshockabout
one year later). The initial transmission of the sub-prime sector shock went in
tandem with the attempt by highly-leveraged institutions in europe and the uS to
quicklyunraveltheirexposuretopoorly-performingsecuritiesandtoreducetheir
balance sheets. This set up a process of ﬁnancial ﬁre-sales that triggered further
asset-price declines. emerging markets were indirectly aﬀected by the sharp
deleveraging in advanced economies’ ﬁnancial institutions. Between the autumn
of 2007 and the spring of 2008, the decline in demand for corporate bonds and
privately-issuedasset-backedsecurities,coupledwithareductioninpolicyrates,
drovedownwardthevalueofthedollar.FollowingthecollapseofBearStearns,there
was major retrenchment in cross-border banking ﬂows, which was particularly
dramatic in the uK and Switzerland. unlike the crash scenarios stressed in the
policyandacademicliteraturesonglobalimbalances,thecrisisdidnothaveamajor
direct impact on large creditor countries (such as China, Japan and the oil
exporters).
Act two started with the lehman crisis and (tentatively) ended sometime in
2009 (at the time of writing, the jury is still out on the exact details of when and
how). In the second half of 2008, the synchronised cyclical downturn meta-
morphisedintoglobalpandemonium,withadramaticfallinworlddemandandthe
virtual collapse of cross-border ﬂows. Transmission to real activity was fast and




the entire emerging-markets region experienced the sudden cutting-oﬀ of capital
inﬂows,andsalesofreserves.Severalemergingeconomiesalsowitnessedsharp
currency depreciations, while safe-haven currencies (uS dollar, Swiss franc,
Japaneseyen)rebounded.
What emerges from this deliberately-simpliﬁed summary of the (author’s
reconstruction of the international dimensions of the) crisis, is a pattern of
substantial similarities between the ﬁrst and second acts, and the relentless
unfoldingofthedramaannouncedintheprologue.Butafewimportantdiﬀerences,
and perhaps structural discontinuities, should be highlighted. For instance, the
inﬂationaryoutlookwasremarkablydiﬀerentbetweenthetwoacts.Strongglobal
inﬂationary pressures prevailed during act one, driven by the direct and indirect
eﬀects of a substantial boom in commodity prices. Instead, in the months of act
two, the generalised collapse of production and trade was associated with rapid
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disinﬂationworldwide.evenmoreimportantwastheroleoftheuScurrency:amajor
loser in the ﬁrst act due to the frenetic deleveraging rush, the dollar appreciated
rapidlyinthesecondact,asglobalmarketparticipantsﬂewtosafety.
going further, one could maintain that a key change in the dynamics of the
crisis,anditsinternationaldimensions,occurredwhenwemovedfromtheﬁrstto
the (more devastating) second act. using the jargon of international macro-
economics,actonewasaninternationalcrisismuchinthespiritof‘ﬁrstgeneration’
crisis models, with shocks transmitted across countries through international
spillovers and linkages; act two was perhaps closer to the ‘second generation’
interpretive framework, with emphasis on the eﬀects on market conﬁdence and
sentimentofcommonshocks.
Two notes of explanation are probably required at this point. In the economic
literaturethatstudiestheglobalcrisesofthepast15years,thebulkofinterpretive
frameworks (and formal models) are customarily systematised in terms of
‘generations’ of theoretical approaches, or at least of comfortable containers
wherein to organise the ﬂow of thoughts. The so-called ‘ﬁrst’ generation puts
emphasisonfundamentalimbalances,typicallyﬁscal,butpossiblyextendedtoa
broader set of macroeconomic and policy distortions. The ‘second’ generation
instead highlights non-fundamental factors: coordination failures in ﬁnancial
markets,bankpanicsandruns,multipleequilibriums,self-validatingexpectations.




a rapid process of ﬁnancial liberalisation. To some extent, the ‘third’ generation
repackageselementsalreadypresentinthe‘ﬁrst’and‘second’generations,while
broadening their scope and reﬁning their conceptual framework. For a concise
introductiontothisliteratureanditsconventions,thereaderisreferredtoPesenti
andTille(2000),amongothers.
With many caveats and nuances, the recent crisis can be approached and
interpretedinlightofacombinationofthesetwo(orthree)theoreticalapparatuses.
The ﬁrst generation emphasises the role of unsustainable imbalances and
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ascatalystsofexcessiveexposure.Similarly,andwithmanyheroicsimpliﬁcations,
onecanfocusonthemechanismofinternationalshocktransmissionandreadthe
pre-lehman events as a story of contagion across countries and asset classes,
where country-speciﬁc elements matter in determining how severely the shocks
were transmitted from the epicentre to the rest of the system. Instead, the post-
lehman act two can be substantially interpreted in terms of a global panic in the
interbankmarketandacollapseofworldactivitydrivenbycommonshocks.
Casting these thoughts within some kind of rough-and-ready interpretive
synthesis, one can think of the world economy as participating in a large, inter-
connected,globalrepomarket.Borrowingfromrecentworkbygarygorton(2009),
thinkofinternationalsavers/lenders(money-marketfunds,corporations,insurance
companies, pension funds, hedge funds and the like) as depositors, that is, ﬁrms
seekingasafeplacetosavecashintheshortterm.Andthinkofborrowersasbanks
(better, as the ‘shadow’ banking system comprised of leveraged ﬁnancial
intermediaries).
In this stylised global repo banking system, agents face a liquidity/
borrowing/leverage constraint reﬂecting borrowers’ default risk and their inability
tocommittorepayment:
L ≤ (1 – h) (p1Q1 + p2Q2 + …)
Depositors lend funds (L in the expression above) in the repo market and
receive collateral for their deposits. eligible collateral includes a variety of assets
Q1,Q2,…,includingnewﬁnancialproductssuchassecuritisedtranches,evaluated




informationally-insensitive, that is, immune to adverse selection by privately-
informedagents(afterall,theyaresenior,backedbyportfoliosandhavehighcredit





$95 for each $100 pledged as collateral. like traditional depositors at regulated
commercial banks, our ‘depositors’ can withdraw their funds from the shadow
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banking system by not rolling over their repo agreements and returning the
collateral,orbyincreasingthehaircut.Disorderlywithdrawaloffundsistantamount
toacolossalbankrunledbygeneralisedpanic.Fromthisvantagepoint,theglobal
shadow banking system resembles an overgrown pre-Federal Deposit Insurance
CorporationuSbankingsystem.
We have now the basic heuristic elements to reconsider the two acts of the
global ﬁnancial crisis. During act one, as stressed in Milesi-Ferreti’s paper, a
correctioninassetvaluessomewhere(saythefallinuShousingprices)transmits
to other asset classes everywhere else through margin calls and widespread
deleveraging.Theoriginalshockinregion1,saytheuSandtheeuroarea,isafall
in p1. leverage constraints become binding. Agents sell illiquid assets to meet
margincalls.Thisleadstofurtherasset-pricedeclinesnotonlyinregion1butalso









until August 2007, reached 10 percent by the end of 2007, moving around 40
percent after the lehman shock). Within an interconnected money market, this
shock is global in nature. It leads to a worldwide credit-supply freeze. lIBOr-OIS
spreads and similar measures, already larger than usual during act one, jump to
unprecedentedlevelsduringacttwo.Accordingtothisstory,theproblemisnotthe
sharpriseinborrowerdefaults.Thecrucialpartisrathercreditors’reluctancetolend
and to invest in anything more risky than highly-liquid securities such as short-
termTreasuries.
To rationalise the spike in h, diﬀerent stories can be provided. gorton (2009)
suggests that collateral securities that used to be perceived as informationally-
insensitive (as good as insured deposits) suddenly become informationally-
sensitive(toxicassets).Itbecomesproﬁtabletoproduceinformationandspeculate
on the value of these securities. uncertainty about valuations in a ‘market for
lemons’ makes them illiquid. But this is a thorough regime switch, leading to a
worldwide ﬂight to quality and safety. The transmission to the real economy is
immediate and devastating. As resources are no longer available to fund
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and shipments plunge, industrial production nosedives, trade volumes contract
sharply, both because of the direct drying-up of export ﬁnancing and the indirect
fallinworlddemand.Allofthishappenssimultaneouslyandeverywhere.
Building on these considerations, in the second part of the paper, the author
draws a set of valuable lessons, especially for (but not conﬁned to) emerging
markets. Avoid large current-account deﬁcits and unsustainable imbalances.
reducesectoralexposure.Strengthentheﬁscalposition(thecrisishasshownvery
dramaticallyhowquicklyﬁscalprospectschangewhenacreditboomcomestoan
end; declining asset prices can have very signiﬁcant eﬀects on publicrevenues).







size of the central-bank balance sheet, or the cyclically-adjusted public deﬁcits
duringtheprocessofcrisismanagement,donotpreventglobalpolicymakersfrom
acting as appropriate, and for as long as it takes (you want act three to end on a
positive note after act two). At the same time, the lessons of the crisis include
makingsurethataviableexitstrategydoesexist,andgoingforitwithouthesitation
when the right time comes. After all, nobody wants act three to create the pre-
conditionsforanewactone.
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were substantially less than anticipated2. A substantive portion of recent
investment was in assets (such as uS and Spanish housing, or oﬃce space for
investment banks) whose productivity has been found to have diminished, and
large numbers of workers (in industries such as construction and ﬁnance) have
beenfoundtobeinsituationswheretheirwagesexceedthevalueoftheirmarginal
products. The resulting losses of values and incomes contributed to the sharp
contraction of demand, and surely have deepened (if not created) the industrial
world’s recession. In light of these events, prior estimates of the physical returns




stated? Will potential and actual output growth in the future be directly impeded
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importantly,inthecaseofﬁnancialﬁrms,capitalgainandlossesmadeinthecourseoftrading.The31





uS more than doubled, rising from $196 billion (2.0 percent of nominal gDP) to
$462billion(3.5percentofnominalgDP)3.Thisproﬁtssurgeoccurredinaperiod




the increased contribution of the sector to overall gDP growth. However, the scale
ofthecollapseinvaluesinsecuritiesmarketsoverthepastfewyearscouldsuggest
that the growth of ﬁnancial output was overstated in the earlier period. even in





ment could further suggest that the increase in the ﬁnancial proﬁt share largely
reﬂected a diversion of productive resources rather than a return to increased
productivity. A reduction in estimates of the past growth of ﬁnancial output may
help to raise concerns about the growth of uS economic capacity. A reduction of




ﬁnance, insurance and real estate sectors accounted for about one-fourth of the
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growth, but these reductions reﬂected the routine incorporation of new source data, rather than any
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objectives in order to avoid increased inﬂation: inﬂation increases usually lag
acceleratedoutput,soonemayerroneouslythinkthatoutputgapsarenotnarrow-
ing and inﬂationary pressures are not receding if potential is overstated. Such
overestimatesappeartohavebeenlargeinthe1970s(OrphanidesandvanNorden,
2002), and may have played a role in the increase in uS inﬂation in that decade.
An examination of the uS data suggests that concerns about past overstate-




estimates of aggregate output, though such changes would aﬀect the industrial




earned in recent years would result in a mild markdown in aggregate growth;
however, this markdown would not be in the nonfarm business sector, usually
viewed as the key area to examine for analysis and projections of inﬂation and
employment.lookingforward,itisconceivablethatsomeoftheoutputlostinthe
course of the recession may persist in the form of a modestly lower path for





ing treatment of ﬁnance and the returns from housing and how they relate to
measured aggregate activity. This is followed by an analysis of how altered esti-
mates of growth of real ﬁnancial output and the real output of housing feed into
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Broadly speaking, the ﬁnancial sector earns its income in two ways. First, it
processespayments(incomeitemssuchasbrokeragefeesmaybethoughtofin
thisfashion,aswouldbe,ofcourse,thefeescollectedformanagingloanpayments,
etc.). Second, it plays a major role in the allocation of capital, for instance by
advisinginvestorsorborrowers,ortakingpositionsonitsownaccount.Ingeneral,




earning). In general, these latter areas are the ones that have expanded the most
rapidly,andenhancingourunderstandingtheconnectionsbetweenthemandthe
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keep track of these switches (the errors would arise from missing the changes; the distortions from








The distinctions between these two sources of ﬁnancial sector income are
importanttokeepinmindinlookingatthesector’sdirectcontributiontoaggregate
output5. To avoid the double counting of activities and align measures of national
incomesandoutputs,nationaloutputiscomputedbyaddingupmeasuresofsales
of goods and services to ‘ﬁnal’ users. Aggregate national output is not directly
aﬀectedbythereallocationofexistingcapital,ifthetransactiondoesnotinclude
the delivery of a service to a ﬁnal user. To make this more speciﬁc, ﬁnancial
transactions involving domestic businesses do not automatically aﬀect national
output.Thisisacriticalpointtokeepinmindinassessingtheimpactoftheﬁnancial






This means that fee income paid by homeowners in the course of mortgage
originations and reﬁnancing is an expense item that reduces aggregate rental
income. In an accounting sense, much of the income of the ﬁnancial sector is an
expense paid for out of nonﬁnancial corporate proﬁts, nonﬁnancial proprietors’
(unincorporatedbusiness)income,andrentalincome.
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depositatinstitutionssuchascommercialbanks,andthepresumptioninnational
accounting is that they are earning and consuming implicit services in return for
the sacriﬁce of income. Borrowers are also assumed to be receiving imputed
services, when they pay above-market rates for their funding. The receipt of such




The precise computation of these imputed services is an unsettled matter
(TriplettandBosworth,2004).IntheuSaccounts,theassumptionisthattheentire






paid by borrowers and the amount they would have paid if they had borrowed at
thereferencerateprovidestheestimateofimputedinterestpaidtoborrowers.
Clearly,thecomputationoftheseimputedinterestﬂowsisratherarbitrary.One
particular issue is the use of Treasury rates to set the reference rate to calculate




be said to reﬂect the implicit costs of services provided by banks to borrowers
(Fixler,reinsdorfandSmith,2003).Othershavearguedthathigherrates,reﬂecting
the inherent risk in lending to private parties, be used to set the reference rate to
computeimputedinterestpaidtoborrowers(Wang,BasuandFernald,2004;Basu,
Inklaar and Wang, 2008). If such a procedure were adopted the dollar value of
imputed interest paid to business borrowers by the ﬁnancial sector would be
reduced, as would recorded ﬁnancial output. A contrasting view arises from the
observationthatthepaymentofimputedinterestisassumedtoceasewhenaloan
issoldbyadepositorytoanondepository–forinstance,whenaloanispurchased
for securitisation (Ashcraft and Steindel, 2008). Because, from the borrower’s
viewpoint, nothing substantive has changed in the servicing of the loan, the
disappearanceofitsimputedinterestﬂowappearshardtojustify.recognitionthat
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services to ﬁnal users than they earn as value-added. By construction, imputed interest paid to
imputed interest continues to ﬂow to such borrowers would have the eﬀect of
increasingthedollarvalueofimputedinterestpaidtoborrowersandwouldshiftthe
compositionofindustryoutputtowardﬁnancialﬁrms8.
These issues connected to the computation of imputed interest paid to
borrowers bear on the calculation of current-dollar ﬁnancial output. And a whole
host of other questions relate to the computation of the real output of the sector,
giventheimmensediﬃcultiesindeﬁningstandardisedtransactions.Forinstance,
even a very simple transaction such as the purchase and sale of corporate stock
raises some complexity in determining the real activity involved. Is the unit of
transactionasinglesaleofablockofshares,orthesaleofoneshare?Itcertainly
seemsasifthesaleof10sharesinoneblockinvolvesnomorephysicalservices





We are left with the issue that there are serious concerns associated with the
computationofcurrent-dollarﬁnancialsectoroutput,andlikelyevengreaterones
involving the calculation of real output. Many would have associated more inten-
siveuseofﬁnancialservicesinrecentyearswitheﬃciencygainsinuserindustries
andacrosstheeconomyasawhole(Kohn,2008).giventhesubsequentcontrac-
tion one might argue that either the measures of past usage and the eﬃciency
gains were overstated, or that lessened use in the future will weigh down growth.
Turning from the conceptual issues to the published numbers, Table 1 shows
thebreakdownofﬁnancialsectorgrossrevenuesin2007basedonthecategories
value-added, services to ﬁnal users, and intermediate services provided to other
industries.Overhalftherevenuesoftheﬁnancialsectorwereintermediateservices
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suchasutilitiesandrealestateprovideinputtotheircreation,itseemsreasonabletosupposethatthe
bulk of the value-added stems directly from the labour and capital employed in ﬁnance. The ﬁnancial
sector’s value-added is somewhat larger than its ﬁnal sales, likely reﬂecting income generated from
intermediateservicesprovidedtononﬁnancialbusinesses.
Housing
The sector that has been most closely linked to ﬁnancial developments in recent
years is housing. In the uS accounts, ‘residential ﬁxed investment’ encompasses
privateexpendituresonnewhomeconstruction,repairsandalterationstoexisting
homes,andbrokeragecommissionsearnedfromthesalesofhomes.Manysectors
– construction, real estate, manufacturing, etc. – are important suppliers to
residential investment. In current dollars, this category of spending rose from 3.4
percent of gDP in 1991, to a near-record high of 6.2 percent in 2005, before
contractingdrasticallyto3.4percentin2008(Figure2).Duetoitsrapidgrowth,real
residential investment contributed, on average, 0.4 percentage point to the
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Charged against these rents on the income side are depreciation, property taxes,
andnetinterestpaid(nettingoutimputedinterestreceived),aswellasmortgage
ﬁnancing fees; the residual proﬁt-like income series is called ‘rental income of
persons’.essentially,thedirecteﬀectofmortgageﬁnancingactivitiesistoshiftthe
composition of the income side of the shelter service ﬂow (unless the ﬁnancial
transactioninvolvesthesaleofahome;inwhichcasethebrokeragecomponentof
residential investment increases). In real terms, growth in shelter services con-
sumedbyhouseholdowner-occupiersslowedfromapaceashighasfourpercent
in the middle of this decade to be barely positive in the most recent readings, as
the growth of the real housing stock cooled oﬀ with the slump in construction
(Figure 3). Shelter services are a nontrivial part of gDP. Owner-occupied shelter
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reduction in their real rate of growth has played a substantive role in the overall
slowinginthegrowthofrealgDP.
Waseconomicgrowthoverstatedinrecentyears?
The value-added of the ﬁnancial sector grew rapidly for much of the past decade.
Innominaltermstheaverageincreasewas6.25percentintheperiod1998-2007.
Thiscomparestoanaveragegrowthrateof5.2percentforoverallgDP(whichis,of
course, the sum of nominal ﬁnal demand and inventory accumulation across the
economyasawhole).Inrealterms,ﬁnanceandinsurancevalue-added(whichcan
be alternatively labelled as industry gDP) rose an average 4.8 percent in these
years,comparedto2.85percentforoverallgDP.
If we look at real revenues, rather than value-added, the gap between the
ﬁnancial sector and the rest of the economy has been wider: real gross output of
theﬁnancialsectorincreasedanaverageof5.9percentovertheyears1998-2007,
comparedtoanaveragegainof3.1percentforallindustries.Themorerapidgrowth
of real gross output compared to value-added suggests that a rising share of the
real revenues of the ﬁnancial sector was used as intermediate product by other
industries,asopposedtosatisfyingﬁnaldemands.
Anargumentcanbemadethattheexistingnumbersoverstatetherealgrowth
of ﬁnancial sector activity. The recent ﬁnancial crisis conceivably reﬂects a
misallocationincapital;someportionofthatmisallocationcouldwellreﬂecterrors
by the ﬁnancial sector itself. In other words, the real services provided by the




turned out in a year was less than was initially assumed, it is likely that the real
outputoftheindustrywillbereviseddown.
On the housing front, it might be argued that real residential investment was
also overstated signiﬁcantly, in that many of the units built (and sold) in recent
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of, and consumption of, real shelter services may turn out to be smaller than we
currentlymeasure.
Inbothﬁnanceandhousing,then,counterfactualscanbemadeassumingthat
prices have been understated – alternatively, not as much real product was
obtained as is currently recorded10. If one advances such arguments, how much
(plausibly) lower would overall growth in recent years turn out to be, and what is
theimplicationforthefuture?
recomputingrealoutput
The counterfactual involves examining the implications for past real output of
alternate estimates of the growth of real ﬁnancial and real housing activity. The
assumptionwillbethatnominalspendinghasbeencorrectlyestimated,meaning
thatweareimplicitlyassumingalternativeassumptionsforprices.
We ﬁrst examine counterfactuals for ﬁnancial activity (Table 2). Financial
activityismultifaceted,andanynumberofassumptionscanbemadeaboutwhich
aspect may have been overstated. The overwhelming majority of ﬁnal sales

























a bit problematic. The case for an increased understatement of price gains in the
recent past appears strained, given that technological advances (such as the




revenues that are not ﬁnal sales have been overstated. These consist of services
providedasintermediateinputstononﬁnancialbusinesses.Onemaycontendthat
slippages in quality and standards could mean that it is unlikely that the real
volumeoftheseservicesexpandedbysuchawidemarginrelativetorevenuesin
theeconomyasawhole.Onewaytoconsidertheimplicationsofthisargumentis
to assume that the diﬀerence between real gross output in ﬁnance and the
economyaswholeaveragedtwopercent(thesameasthediﬀerenceinrealvalue-
added, much of which is likely mirrored in the movements in household usage of
ﬁnancialservices12)in1998-2007,ratherthanthereported2.8percent.Incurrent
dollars, the share of gross revenue by the ﬁnancial industry was little-changed at
around7.5percentinthoseyears.reducingthediﬀerentialbetweenrealgrowthof
industry revenues and that of the economy as whole to average the same 2.0
percent as the corresponding diﬀerential for real value-added would mean real






aggregate gDP. rather, changes in the growth rate of real intermediate services
providedbytheﬁnancialsectorwouldimplychangesintheindustrycomposition
of growth: the growth of real value-added in ﬁnance would be reduced, and the
growth of the value-added of nonﬁnancial industries would be boosted, with
66 OCeANSAPArT
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commensurate changes in the distribution of labour productivity. estimates of
multifactor productivity would also be shifted, with reductions to ﬁnance and




real gDP growth by as much as ﾼ percentage point? A key point is that ﬁnancial
sectorvalue-addedaccountsforabout8percentofnominalgDP.Hence,theresult
is that the growth in real value-added in ﬁnance would need to be revised down a
stiﬀ 3
1⁄8 percentage points per year to reduce real gDP growth by ﾼ percentage
pointperyear(assumingthatsuchareductionwouldnotbeassociatedwithmore
rapidgrowthelsewhere).Thischangewouldshrinktheaveragerateofvalue-added
growth in ﬁnance to a modest 1.7 percent a year in 1998-2007. given that forces
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structurethatisbuilt.
Thecounterfactualwillassumethatannualpriceinﬂationintherelevantportionsof
ﬁnal demand was underestimated by 3 percentage points a year from 1998 to
2005(theperiodofmostrapidexpansioninhousing).ThespeciﬁcgDPcomponent
isinvestmentinowner-occupied1-to4-familynonfarmhomes.Theessenceofthe
counterfactual is an assumption that homes were built and purchased which did
not and will not provide the vector of shelter services the price indexes assumed.
Nominalspendinginthiscategoryaveragedabout4.2percentofgDPin1998-
2005, with a peak level of 5.3 percent in 2005. reducing the real growth of this
sector by 3 percentage points a year would have the eﬀect of reducing aggregate
realgDPgrowthbyroughly0.1percentagepointannually.However,increasingthe
rate of price increase in these categories by 3 percentage points annually would
boosttheirannualpricegainstotheneighbourhoodof10percentormorein2004-
05. In other words, the gDP measures were already reporting very high growth in
theseprices14.
Iftherealvalueofgrossspendingonnewresidentialﬁxedstructuresroseata











may, arguably, have been overstated by an unusually large amount. However,
errors in that calculation do not aﬀect estimates of the size or growth of the uS
economy, but rather feed into misstatements of the industrial composition of
growth. Indeed if estimates of the real value of intermediate services provided by
the ﬁnancial sector were slashed, the ﬁnding would be that a larger portion of uS
outputgrowthwouldbeattributedtotechnicalprogressinotherindustries.Inthat
sense one might argue that the contribution of ﬁnance to uS growth could have
been overstated. As noted, the contention that growth in components of ﬁnal
demand that are ﬁnance-centric have been overstated to any larger extent in the
68 OCeANSAPArT
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perhaps, be a case that much of the investment in housing was in residences
whose ultimate shelter value will be much smaller than anticipated at the time of
construction.Nonetheless,ifonecutsestimatesoftherealvalueofthatinvestment
andtheongoingsheltervalueofthecompletedstructuresbywhatappearstobea





occupied housing is not a part of nonfarm business output, though it is a
componentofgDP).
Note that these calculations do not bear on the issue of the ‘sustainability’ of
uSgrowthduringthelastdecade.The‘sustainability’argumentappearstostartwith
the observation that much of the growth in real spending in the uS was in
homebuilding,andatsomepointtheshiftofresourcestohomeconstruction(and
the related shift of income to ﬁnance associated with housing transactions) was
bound to slow. Building on the growth in housing, the rapid expansion in ﬁnancial
sectoractivityandthesurgeinhomepriceshelpedtodrivethesubstantialincrease
inuSwealthfrom2002to2007.Inturn,thegainsinhouseholdwealthwerelikely
signiﬁcant forces supporting growth in consumer spending and overall gDP. The
sustainabilityargumentappearstofurthermaintainthathouseholdswerespending
onthebasisofwealththatwasboundtodiminishwhentherapidlygrowingsectors
cooled oﬀ. In principle, one can then make estimates of the secondary, induced,
growtheﬀectoftheincreaseinﬁnancialandrealestateoutputthroughlinkagesto
wealth gains. Perhaps if these sectors had not grown as rapidly, the aggregate
increaseinwealthmayhavebeensmaller,possiblyworkingtoconstrainthegrowth
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The calculations above suggest that the surge in ﬁnance and real estate was not
connected to any yawning overstatement of uS growth in the past decade. The
boom and bust in ﬁnance and real estate will likely continue to be measured as
broadlysimilartowhattheaccountsnowreport.Amorefundamentalissuemaybe
thefutureimplicationsofongoingcontractionsinthesesectors.Thelastfewyears
have seen major downward adjustments in both, measured by such indexes as
construction employment, housing starts and sales, and ﬁnancial sector income,
and the contribution of gains in the broadly deﬁned FIre sector to overall gDP
growth tumbled from 0.8 percentage point in 2005-06 to zero in 2008 (Figure 4).
Clearly,muchofthisadjustmentcanberelatedtoreduceddemandfortheproducts
of these industries, some portion of which can surely be considered payback for
earlier over-expansion (homebuilding is the most obvious example, but ﬁnancial
activities related to home sales and real estate development are obviously






roughly one-third of one percent to one percent per year for the next ﬁve years
(Barrera, estevao and Keim, 2009). These results appear broadly in line with the
reinhart and rogoﬀ (2009) ﬁndings that ﬁnancial crises often have major long-
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industriesofintermediateservicesfromﬁnance,therewouldbesomeadditionaldownwardpressureon
the growth of real output, which would be associated with slower growth of multifactor productivity.
Fernald and Matoba (2009) note that uS multifactor productivity growth has apparently been well-
maintainedduringtherecession.
term negative eﬀects on real output. The higher end of the range would clearly
suggest a considerable downgrade of potential growth for a substantial time and
would result in uS gDP remaining noticeably short of its earlier growth path
throughoutmost,ifnotall,ofthenextdecade.
Adirectwaytogaugesomeofthesedownsiderisksistolookatthepotential
output shifts that could be associated with shifts of labour and productivity
slowdowns in these sectors. In particular, ﬁnance and insurance has seen quite




how value-added per worker in ﬁnance and insurance performed relative to the
economyasawhole).If,atoneextreme,thatexcessweretobereducedby2013
(in other words, the gap between real output per worker in ﬁnance and the rest of
theeconomywasrestoredtoits2000ﬁgurein2013),withoutanycompensating
shifts elsewhere, the growth of real value-added per worker in ﬁnance and
insurance would average about 2.5 percent per year less than the economy-wide
average. given the small employment share of this sector (as noted, about 4.5
percent),though,thisshortfallwouldhaveonlyaminimalimpactonholdingdown
the trend growth of real value-added per worker (about 0.1 percent a year)15. Of
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Assumes return to 1998 ratio in 2013
Figure5:ratioofrealvalue-addedperworker,ﬁnanceandinsurancetooverallgDP
Source:uSBureauofeconomicAnalysis,author'scalculation
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course,ifsuchanadjustmentproceededmorerapidlytherecouldbelargereﬀects
inashortertimeperiod.However,giventhelonger-termtendencyofrealoutputper
worker to grow more rapidly in ﬁnance and insurance than elsewhere the
assumptionofacompletereversaloftherecentwideningseemsabitextreme.Also
extreme is the presumption that high-productivity workers in ﬁnance will not
migrate to higher-wage jobs outside of a diminished ﬁnance sector with slower
productivityand(presumably)earningsgrowththaninthepast.
Anotherpotentialdragongrowthcomesfromtheredeploymentoflabourand
capital involved with real estate. Because real estate construction and sales are
industriesthathavehistoricallyseenverylargeandlastingﬂuctuationsinoutput
andemployment(and,also,arefairlylowwageandhaveseenonlysluggishgrowth
in real value added per worker), an argument that a prolonged low period would
hamper overall output signiﬁcantly is diﬃcult to accept. While homebuilding is





the obvious: there are independent forces aﬀecting housing and real gDP. As has
been noted, though, if much of the expansion of the housing stock in the last few
yearswasunsustainable,newactivitywillbelowforsometime(manypartsofthe
nation will have little need to build new housing, while other parts may see less
elaborate construction than in the past). This slower growth of the housing stock
willleadtomodestlyslowergrowthofrealshelterservices,but,asnotedearlierin
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the usual growth accounting mechanisms, then it is possible that an ongoing
contraction in the sector could have larger impacts on growth going forward than
currently seen. It is very hard to quantify such eﬀects in past data, and it can be
argued that recent developments have altered any relationships that may have
beenpreviouslycharted.16Onepossibility,ofcourse,isthatacontractioninﬁnance
could be associated with a general retreat from risk-taking, which may hamper
technologicalprogress,orthatanewregulatoryregimefortheindustrymayhamper
eﬃcient capital allocation, or that the funding of ﬁscal initiatives to deal with
ﬁnancialdistresscouldinvolveincreasesindistortionarytaxes.
Combining the eﬀect of slower growth in the stock of housing (and thus of
shelterservices)withthatofsomenoticeablecontractioninﬁnancialoutput(and
addinginsomespillovereﬀectsfromsuchaslowdown)couldproduceadeterrent
eﬀect on uS real gDP growth on the order of 0.3 percentage point per year in the
near future: 0.1 percentage point from slower growth of housing services, 0.1
percentage point directly from a ﬁnancial contraction, and perhaps another 0.1
percentage point from spillovers (essentially, less provision of intermediate
services to other industries) arising from a ﬁnancial contraction. This is roughly
comparable to the lower bound of the Barrera, estevao, and Keim range, though it
appears to be something of a worst-case scenario for the direct eﬀects of con-
tractions in these sectors. This would not be a trivial reduction in the growth of
near-termpotential,butitisdwarfedbythedeclineinrealgDPexperiencedinthe




ﬁnance and real estate likely exaggerated growth in the last decade to any
meaningful degree. First, a deﬁnitive claim that real growth in these sectors was
16.As Vice Chairman Kohn remarked, “ﬁnancial innovation can induce structural changes that can
importantlyalterthewayﬁnancialinstitutions,markets,andthebroadereconomyrespondtoshocks”
(Kohn,2008).
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overstatedtoanunusuallylargedegreeishardtosustainwhenonelooksclosely
at the composition of their activity, particularly their direct contribution to ﬁnal
output. Second, even if some signiﬁcant overstatements in these areas occurred,
thesectorsaresimplynotlargeenoughsuchthatcorrectingforthemwouldreduce
the aggregate data to a marked extent. looking forward an ongoing retardation of
the ﬂow of resources from ﬁnance, especially, could work to slow aggregate uS
growth modestly, but calibrating a substantive eﬀect implies fairly extreme
assumptionsastothesizeandancillaryeﬀectsoftheindustry’sslowdown.
One may keep in mind the distinction between economic output and welfare.
One can, conceivably, argue that aggregate growth in the last decade may have
enhancedaggregatewelfarelessthancomparablepastexpansions(forinstance,
one may be concerned that most measures of income inequality expanded).
However, such concerns are reasonably distinguishable from issues of the
measurementofthescaleofactivity.
even if one believes that the composition of uS growth in the last expansion
contained the seeds of a considerable contraction, the issue of the sustainability
of demand can be diﬀerentiated from that of the measurement of real output and
the evolution of potential. It is useful to distinguish between supply and demand
eﬀects when examining the ongoing and future eﬀects of developments in the





suﬀer as the result of a long and deep recession (Furceri and Mourougane, 2009;
OeCD,2009),likelyreﬂectingslowgrowthinphysicalcapitalandthedegradationof
humancapital;andﬁnancialfactorscouldwellbeassociatedwiththeonsetoflong




and depth17. We may acknowledge the possibility that changes in the ﬁnancial
17.BasuandFernald(2009)discusssomegeneralissuesconnectedwiththeestimationofpotentialoutput
in the framework of a New Keynesian growth model. Their assessment was that as of late 2008 –
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industry in particular may, in the near term, hamper the transmission of
expansionary monetary policy to real activity, which could bear on the length of
timeinwhichintheeconomyisoperatingunderitslonger-termpotential.Thiseﬀect
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ﬁnancialcrisisforpotentialgrowthintheunitedStates,approachingthequestion
with an innovative methodology. rather than trying to construct a production




than previously estimated, it would have clear implications for policy on inﬂation
and monetary policy. The lessons from the inﬂation scare of the 1970s are very





that the assumptions needed to arrive at such overstatement would be very
extreme,andthateventhentheimpactoftheoverstatementwouldnotbematerial.
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growth. In fact, given the losses the ﬁnancial sector has suﬀered in the last two
years,andthedeclineinmarketvaluationstothelevelof1996-97,itcanbeargued
thattheuSﬁnancialsectorhasaddednovalueinthelastdecade(seeFigure1).To
the extent that these apparent proﬁts served as collateral for balance-sheet
expansion, the mismeasurement of ﬁnancial-sector activity did potentially
contributetoalowercostofcapital,andthustohigherapparentpotentialgrowth.
Some of the assumptions that the author describes as extreme in computing
alternativescenariosmaynotbethatextreme.Oneexampleistheassumptionthat
ﬁnanceworkersmightnoteasilybeabletomovetohigh-wagejobsoutsideﬁnance.
given that they are typically highly-qualiﬁed workers, it may be reasonable to
expect that workers from the ﬁnancial sector will easily ﬁnd similar jobs in other
areas,butthismaynotbethecaseiftheﬁnancialsectorbecomesoverstretched.










10/01/93 10/01/95 10/01/97 10/01/99 10/01/01 10/01/03 10/01/05 10/01/07 10/01/09
Source:Bloomberg.
Figure1:marketvaluation,KBWBankindex
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losses being deﬁned as below-average growth during expansions, and above-
averagelossesduringdownturns.Intherecentdownturn,accordingtoKirkegaard
(2009), only commercial banking has continued to experience structural gains,
while non-depositary activities, credit intermediation and ﬁnancial investments




potential growth rates. Barrera et al suggest that a sharp increase in the non-
accelerating inﬂation rate of unemployment (NAIru) will be responsible for the
decline of potential growth, leading one to wonder which sectors of the economy





and the optimal sectoral allocation of resources. An excessive allocation of




sector, depriving other sectors of much-needed human capital. For example, the
shareofHarvardgraduatesgoingtoﬁnancehasincreasedfromﬁveto15percent
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years later, the worst appears to be over and economies are showing initial signs
of recovery. Over this period, central banks have pushed policy interest rates to
historicallylowlevelsandhaveengagedinavarietyofmeasures,bothtraditional
and nontraditional, to ease ﬁnancial market strains and to provide additional
macroeconomicstimulus.
These central bank actions generally appear to have made positive contri-
butionstoeconomicandﬁnancialconditions.Insomecases,theevidenceofthese
positive eﬀects is clear. In other cases, the nature of the policies is such that it is
diﬃculttogaugetheireﬀects.
Manyofthepoliciesareaimedatreturningliquidityandcredit-riskspreadson
ﬁnancial assets to normal levels, thereby encouraging a renewed ﬂow of credit
throughtheeconomy.Totheextentthatthesepolicieshavesucceeded,theyhave
reduced the 'headwinds' that restrain economic activity, but they have not
augmented macroeconomic stimulus beyond the level that would be implied by
thecurrentlevelofpolicyinterestratesundernormalﬁnancialconditions.Similarly,
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scale purchase of ﬁnancial assets, particularly assets that mature over long
periods.Theeconomicliteratureandrecentevidencesuggestthatsuchpurchases
can stimulate economic activity by reducing the spread between long-term and
short-term interest rates. Another tactic pursued by several central banks for
lowering longer-term interest rates is to provide guidance aimed at lowering
expectationsofthefuturepathofshort-terminterestrates.However,suchguidance
appears to have had limited success to date. Other approaches to providing
additionalmacroeconomicstimulushavenotbeenadoptedwidely.
empiricalpolicyrulesinthestyleofTaylor(1993)supportthecurrentsetting
of near-zero overnight interest rates in all the major developed regions. Indeed,
some versions of these rules call for signiﬁcantly-negative interest rates, sug-
gesting that central banks should be taking substantial nontraditional policy
actions. Forecasts of economic activity by central banks, international agencies,
and the private sector provide even stronger support for additional policy ease.
Theseforecastsalmostuniversallyprojectaveryslowandweakrecoveryoverthe
next two years, with persistent major shortfalls of output below potential, and
inﬂationratesconsiderablybelowthelevelsdesiredbycentralbanks.TheBankof





In early 2007, market participants began to be concerned about potential losses
onﬁnancialassetsthatmightresultfromtheincipientdownturninhousingprices
around the world. These concerns were most intense with respect to structured
creditproductsbasedonuSsubprimemortgageloans,whichtheratingsagencies
were beginning to downgrade on a widespread basis. The prices of such assets
droppedsharplyandanumberofuSmortgagecompaniesspecialisinginsubprime




2. This paper focuses on the responses of the four main developed-country central banks: the Federal
reserveBoard(Fed),theeuropeanCentralBank(eCB),theBankofJapanandtheBankofengland.
1833 Oceans_8.3.11.qxp:oceans apart book  9/3/11  16:05  Page 82OCeANSAPArT 83
whenalargeeuropeanbanksuspendedwithdrawalsfromthreeinvestmentfunds
it sponsored, citing an inability to value some of the mortgage-related assets.
Funding pressures quickly emerged across a wide range of european and uS
ﬁnancialinstitutionsbothbecausebanksdecidedtohoardcashtomeetpotential
calls on their credit lines to oﬀ-balance-sheet conduits, and because of concerns
about potential losses in the portfolios of ﬁnancial institutions. In particular, the
spreadsofbanktermfundingratesovercomparable-maturityovernightindexswap
ratessoaredandliquidityintheinterbankandothercreditmarketsvanished.The
european Central Bank and the Federal reserve quickly responded to these




Japan did not noticeably alter their operating procedures in August 2007. All four
central banks held their main policy rates constant that month (see the timeline
tableattheendofthischapter).
Duringtherestof2007,theFed,theeCB,theBankofengland,andothercentral
banks adopted further measures to increase liquidity in the banking system,
including the frontloading of reserves into the banking system during each main-




and Swiss National Bank (SNB). In conjunction with the uK Treasury, the Bank of
england set up a special liquidity support facility for Northern rock. Japanese
markets were relatively unaﬀected by these strains, reﬂecting a much lower
exposuretothehousingbubble,andtheBankofJapandidnotadoptmeasuresto







points. The eCB and Bank of Japan continued to hold their policy rates steady.
Duringthisperiod,theFedincreasedthesizeofitstermcreditauctionsforbanks
and its swap lines with the eCB and SNB, established a term securities lending
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facility, and established a direct credit facility for nonbank primary bond dealers
similar to the discount window for banks. The Fed also made an emergency loan
securedbyassetsofBearStearnstofacilitatetheacquisitionofBearStearnsbyJP
Morgan.TheBankofenglandestablishedatermsecuritieslendingfacilityforbanks.







October 8, the Fed, the eCB, the Bank of england and other central banks (but not
the Bank of Japan) announced an unprecedented coordinated cut in policy rates
of 50 basis points. later in October the Fed cut its policy rate another 50 basis
pointsandtheBankofJapancutitspolicyrate20basispoints.InNovemberand
December 2008 all four central banks made further policy rate cuts, totaling 85,
125,250,and20basispointsfortheFed,eCB,BankofenglandandBankofJapan









Japan took measures to support the commercial paper (CP) market. The Fed
announced plans to support the asset-backed securities (ABS) market. The Fed
announcedlarge-scalepurchasesoflonger-termdebtissuedorguaranteedbythe
federal housing agencies. In coordination with the uS Treasury, the Fed provided
emergency support to AIg, Bank of America, and Citigroup, secured on the assets
ofthoseinstitutions.governmentsintheeuroareaandtheuKprovidedemergency
support to several large ﬁnancial institutions. The eCB narrowed the corridor
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european banks. The Bank of england converted its temporary securities lending
scheme to a permanent discount window facility that lends liquid government
bondsagainstawiderangeofcollateral.TheBankofJapanannouncedincreased
purchases of Japanese government bonds and lowered its securities lending
operationsfee.Inadditiontothesenontraditionalcentralbankmeasures,govern-
























main reﬁnancing rate at one percent, and the true lower bound for the overnight
interbankratemaybethe25basispointspaidbytheeCB’sdepositfacility,which
isequivalenttothe25basispointspaidbytheFedonexcessreserves.
In 2009, the Fed expanded its purchases of long-term agency securities,
expanded the range of securities eligible for ﬁnancing under its Term ABS loan
Facility(TAlF),andbegantopurchaselonger-termTreasurysecurities.TheBankof
england announced a programme to buy long-term gilts, commercial paper, and
corporatebonds.TheeCBannouncedaprogrammetobuycoveredbonds,albeitto
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supply liquidity to dysfunctional markets by increasing their lending operations,
extendingloanmaturities,broadeningtherangeofcollateralacceptedandmaking
outright purchases of assets. They also responded to macroeconomic weakness
byloweringpolicyrates.Diﬀerencesincentralbankresponsesreﬂectdiﬀerences
intheexposureoflocalﬁnancialinstitutions,diﬀerentﬁnancial-industrystructures
and diﬀerent perceptions of the appropriate role of monetary policy. The Bank of
Japan responded far less aggressively in each of these areas – despite suﬀering
an equivalent (indeed greater) shock to output and inﬂation – mainly because of
themuchlowerexposureofJapaneseﬁnancialinstitutionstotroubledassets,and
becauseoftheperceivedlimitedroomforadditionalmonetarystimulus.
With respect to ﬁnancial strains, all the central banks covered in this chapter
movedquicklytodealwithproblemsinindividualmarketsastheyarose,withthe
temporary exception of the Bank of england in the opening weeks of the crisis.
Althoughitisdiﬃculttoprovestatistically,marketparticipantswidelycreditthese
programmesashavingpreventedamuchworseoutcome.TheFedappearedtoface
the greatest obstacles, arising from the greater role of non-bank ﬁnancial institu-
tionsintheuSandthelimitationsonFedlendingtonon-bankinstitutions.Fedloans
tonon-banksareallowedonlyunder'unusualandexigentcircumstances,'mustbe
fully collateralised and must be approved by a super-majority of the Board of
governors.ThattheFedwasabletosupporttheCPandABSmarketsisatestament
to the resolve of its governors and the ingenuity of its lawyers. The obvious
exceptiontothispatternofextraordinarysupportisthefailureoflehmanBrothers.
FedChairmanBenBernankehasstatedthathelackedtheauthoritytosavelehman
because lehman did not have suﬃcient collateral to back a loan of the size that
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acted the fastest, in part at least because the uS was the initial focal point of the
ﬁnancialcrisis.TheBankofJapanandtheeCBweremorereluctanttoeasepolicy,
with the eCB actually raising rates in mid-2008. The Fed and the Bank of england
havebeenthemostaggressiveinoutrightpurchasesoflonger-termassetsthatgo
beyondmeasurestostabilisespeciﬁcmarkets.
The preceding table presents changes in the size of central-bank balance
sheets,whichareacrudemeasureoftheoverallextentofcentral-bankresponses
to the ﬁnancial crisis. This measure does not capture changes in operating
proceduresorinthecompositionofcentral-bankassetsandliabilities.Forexample,
these central banks initially ﬁnanced the increase in longer-term loans to the





increase in the eCB’s balance sheet reﬂects term loans (up to one year) to the
bankingsystem,whichprobablyhavelesseﬀectonthetermstructureofinterest
rates than the Bank of england’s and the Fed’s purchases of longer-term assets.
isitworking?
Allthecentralbankscoveredhereloweredtheirtraditionalpolicyratesinresponse
to the ﬁnancial crisis. It is widely accepted that lower short-term interest rates do
providemacroeconomicstimulus5.TheFedandBankofenglandhavegonesome-






July2007 Sept.2009 Change(%) Change(%gDP)
Fed $850bn $2200bn 152 9.1
eCB ᾬ1213bn ᾬ1790bn 52 7.0
BankofJapan ﾥ108tn ﾥ117tn 9 2.0
Bankofengland ﾣ80bn ﾣ226bn 181 10.3
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However, the term structure of interest rates continues to slope upwards in both




Another common policy response has been to combat elevated spreads and
reduced liquidity in the interbank funding market. Policies include increasing the
amountandtermofcollateralisedlendingtoﬁnancialinstitutions,frontloadingthe
provision of bank reserves, broadening the range of collateral accepted and
narrowing the spreads between deposit and credit facilities. Central banks surely
have lowered spreads in this market below what they would otherwise be. But,
measuringthiseﬀectisextremelydiﬃcult.Asimplecorrelationofthesizeofthese
central bank programmes with the size of the spreads is not informative because
causalityrunsinbothdirections:higherspreadsinducedcentralbankstoexpand
theirprogrammesandlargerprogrammeshelpedtoholddownspreads.Theformer








markets. For these programmes, particularly in the uS, the evidence is clear that
theprogrammesdidsucceedinloweringspreads.SpreadsoneligibleCPdropped
6. KimandOrphanides(2007)showthatthetermpremiumoveratwo-yearhorizonhasbeenclosetozero
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sharply immediately after the launch of the Fed’s CP programmes and these
spreadshaveremainednearnormallevelssincethen(theﬁrstverticallineinFigure
1 denotes the announcement of the Commercial Paper Funding Facility and the
secondverticallinedenotesthebeginningofitsoperations).CPspreadsinJapan
did not rise to the extent that they did in the uS, but a series of Bank of Japan
measures to support this market, denoted by the vertical lines in Figure 1 on the
nextpage,appeartohavereducedspreadstoverylowlevels9.
Spreads on consumer ABS began to decline immediately after the announce-
ment of the Fed’s TAlF programme, and there were further declines as the
programmebeganoperations(althoughconsumerABSspreadsremainsomewhat




programme, declined sharply with the announcement of the agency purchase





in corporate yield spreads. given that the sizes of these programmes are rather
limited,itisnotsurprisingthattheeﬀectshavebeenless-readilyapparent.
For central bank asset-purchase programmes that focus on relatively liquid
long-termgovernmentandgovernment-backedsecurities,themajoreﬀectislikely
to be through the spread between long-term and short-term interest rates on all
debtsecurities.Forexample,theFedexplainedthatitsdecisiontopurchaselonger-
termTreasurysecuritieswasintendedto'helpimproveconditionsinprivatecredit
markets' (italics added). This view is based on theories such as the habitat-




2008, the Bank of Japan began outright purchases of small quantities of CP. On 22 January 2009, the
Bank of Japan increased its outright purchases of CP. On 19 February 2009, the Bank of Japan further
relaxedrulesregardingtheuseofCPascollateralforBankofJapanloans.
10.The vertical lines in this panel denote 25 November 2008, when the Fed announced $600 billion in
plannedpurchasesofagencysecurities,5January2009,whentheﬁrstpurchasestookplace,and19
March2009,whenplannedagencypurchaseswereraisedto$1.45trillion.
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than oﬀset by increased Treasury issuance of long-term debt. Overall, there was
littlemovementintheaveragematurityofTreasurydebtheldbythepublicandthus
little hope of estimating a statistically signiﬁcant and robust eﬀect. A new
generation of studies, using a longer span of data, consistently does ﬁnd a
noticeable eﬀect of shifts in the maturity structure of Treasury debt on the term
structure12. The estimated size of this eﬀect depends on the degree of theoretical
restrictions imposed on the estimating equation and it is somewhat sensitive to
sampleperiod.Nevertheless,theeﬀectalwayshasthecorrectsign.Basedonthese
studies, a plausible range for the eﬀect of central-bank purchases of long-term
TreasurysecuritiesequivalenttoonepercentoftheoutstandingstockofTreasury





large-scale purchases of long-term assets by the Fed and the Bank of england
provide further evidence on the eﬀect of such policies on the term spread. The
followingtableliststhemovementsinvariousinterestratesoverone-andtwo-day
eventwindowssurroundingFedandBankofenglandcommunicationsaboutsuch
asset purchases14. Note that the movements are common across all long-term











and $500 billion of agency MBS. On 1 December, Chairman Bernanke raised the possibility of buying
longer-term Treasury securities. On 16 December the FOMC conﬁrmed the agency programme and
reiteratedthepossibilityofbuyingTreasurysecurities.On28JanuarytheFOMCdisappointedmarkets
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rates.Themovementsareintheexpecteddirectiononalldatesexcept7May,when
the announced increase in purchases had been widely anticipated and global
sovereign yields were rising. The continued evidence of such eﬀects on 6 August
(the ﬁnal column) suggest that the rise in long-term government bond rates
between April and June reﬂected other factors, such as rising government debt
issuance and an unwinding of safe-haven ﬂows, rather than a change in the
market’sassessmentoftheimpactofassetpurchases15.
Theseannouncementeﬀectsareroughlyconsistentwiththerangeofplausible
estimates reported in the econometric literature. A precise comparison is
complicated by issues such as 1) the substitutability between agency securities
andcorporatedebtontheonehandandTreasurysecuritiesandgiltsontheother
by not announcing Treasury purchases. On 18 March the FOMC announced a Treasury purchase
programmeofupto$300billionandexpandedtheagencyMBSprogrammeto$1.25trillion.On5March
theBankofenglandannouncedanassetpurchaseprogrammeofﾣ75billion,potentiallyexpandableto








Nov. Dec. Dec. Jan. Mar. Mar. May Aug.
25 1-2 16-17 28-29 18-19 576
buy buy buy buy buy buy buy buy
more more more less more more* more** more
1-Yr.Treasury 0 -13 -5 4 -9 002
10-Yr.Treasury -24 -27 -33 30 -40 -28 8 -9
10-Yr.Swap -32 -23 -53 5 -37 -12 15 -1
10+Yr. -16 -27 -57 23 -29 -15 2 -6
Corporate***
Source:Datastream.
Note: event windows are 1-day for morning announcements and 2-day for afternoon
announcements.
*Alllong-termratesfellsigniﬁcantlyfurtherthefollowingday.
**The announced increase was close to market expectations. An initial drop in yields was
reversedoverthecourseofthedayasglobalbondyieldsrosestrongly.
***Based on price indexes assuming 6 percent coupon and 12 years to maturity. uS data are
Barclayslong-termcorporateaggregate.uKdataareFTSeSterling10-15yearcorporate.
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hand; 2) the extent to which markets anticipated these announcements; 3) the
extent to which markets extrapolated additional purchases beyond those
announced;4)theextenttowhichtheprogrammesaﬀectedmarketexpectations
of future short-term interest rates; 5) the length of time markets expect central
banks to hold these assets; and 6) the speed with which markets price-in the full
eﬀectsofannouncedpurchases.
Overall, the evidence supports the view that large-scale alterations in the
relativesupplyofshort-termandlong-termdebtinprivatehandscanaﬀecttheterm
structure of interest rates. The size of this eﬀect is relatively small, so large
quantitiesmustbepurchased.Importantly,theeﬀectseemstospilloveracrossall
long-term debt securities, including classes that are not included in the purchase
programmes,suchascorporatedebtintheuSandswapsintheuKanduS.
isitenough?
Clearly, central banks on both sides of the Atlantic have been very responsive to
the ﬁnancial crisis, both in terms of traditional monetary policy and in terms of
nontraditional monetary policies and the provision of liquidity16. Nevertheless,
further policy easing is warranted. Monetary-policy rules in the style of Taylor
(1993) generally point to policy rates around or below zero for these regions.
Moreover, these simple rules do not factor in the eﬀects of exceptional ﬁnancial
strainsonthetransmissionofmonetaryeasetoeconomicactivity17.Thustheymay
understate the eﬀective tightness of monetary policy. To some extent, non-
traditionalpolicymeasuresarehelpingtraditionalpolicychannelstofunctionmore
normally, but for the most part such measures are not providing additional
macroeconomicstimulusbeyondthatimpliedbytraditionalpolicymeasures18.An
alternative gauge of the appropriate stance of policy derives from forecasts of
outputandinﬂationoverthenextyearorso.economicforecastsbycentralbanks,
other oﬃcial institutions and the private sector overwhelmingly show a
disappointingreboundfromthedeeprecession.giventhepotentialdangeroffalling
intodeﬂation,policymakersshouldaimatamorevigorousreturntogrowth.




18.The main caveat to this conclusion arises from the potential eﬀects of purchases of long-term liquid
assetsonlong-terminterestrates.


































































































































































































































































































































negative interest rates next year as inﬂation is projected to decline. The dashed
linesaretheoriginalTaylor(1993)rule,showninequation(1),usingoutputgaps
(y - y*) estimated by the OeCD and assuming a target inﬂation rate (ˀ*) of two
percentintheeuroarea,uKanduS,andonepercentinJapan.Asintheoriginalrule,
theequilibriumrealinterestrateisassumedtobetwopercent20.
1) rt=2+pt - pt-4+ 0.5pt - pt-4- ˀ* +0.5(yt- yt*)
Thedottedlinesaredynamicsimulationsofestimatedpolicyrulesbeginning
in 1984Q2 using the speciﬁcation in equation (2)21. The estimation sample is
1984Q1-2007Q222.Thisspeciﬁcationallowsforslowadjustmentofthepolicyrate
with a diﬀerent (generally faster) adjustment speed allowed for changes in the
outputgap23.estimationresultsarepresentedinthefollowingtable.Thecoeﬃcient
on inﬂation does not diﬀer signiﬁcantly from that in Taylor’s original rule for any
region. The coeﬃcient on the output gap is signiﬁcantly larger than in Taylor’s
originalruleintheeuroareaandtheuS,whereasitissmallerthaninTaylor’soriginal
ruleinJapan.
2) rt= ˁ rt-1 + 1- ˁ ʱ + pt – pt-4 + ʲpt – pt-4+ ʸyt- yt* + ʴ ∆ (yt- yt*)
Figure 2 shows that both policy rules called for a sharp drop in short-term
19.Theinterestratesareobservedthrough2009Q3.From2009Q2until2010Q4,thepolicyrulesarebased
onOeCDestimatesandprojectionsofrealgDPandgDPdeﬂators.
20.Data are quarterly, from OeCD economic Outlook database. Inﬂation is the (logarithmic) percentage
changeinthegDPdeﬂator.
21.Dynamic simulations use the previous period’s ﬁtted value for the lagged interest rate rather than the
actualvalue.
22.Priorto1999,euro-areadataaregDP-weightedaveragesofthesixlargestmembercountries.Thissample
corresponds to the period of relative macroeconomic stability in these regions. However, there have
beennotableshiftsintheframeworkorgoalsofmonetarypolicysince1984.Forexample,uSinﬂation
appearedtomovedownpersistentlyin1991,theBankofenglandmovedtoinﬂationtargetingin1993
and was granted independence in 1997, the Bank of Japan was granted increased independence in
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interest rates beginning in 2008Q4 in the euro area, the uK and the uS. In every
region, the original Taylor rule calls for a negative short-term interest rate by the
beginningof2010,basedonOeCDforecastsofoutputandinﬂation.Theestimated
rule calls for negative policy rates next year in the euro area and the uS. An
estimatedTaylor-stylerulebasedonthegrowthrateofgDP(notshown),insteadof
theoutputgap,pointstonegativepolicyratesinallfourregionsbylate2009.




larger, than those in the original Taylor rule. More activist rules generally point to
more negative policy rates in the current situation. Some papers have argued for
the inclusion of exchange rates, equity prices, house prices, or measures of
ﬁnancialstressinthepolicyrule.Somehavearguedforbasingtheruleonforecasts








euroArea Japan* UK US
0.91 0.88 0.84 0.92
(.02) (.04) (.05) (.02)
0.18 1.68 0.73 1.09
(.86) (.39) (1.41) (1.99)
0.79 0.52 0.80 0.53
(.30) (.22) (.35) (.74)
1.99 0.11 0.39 2.18
(.43) (.17) (.38) (.64)
0.09 0.11 0.39 0.24
(.07) (.05) (.20) (.10)
rootMSe 0.27 0.37 0.90 0.45
Note:Coeﬃcientstandarderrorsinparentheses.DataarefromtheOECDEconomicOutlookdatabase.
*A four-quarter dummy was added for the imposition of the consumption tax in 1997, but the
estimatedeﬀectwasnotsigniﬁcantatanylevel.
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rudebusch(2009)haveciteddiﬀerentvariantsofTaylor-stylerulestosuggestthat




this chapter to sort out the vast literature on Taylor-style policy rules. rather, I







current policy can have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on output and inﬂation in 2010. A
minimumstandardforcountercyclicalpolicyinthefaceofalargeoutputgapisthat
output should be forecast to grow faster than potential over the next year or so
unlessinﬂationisexpectedtobehigherthandesired28.








2010 2010Q4 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010
Q4/Q4 Output Q4/Q4 Q4/Q4 Q4/Q4 Output Y/Ygap
gDP gap gap gDP gDP gap Change
growth Change growth growth
euroarea 0.9 -5.8 0.3 1.2 0.9 -3.1 -0.1
Japan 0.8 -6.1 0.0 1.0 1.4 -5.5 1.5
uK 1.1 -6.2 0.0 1.9 1.3 -4.7 0.2
uS 1.4 -5.3 0.1 2.8 1.9 -3.9 0.6
*ConsensusForecastssurveyaveragesfromConsensuseconomics,Inc.





no signiﬁcant reduction in output gaps over the four quarters of 2010. The IMF
projects somewhat smaller, but still substantial, negative output gaps in all four
regionsnextyear.OnlyJapan,whichisestimatedtohavethelargestoutputgapof
these regions in 2009, is projected by the IMF to grow substantially faster than


















of 1.2 percent. Both of these are clearly below desired levels, even after
allowingforapossibledeclineinthepotentialgrowthrate.
• The midpoint of Bank of Japan policy-board members’ (July 2009) forecasts
of gDP growth in ﬁscal year 2010 is 1.0 percent, below the recent historical
average of output growth, but close to the Bank of Japan’s assessment of the
currentpotentialgrowthrate.Themidpointofpolicy-boardmembers’inﬂation
forecasts is -1.0 percent, well below the Bank of Japan’s deﬁnition of price
stability,whichiscentredaround1.0percent.
29.The Congressional Budget Oﬃce (2009) projects the potential growth rate of uS output in 2009 and
2010attwopercent.




run' rate of 4.9 percent30. FOMC participants project core inﬂation to be about
1.3percentin2011,comparedtoadesiredinﬂationrateofaround1.8percent.
It is not clear when policymakers at these central banks expect inﬂation to return
to its desired level, but it is surely further out than the commonly-used two-year
horizon.
TheBankofenglandprovidesanexceptiontothispattern.TheBankofengland




(Q4/Q4) and that inﬂation will return to its target rate by late 2011. under market
expectations of somewhat-higher interest rates, the Bank of england projects
slightly lower growth and a continued undershooting of its inﬂation target. From
theseprojectionsweinferthattheBankofenglandexpectstoholdpolicyratesat





Altogether then, the evidence from a wide range of economic forecasts
suggeststhatfurthermonetary-policystimuluswouldbeappropriateinthemajor
developed regions. A notable exception to this conclusion is found in the Bank of
englandforecastfortheuKeconomy,whichsuggeststhatmaintainingthecurrent
policystanceoverthenexttwoyearswillleadtoasatisfactoryoutcome.However,
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Annex:timelineofcentralbankresponsestotheﬁnancialcrisis







increasedterm Sep2007 frontloadedbank frontloadedbank
liquiditytobanks, through reserves,widened reserves,







increasedterm Jan2008 establishedterm increaseddollar
liquiditytobanks, through securitieslending, liquidity










increasedterm increasedterm Sep2008 increasedterm increasedterm
liquiditytobanks, liquiditytobanks, through liquiditytobanks, liquiditytobanks,
supportedCP supportedCP Dec2008 provideddollar increaseddollar
market,provided market,broadened liquiditythrough liquiditythrough
dollarliquidity collateralaccepted, Fedswaps, Fedswapsand
throughFed beganoutright broadened providedswiss
swaps,increased purchasesof collateralaccepted, francliquidity
JgBpurchases, agencysecurities, loweredpolicy throughSNB








beganoutright beganpurchasing Jan2009 beganpurchasing increasedterm
purchasesofCP longer-term through longer-termgilts, liquiditytobanks,
andshort-term Treasury Aug2009 corporatebonds, beganpurchasing






1833 Oceans_8.3.11.qxp:oceans apart book  9/3/11  16:05  Page 102ItisapleasuretohavebeenaskedtocommentonJoegagnon’scontributiontothis
volume.Hispaperisinterestingforatleastthreereasons:(i)itprovidesatimeline
of the crisis; (ii) it argues that quantitative easing has been eﬀective; and (iii) it
concludes that given their historical interest-rate setting behaviour, the Bank of
england, the Bank of Japan, the european Central Bank and the Federal reserve
shouldnowallhavesetinterestratesmuchbelowzero,ifthathadbeenpossible.





will consider only the euro area. My main conclusion is that a better-speciﬁed
empirical reaction function than that used by Joe shows that interest rates in the
euro area are in fact quite close to where one would expect them to be, given the
eCB’sinterest-ratesettingbeforethecrisiserupted.
Joe estimates empirical reaction functions on quarterly data for the period
1984Q1–2007Q2measuringinﬂationbythegDPdeﬂator,thegrowthrateofwhich
hasfallensharplyasaconsequenceofthecrisis.Furthermore,heusesthegrowth













Figure 1 provides dynamic out-of-sample predictions from the model, which
showthatthree-monthinterestratesintheeuroareain2009Q2shouldhavebeen
about minus one percent, with a 95 percent conﬁdence band that excludes zero.
AsJoeconcludes,monetarypolicyintheeuroarealooksfartighterthanonewould
expectonthebasisofthehistoricalrecord.
But one problem with using empirical reaction functions in this way to
characterisemonetarypolicyisthatmisspeciﬁcationcanhavealargecumulative




the Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI), which declines in much the same way as
real gDP growth during the crisis, but starts to recover in 2009Q2 since it is a
forward-lookingvariable.Moreover,themodelusescoreinﬂation,whichfellmuch
lessthaninﬂationcomputedusingthegDPdeﬂator.Finally,itincorporatesbothM3
growth and year-on-year changes in the euro's nominal eﬀective exchange rates.
TheestimatesarepresentedinthesecondrowofTable1.Theimprovementin
ﬁtisdramatic:theadjustedr-squaredrisesfrom0.48to0.83.Moreintuitively,the
standard error of the estimate falls sharply from 0.24 basis point to 0.14 basis
points.
Figure2showsthedynamicout-of-samplepredictionsofthemodel.Interesti-
ngly, these are very close to the actual interest rate, which lies well inside the 95
percent conﬁdence bands, except during 2008Q3-Q4, when the turmoil after the







the dependent variable is the three-month libor rather than the eCB’s repo rate; and core inﬂation is
signiﬁcantinthenewmodelandisthereforeincluded.
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table1
lagged Output Pmi inﬂation Core eﬀective m3 Adj.r2
interest growth inﬂation exchange growth(changes)
rate rate
1. 0.84 0.31 0.27 0.48
(14.82) (4.56) (1.84)
2. 0.94 0.06 0.15 -0.02 0.04 0.83
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ﬁnancial crisis, which started in 2007, and describes the responses of the major
centralbanks.Allcentralbanksreducedtheirinterestratestolevelsclosetozero
andused'non-standardmeasures'toeaseconditionsintheﬁnancialmarkets.For
example, the european Central Bank has lengthened signiﬁcantly the maturity of
its operations and extended the range of securities it accepts as collateral. This
extension of accepted collateral was very important because it ensured banks
could access liquidity from central banks and it allowed banks to oﬀer new loans
or,atleast,torenewexistingcontracts.Althoughgagnonacknowledgesthesesteps,




been negative, which meant that the zero lower bound was severely binding.
• Althoughshort-terminterestratesareatalowlevel,theyieldcurveissloping













Taylor rules have often been used as a simple benchmark to evaluate the
restrictivenessofmonetarypolicy.However,theweaknessesofthisarewellknown,
such as diﬃculties in measuring (the current or forecast) output gaps and the
naturalinterestrate(particularlyinrealtime),orifasimpleruledoesjusticetoall
the information central banks should take into account2. Therefore, it is not
surprisingthatcentralbankersusuallyhesitatetoacceptsuchinterestratesasa
benchmark for evaluating their policies3. The use of the Taylor rule as a guide for
monetary policy during the turmoil of the past few years raises some speciﬁc
problems.
First,makingforecastsofinﬂationandgDP,ortheoutputgap,wasclearlymore




percent over the comparable time span two years previously). Similar drastic
revisions were observed in most other countries. These experiences clearly




rate is, to a large extent, the result of the sombre outlook for real growth given by
mostforecasters.Inadditiontouncertaintyaboutfutureoutput,thecrisishasalso
increased our uncertainty regarding potential output. Several structural shocks
(fromoilpricestotheuncoveringofstructuralweaknessesintheﬁnancialindustry
and its consequences for future real growth) and the dramatic increase in public
debtinthecourseofthecrisis,whichmayhavenegativeconsequencesforlonger-
term growth in our economies, may well require a downward revision of our
estimatedfutureoutputgap.





3. See, for example, J C Trichet: Activism and alertness in monetary policy, lecture at the conference on
CentralBanksinthe21stCentury,Madrid,June2006.
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changed during the crisis. This may reduce the usefulness of short-term interest
ratesasindicatorsformonetarypolicy.Infact,centralbanksusedabroadrangeof
other measures to ensure the functioning of the ﬁnancial system, including







market reduces the danger that central banks may distort ﬁnancial markets and
theallocationofscarceresourcestotheprivatesector4.Buyingpublicdebtoutright
mightbeinconﬂicttheoverallaimofnotbeinginvolvedinﬁnancingpublicdeﬁcits
– historically one of the, if not the, main peril for stable prices. On the other hand,
inthecaseofoutrightpurchasesofprivateassets,centralbanksshouldalwaysbe
awareoftheriskthattheircounterpartydefaults(withunpleasantconsequences
for proﬁts and possible resulting dependence on governments – not the best
preconditionforacrediblecentralbank;itisself-evidentthattheserisksaremore
serious in a sharp recession than in normal times). All in all, such a (massive)
shifting of central-bank operations toward the longer end of the ﬁnancial markets
wouldbeariskyexperiment.Indeed,itisnotclearwhy–ifitisneeded–itshould
notbecarriedoutbythegovernmentitself.
4. The guidelines of the eCB state that “the eurosystem has to act in accordance with the principle of an
openeconomywithfreecompetitionfavouringaneﬃcientallocationofresources”.
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With the sharp deterioration of global economic conditions, prospects for a
prolongedrecession,andsigniﬁcantdownsiderisks,themanagingdirectorofthe
InternationalMonetaryFundcalledinlate2008forﬁscalpolicytoplayamajorrole
in supporting global demand. The managing director noted that counter-cyclical
ﬁscalpolicywouldnotbeadvisableinallcountries,particularlyinthosewithgreater












ﬁscal aﬀairs department of the International Monetary Fund and co-ordinated by the author. See the




3. See, for example, ‘Fiscal Policy for the Crisis’, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/spn/2008/
spn0801.pdf.




• Diversiﬁed, given uncertainty over which measures would be most eﬀective.
• Contingent,indicatingthatfurtheractionwouldbetaken,ifneeded.




• The Fund staﬀ observed that the challenge would be to ﬁnd the right balance
among these potentially competing goals – particularly, large and lasting
actionsversustheneedtoensureﬁscalsustainability.
theﬁscalpolicyresponse





ﬁscal expansion is signiﬁcantly less in emerging economies and low-income
countries than advanced countries. Across the g20, the average overall deﬁcit is
projectedtowidenby6.9percentofgDPthisyear,andtonarrownextyear5.looking
acrosstheAtlantic,theﬁscalexpansionfrompre-crisislevelsissigniﬁcantlylarger
in the uK and the uS than in the g20 as a whole and in the other european g20
countriessuchasFrance,germanyandItaly(Figure1).
The more sizable overall ﬁscal expansion in the advanced g20 countries
reﬂects, in part, larger automatic stabilisers. These reﬂect, in turn, larger govern-



















Automatic stabilisers & other factors
Losses from ﬁnancial sector support






(Pre-crisis) 2009 2010 2014
World -0.5 -6.7 -5.6 -2.8
Advancedeconomies -1.2 -8.9 -8.1 -4.7
emergingeconomies 0.7 -4.0 -2.8 -0.7
least-developedeconomies -0.2 -3.8 -2.0 -1.4
g20Countries -1.0 -7.9 -6.9 -3.7
Advancedg20economies -1.9 -9.7 -8.7 -5.3
emergingg20economies 0.3 -5.1 -4.1 -1.3
Memorandumitem:excludingﬁnancialsupport
20Countries -1.0 -7.0 -6.7 -3.7
Advancedg20economies -1.9 -8.2 -8.4 -5.3
emergingg20economies 0.3 -5.1 -4.1 -1.3
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table2:g20countries:automaticstabilisersandotherfactors
(inpercentofgDPandchangeinpercentagepoints)
revenue- Changein Contributionof Contributionof
to-gDP output automatic other
ratio gaps* stabilizers*/ factors*
2007 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010
Total 31.3 -4.8 -4.6 -1.8 -1.7 -2.1 -2.3
Advancedcountries 34.7 -5.3 -4.7 -2.2 -2.0 -2.2 -2.8
emergingandDevelopingg20 26.3 -4.1 -4.4 -1.1 -1.1 -2.1 -1.6
Source:StaﬀestimatesbasedontheOctober2009WeO.
*ChangesinthegDPPPPweightedcountrygroupaverageswithrespectto2007.Otherfactorsinclude
non-crisis related discretionary spending or revenue measures (eg, changes in defence spending),
aswellastheimpactofnon-discretionaryeﬀectsonrevenuesbeyondthenormalcycle.Theseinclude



































Changes in output gaps Revenue to GDP ratio
Figure2:AutomaticstabilisersintheUSandtheg20countries
Source:StaﬀestimatesbasedontheOctober2009WeO.
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and 1.6 percent of gDP in 2010 (both with respect to 2007). emerging g20
countries have announced somewhat larger stimulus packages for 2009, 2.2
percentofgDPonaverage,thanadvancedg20countries–1.9percentofgDP.
Similarly,thestimuluspackageintheuSisnearlytwiceaslargeonaverageas
those in the eu g20 countries (Table 3). In both comparisons, larger stimulus
reﬂects,atleastinpart,smallerautomaticstabilisersandconsequentlygreater
need6. In addition, key emerging markets entered the crisis with substantial










Overall Crisis-related Other Overall Crisis-related Other
balance discretionary Factors balance discretionary factors
measures measures
France -4.3 -0.7 -3.6 -4.4 -0.8 -3.6
germany -3.7 -1.6 -2.1 -4.2 -2.0 -2.2
Italy -4.1 -0.2 -3.9 -4.1 -0.1 -4.0
unitedKingdom -8.9 -1.6 -7.4 -10.6 0.0 -10.6
unitedStates -6.4 -2.0 -4.4 -6.5 -1.8 -4.7
g20Countries(gDPPPPweighted) -5.9 -2.0 -3.9 -5.6 -1.6 -4.0
Advancedg20economies -6.2 -1.9 -4.3 -6.4 -1.6 -4.7
ofwhicheug20 -5.2 -1.1 -4.1 -5.8 -0.9 -4.9
emergingg20economies -5.4 -2.2 -3.2 -4.4 -1.6 -2.8
Source:StaﬀestimatesbasedontheOctober2009WeO.SeeAnnexTables2forcountry-by-country
informationfortheg20.
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• Non-discretionary impacts on ﬁscal revenues of eﬀects beyond the normal
cycle.Fortheemergingmarkets,thesearedrivenbysharplylowercommodity
prices compared with 2007 (eg, russia, Saudi Arabia). For the advanced
countries,thesereﬂectlowerrevenueslinkedtodeclinesinpropertyandasset














10 multi-year plan. The rest is explained by structural revenue losses (see
previouspoint).
• Fortheemergingg20countries,structuralprimarybalancesarealsoprojected
to weaken between 2007 and 2010, by three percentage points of gDP on
average. Once again, this is only partly explained by discretionary ﬁscal
stimulus(1.6percentofgDPin2010).Theremaining1.5percentagepointsis








income taxes (Figure 5). given that their governments are larger, it was
expectedthatadvancedcountrieswouldfocusmoreontaxcuts,whileemerg-
ingeconomieswouldaimtoaddressinfrastructuregapsandweaknesses.





































primary Primary Primary temporary
balance* revenue spending factors* total revenue expenditure total revenue expenditure
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________
g20Countries(gDPPPPweighted) -3.6 -1.4 2.5 -0.3 1.6 0.5 1.1 -2.3 -0.9 1.4
excludingunitedStates -2.4 -0.7 1.8 -0.1 1.1 0.3 0.8 -1.4 -0.4 0.9
Advancedg20economies -4.0 -1.7 2.7 -0.3 1.6 0.7 1.0 -2.7 -1.0 1.7
excludingunitedStates -2.0 -0.5 1.5 0.0 0.8 0.3 0.5 -1.2 -0.2 1.0
emergingg20economies -3.0 -1.0 2.2 -0.2 1.6 0.3 1.3 -1.6 -0.8 0.9
Source:StaﬀestimatesbasedontheOctober2009WeO.
*The cyclical adjustment to revenues and expenditures corrects for the eﬀect of the economic cycle (see





















































































































































































































































Sources: IMF staﬀ estimates; joint IMF-uK. Treasury survey; http://www.recovery.gov. unless other indicated, the information refers to the
authorities’estimatesandviewsasreportedinthesurvey.
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• Important diﬀerences also emerge in comparing the composition of Trans-
atlantic stimulus packages (Figure 6). Measures in France, germany and the
uK are focused on tax relief – corporate, personal, and indirect, respectively,
althoughtheuKpackagealsohasasizablepersonal-incometaxcomponent.
The relatively small stimulus package in Italy consists mostly of safety-net
measures. The uS package is made up of a diverse range of measures,
includingtaxrebatesandtransferstostateandlocalgovernments.
Projections of the ﬁscal expansion assume that all discretionary stimulus
envisagedfor2009–10willbeimplemented,althoughasizableshareremainsin
thepipeline.ArecentIMFanduKTreasurysurveyfoundthatstimulusimplementa-
tion is proceeding broadly as planned (Table 5). However, information is mostly
qualitative, except for that for France, Korea and the uS. Implementation rates







impacts range from 1.2 to 4.7 percentage points in 2009 and from 0.1 to 1.0
percentagepointin2010,bothwithrespecttothepreviousyear.Theseestimates
alsoconsidertheeﬀectofspilloverstoothercountries(viaimports),akeyelement
of the crisis response and the eﬀorts to pursue co-ordinated global action. The
estimates are broadly consistent with the ﬁndings of structural models, although
they reﬂect the impact of the full ﬁscal expansion and not only the discretionary
stimulus. The multipliers suggest that the growth impacts of the stimulus may be
relatively large in emerging g20 economies, given the emphasis on investment
spending, although the overall ﬁscal expansion is larger in advanced countries,
particularly in 2010. Across the Atlantic, the heavy weight to tax cuts in the uK-
stimulus package suggests relatively lower growth impacts than in germany and
theuS,wherethestimulusislargerandmorediverse.
7. Forspending,complicationsariseifstimulusprogrammesdonotrepresentaseparateiteminthebudget,
if budgetary data fail to distinguish among stages of implementation and if spending is at the sub-
nationallevel.Monitoringtaxcutsisinprincipleeasier,althoughquantifyingtheirimpactiscomplicated
bystatutorylagsintaxﬁlingschedulesanddiﬀerencesintaxbasesrelativetoinitialprojections.





• Structural models, based on household and ﬁrm optimising behaviour, such as the
IMF’sglobalIntegratedMonetaryandFiscalModel(gIMF).
• empirical estimations (VArs, narrative studies, micro studies, cross-country




2008). For empirical studies, estimates range from 3.8 to 5 (Perotti, 2006, romer and
romer,2008)to-1.5(Perotti,2005).
Increasing spending—either for consumption or investment—appears to be more
eﬀective than cutting taxes. While government spending results in a direct increase in
aggregate demand, tax cuts might not be fully spent (although increased saving may
haveabeneﬁcialimpactoverthemediumterminrepairinghouseholdbalancesheets).
The gIMF yields low ﬁscal multipliers for cuts in labour taxes and lump-sum transfers
(0.2–0.5); and high multipliers for government expenditure (1.6–3.9) and targeted




as noted earlier, it often takes a long time to activate spending without wasting public
resources,especiallyfornewprogrammes.




















g20total 1.2-4.7 0.1-1.0 0.7-2.8
Advancedg20countries 1.3-4.4 0.1-1.1 0.7-2.7





2/ The range of growth estimates reﬂects diﬀerent assumptions on ﬁscal multipliers. The low set
includedamultiplierof0.3onrevenues,0.5oncapitalspendingand0.3onotherspending.Thehigh
set included a multiplier of 0.6 on revenues, 1.8 on capital spending and 1 for other spending. For
calculation of the growth impact of total ﬁscal expansion a weighted average of current and capital
expendituremultiplierswasused.
3/ For the calculation of growth impacts, the change of the overall ﬁscal balance was adjusted: for





Capital Purchaseof guarantees liquidity Upfront
injection Assetsand Provisionand government
lendingby OtherSupport Financing
treasury byCentralBank
(A) (B) (C) (D) (e)
Average
g20 2.2 2.7 8.8 9.7 3.7
Advancedeconomies 3.4 4.1 13.9 7.6 5.7
InbillionsofuS$ 1,160 1,436 4,638 2,804 1,887
emergingeconomies 0.2 0.3 0.1 13.5 0.4
InbillionsofuS$ 22 38 7 1,581 47
Source: IMF staﬀ estimates based on oﬃcial announcement by agencies. Columns A, B, C and e
indicate announced or pledged amounts, and not actual uptake. Column D indicates the actual
changes in central bank balance sheets from June 2007 to June 2009. While these changes are
mostly related to measures aimed at enhancing market liquidity and providing ﬁnancial-sector
support,theymayoccasionallyhaveothercauses,andalsomaynotcaptureothertypesofsupport,
includingthatduetochangesinregulatorypolicies.Forcountrydetails,seeAnnexTable3.
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Supporttotheﬁnancialandothersectors
governmentsandcentralbankshavealsoprovideddirectsupporttotheﬁnancial
and other sectors on both sides of the Atlantic and across the g20. upfront
government-ﬁnancing needs connected with ﬁnancial support operations are
estimatedat5.7percentofgDPfortheadvancedg20countriesand0.4percentof
gDPfortheemergingg20countries(Table7).However,whileannouncedsupport
measures have been large, immediate impacts on government ﬁnancing needs
havebeenmorelimited,astransactionsdonotalwayshaveanimmediateordirect
impact on the overall ﬁscal position8. A key transatlantic diﬀerence: upfront
ﬁnancing needs for ﬁnancial sector support are larger for the uK and the uS than
forFrance,germanyandItaly(AnnexTable3andFigure7).
Financial sector support provided by g20 governments has so far generally
been considerably less than originally announced. Outlays are less than half of
pledged amounts for capital injections in ﬁnancial institutions and about one-
quarter of pledges for the purchase of assets and lending by treasuries (Table 8).
Thisoutcomereﬂectsavarietyoffactorsincludingtheprecautionarynatureofinitial
announcements, indications of increasing stability and improved bank liquidity,
8. Forexample,ifnocorrespondingclaimresultsfromacapitalinjection,thetransactionwouldberegarded
as a capital transfer with a corresponding impact on the overall balance. However, if an intervention
results in the acquisition of a claim, there may be no immediate or direct impact on the overall ﬁscal







Countries Amountused inpercentof Amountused inpercentof
announcement announcement
Average
g20 1.2 44.4 1.0 27.0
Advancedeconomies 1.5 44.4 1.2 26.1
InbillionsofuS$ 446 … 366 …
emergingeconomies 0.2 44.6 0.3 50.3
InbillionsofuS$ 11 … 17 …
Source:Staﬀestimates.PPPgDPweightedaverages.Fordetails,seeAnnexTable4.























*No data on utilised amounts for Germany.
























*Nodata on utilised amounts for Germanyand Italy.
US France Germany* Italy* UK
US France Germany* Italy UK
Figure7:FinancialsectorsupportintheUSandintheg20countriesoftheeU
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and lags in implementation of programmes for recapitalisation and purchase of
assets. Central bank credit facilities also appear to have been taken up only to a
limitedextentinmanycountries,asconditionshavenotturnedouttobeasdireas
expectedatthetimeoftheirannouncement.Forexample,severalliquiditysupport







many countries. removing the ﬁscal stimulus once a private sector-led recovery
develops should be relatively straightforward, as most stimulus measures have
beentemporary(Box2).However,spendingpressuresareexpectedtocontinuein
advancedcountries,particularlyinJapanandintheunitedStates.evenassuming
the expiration of Bush Administration tax cuts in the united States, structural
primarybalanceswouldremainnegative,andgovernmentdebtforadvancedg20
countrieswouldreach118percentofgDPonaverageby2014(Figure8andAnnex
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BOx2:UnWinDingtheFiSCAlStimUlUS
The ﬁscal stimulus put in place in response to the crisis should be relatively
straightforwardtounwindaseconomicconditionsimprove,asalargeshareof
packages is temporary. Stimulus often encompassed time-bound measures
(eg, investment projects or one-oﬀ tax rebates) or contained explicit sunset
provisions. This is particularly true for expenditure items, where only a small
fraction of measures is permanent. By contrast, about half of tax measures




structure spending in emerging countries’ stimulus packages – half, versus





temporary Permanent temporary Permanent
g20total 80 20 54 46
Advancedg20countries 75 25 14 86
emergingmarketg20countries 91 9 88 12
Source:Staﬀestimates.Shareoftotalstimulusandrevenuemeasuresbytheexpectedcostof
speciﬁcmeasures.











































2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Cycl. adj. primary deﬁcit Cycl. primary deﬁcit
Growth Interest
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90percentofgDPorhigherintheuSandeug20countries.Debttrendsaremore
favourableforemergingeconomies,however,projectedstrongpotentialgrowthin




markets, which could add to funding costs. This highlights the importance for
emerging economies of securing the projected medium-term ﬁscal adjustment.
Higher debt stocks, compounded by higher interest rates, will involve a
weakening of debt service indicators in advanced g20 economies. Net interest




especially costly, given already high debt levels. At higher debt levels, ﬁscal
balanceswillbemoresensitivetointerestrates.Forexample,ifrealinterestrates
in 2014 are at the 30-year peak for the g7 countries (5.1 percent in 1985) rather




has taken hold, the positive growth impact of the ﬁscal expansion would be
enhancedbytheidentiﬁcationofclearstrategiestoensurethatﬁscalsolvencyis
preserved over the medium term. The reaction of ﬁnancial markets to the
deterioration of the ﬁscal outlook has so far remained moderate. However, this
shouldnotleadtocomplacency.First,interestratesarenowcyclicallylow.Second,
markets in the past have reacted late and abruptly to changes in fundamentals.




The sharp increase in government debt has complicated the management of
pre-existingchallengesfrompopulationageing,especiallyinadvancedeconomies.
under current policies, spending on pensions and health care is projected to
increase substantially over the next two decades in several countries, especially
1833 Oceans_8.3.11.qxp:oceans apart book  9/3/11  16:05  Page 129130OCeANSAPArT
acrosstheAtlantic(Box3)9.governmentshavealsotakenoncontingentliabilities
– guarantees and other commitments to future expenditures – that may
materialise. Owing to these pressures, which existed prior to the global ﬁnancial
andeconomiccrisis,attainingagivenprimarysurpluswillpresentchallengesthat
werenotexperiencedtothesameextentinthepast.
A ﬁscal exit strategy limited to unwinding discretionary ﬁscal stimulus and
ﬁnancial-sector support would be far from suﬃcient. Simply letting the stimulus
expire would still leave the government debt of many advanced countries on an
explosive path. While maximising the recovery value of assets acquired through








on the eﬀect of ﬁscal variables on interest rates suggests that the 40
percentage-point increase in government-debt ratios projected for advanced
countriesfrom2008-14couldraiseinterestratesbytwopercentagepoints11.





• High debt may ultimately retard growth. The cases of Italy and Japan – two
high-debt countries that have experienced prolonged periods of slow output
growth–arenoteworthyhere12.
9. Formorediscussion,see:http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/spn/2009/spn0913.pdf.
10.See http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2009/020109.pdf, “The Size of the Fiscal expansion: An
AnalysisforthelargestCountries.”
11.SeetheNovemberFiscalMonitorathttp://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/spn/2009/spn0925.pdf.
12.However, the causality may also run from slow growth to high debt ratios. In addition, factors such as
labourandproductmarketrigiditiesorﬁnancialstrainsmayhaveplayedanimportantroleinexplaining
slowgrowthinItalyandJapan.
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BOx3:AgeingAnDheAlthCAreSPenDingPreSSUreSineUrOPeAnDtheUS
growth in age-related and health-care spending (the latter reﬂecting in part
demographics)islikelytoberelativelycontainedoverthenextﬁveyears,butwill




period up to 2015 (compared to 2007), with the increase accelerating after
2015.Theseexpendituresareprojectedtoriseby1.9percentofgDPover2015–
30 and by a further 2.9 percent of gDP between 2030 and 2060. This reﬂects
thetimingofthebabyboomineurope,whichimpliesamarkedincreaseinthe
cohortsreachingretirementagestartingin2020–30.Intheshortrun,netage-
related costs may be partially reduced by lower spending on education, as a







assumption of unchanged relative prices, contrary to recent trends. Higher
relativepricesforhealthservicesandwideravailabilityofhigh-techtreatments,
as well as greater demand for health-care services due in part to the rapidly









factors on future spending trends. For example, technological progress could
improve well-being at older ages and foster more active labour participation,
amelioratingspendingdynamics.laboursupplymayalsoincreaseinresponse
tolowerpensionsduetodepletionofpensionassetsduringthecrisis.
Policy implementation challenges are an additional source of upward risk
totheseprojections.Insomecountries,existingrulesforsocialsecuritybeneﬁts
implyasharpreductioninreplacementratesoverthemediumterm.Whilethis








• Pension expenditure is expected to expand only by 0.2 percent of gDP by
2015, compared to 2007. However spending is expected to grow rapidly
after2015andriseby1.1percentofgDPovertheperioduntil2030anda
further1.1percentofgDPuntil2060.
• Health-care spending is projected to grow by 0.2 percent of gDP overall
during the period 2007–15, 0.5 percent of gDP during 2015–30 and one
percentofgDPduring2030–60.
• long-termcarespendingisprojectedtogrowby0.1percentofgDPoverthe
period until 2015, 0.3 percent of gDP during 2015–30 and 0.8 percent of
gDPafter2030.
• education spending is projected to fall by 0.3 percent of gDP by 2015, to









of gDP between 2030 and 2060. The bulk of the increase is accounted for by
rapidlyexpandinghealth-carespendingforMedicaidandMedicareprogrammes
(+3.2 percent of gDP in 2015–30 and +5.2 percent in 2030–60) owing to
escalatingunitcostgrowthandincreasesinthenumberofbeneﬁciaries.These
programmesarenowunderreviewtocontainspendinggrowthwhileexpanding
coverage. Social security spending will step up in 2015–30 by one percent of
gDP but stabilise thereafter (at about six percent of gDP) as the baby-boom
cohortsfullyretire.
1833 Oceans_8.3.11.qxp:oceans apart book  9/3/11  16:05  Page 132OCeANSAPArT133
Instead,anexitstrategyshouldbeunderstoodasinvolvingasetofmeasuresthat
willbringdebtratiosdowntomoderatelevelsandkeepthemthereonasustainable
basis. This will require a sharp correction in the structural primary balance of
advanced countries. On average, bringing government debt-to-gDP ratios in
advancedeconomiesbelow60percentby2030wouldrequiresteadilyraisingthe
structuralprimarybalancefromadeﬁcitof3.5percentofgDPin2010toasurplus
of 4.5 percent of gDP in 2020 – an eight percentage point swing in one decade –
and keeping it at that level for the following decade (Table 9). Considering adjust-
ment needs across the Atlantic, the requirements are particularly large in the uK
andtheuSandsmallerinFrance,germanyandItaly.
While the precise magnitude of primary adjustment that is required over the
medium term is sensitive to assumptions, the scale of the ﬁscal problem is large
for any reasonable set of parameter values. Assumptions about the diﬀerential
between the rate of output growth and the rate of interest have an impact on








not unprecedented. More than twenty advanced economies have achieved
improvementsintheirstructuralprimarybalancesofatleastﬁvepercentofgDPat
least once in the last four decades; 10 of them have achieved improvements in
excess of 10 percent of gDP in that period (Table 11). As noted, however, future
adjustmentswillbemorechallengingthaninthepastbecausetheywillhavetobe
undertaken in an environment of adverse demographics and potentially sluggish
potentialgrowth.
Few g20 countries have so far developed fully ﬂedged medium-term ﬁscal
adjustment strategies, although some have announced medium-term targets or
have extended the horizon of their ﬁscal projections. However, medium-term
consolidation policies have yet to be articulated. Where they have been mooted,
measures have focused on fuel-tax increases and progressive income taxes, and
insomecasesonlimitinggrowthofcurrentspendingorcuttingcapitalexpenditure.
Table 12 provides an overview of preliminary strategies to ensure ﬁscal
sustainabilityintheuSandamongtheeug20countries.


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Alladvancedeconomies 6.6 7.8 9.1
g20advancedeconomies 6.8 8.0 9.4
Highdebt 7.1 8.4 9.8
lowdebt 0.5 0.9 1.3
80percentofgDP
Alladvancedeconomies 5.2 6.5 7.9
g20advancedeconomies 5.4 6.7 8.1
Highdebt 5.7 7.0 8.5
lowdebt 0.5 0.9 1.3
Pre-crisislevels
Alladvancedeconomies 6.5 7.7 9.0
g20advancedeconomies 6.5 7.8 9.2
Highdebt 7.0 8.3 9.6
lowdebt 1.2 1.5 1.9
Post-crisislevels
Alladvancedeconomies 3.4 4.3 5.2
g20advancedeconomies 3.4 4.4 5.3
Highdebt 3.6 4.6 5.6
lowdebt 0.5 0.9 1.3
Sources:IMF,WorldeconomicsOutlook,October2009andIMFstaﬀcalculations
Thistablereportstheadjustmentinthestructuralprimarybalancerequiredfrom2011-20,inorderto
reach various objectives (as listed) by 2030. The primary balance would be gradually improved
through 2020 and maintained constant thereafter. The objectives ‘pre-crisis levels’ and ‘post-crisis
levels’ indicate that each country would reduce its debt-to-gDP ratio to its pre-crisis (2007) or post-












Country(endyear) adjustment (years) Atyearend ﬁveyearsafterend
ofadjustment
Advancedeconomies
Ireland(1989) 20.0 11 4.4 3.6
Sweden(2000) 13.3 7 3.8 1.1
Finland(2000) 13.3 7 7.1 3.7
Sweden(1987) 12.5 7 4.8 0.2
Denmark(1986) 12.3 4 6.6 4.3
greece(1995) 12.1 6 4.8 4.1
Israel(1983) 11.1 3 2.6 7.9
Belgium(1998) 11.1 15 6.7 6.1
Canada(1999) 10.4 14 5.6 3.2
Cyprus(2007) 8.5 4 6.1 ...
unitedKingdom(2000) 8.3 7 2.9 -0.6
Japan(1990) 8.1 12 2.7 -0.5
Italy(1993) 7.9 8 3.0 4.0
Portugal(1985) 7.5 4 2.6 0.3
luxembourg(1985) 6.9 4 5.1 3.2
luxembourg(2001) 6.7 10 6.1 1.0
Iceland(2006) 6.3 4 5.9 ...
Netherlands(2000) 6.3 10 4.1 1.0
Denmark(2005) 5.9 11 6.4 ...
Australia(1988) 5.8 4 3.7 0.3
HongKongSAr(2005)3/ 5.8 4 1.0 ...
Newzealand(1995) 5.8 4 7.1 3.9
Austria(2001) 5.8 6 2.2 0.7
Iceland(2000) 5.7 6 3.1 1.6
unitedStates(2000) 5.7 8 3.7 -1.0
germany(2000) 5.3 9 3.5 -0.7
germany(1989) 5.3 10 2.7 -0.4
Switzerland(2000) 5.2 7 3.6 1.3
Cyprus(1994) 5.2 3 4.0 0.6
Spain(2006) 5.2 11 3.0 ...
Sources:IMF,WorldeconomicOutlook,October2009andIMFstaﬀcalculations.
1/ Cumulative change in cyclically adjusted primary balance in percentage of gDP. In a given
consolidationepisode,thecyclicallyadjustedprimarybalanceshouldnotbereversedbymorethan
onepercentagepointfromoneyeartothenext.
2/ Table lists largest adjustments per country, unless episodes for a given country are fully non-
overlapping.
3/Furtheradjustmentthrough2006to2007asaresultofasset-priceeﬀectsisnottakenintoaccount.
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percentage points of gDP, if sustained for 10 years), which would require a






possible, those should incorporate base-widening and evasion-reducing
measures,althoughrealisticallysometax-rateincreasesmayalsobeneeded
to achieve the targeted revenue increases. Adjustment eﬀorts should avoid
relianceonone-oﬀmeasures,andrevenueover-performanceshouldbesaved
ratherthanspent.
• The exact composition of the primary adjustment under this scenario would
diﬀercountrybycountry,dependingonthelevelandstructureofexpenditures,























1/ Views of staﬀ of the intentions of g20 country authorities, based on discussions and announcements and in
additiontofunctioningofautomaticstabilisers(recoveryofrevenues).
2/Notethatthisisaprojectionratherthanatarget.
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thebottomline?majortransatlanticdiﬀerences?
Comparing transatlantic ﬁscal policy responses to the ﬁnancial crisis thus far
suggestsmoresimilaritiesthandiﬀerences.Asnoted,theoverallﬁscalexpansion
hasbeenconsiderablylargerintheuSandtheuKthaninFrance,germanyorItaly,
although this reﬂects more the origin and nature of the crisis – in particular, the
importance of the ﬁnancial sector in the uS and the uK – than diﬀerences in the
policyresponse.ThestimuluspackageintheuSisconsiderablylargerthanthose
in europe, but this has helped compensate for smaller automatic stabilisers than
ineuropeandalsoaimedtoprovidesupporttouSstates,whichareconstrainedby
balancedbudgetrules.Thecompositionofstimulushasalsobeendiﬀerentacross
the Atlantic, but this seems to reﬂect pre-existing ﬁscal policy conditions –for
example,higherﬁscalrevenuesineuropeandaconsequentfocusontaxcuts–as
well as political economy considerations including measures in the package that
wouldgeneratebroadsupportandhelpensurealargeandtimelyresponse.
Countries on both sides of the Atlantic are confronted with sharp increases in
governmentdebt,whichwillcomplicatethemanagementofpre-existingchallenges
from population ageing, especially in advanced economies. The challenges are
particularlystrongintheuSandtheuK.exitstrategiesinvolvingasharpcorrection
in the structural primary balance will be needed to bring down debt ratios to
moderatelevelsandkeepthemthereonasustainablebasis.
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Country (Pre-crisis) 2009 2010 2014 2009 2010 2014
Argentina -2.1 -3.9 -2.4 -1.7 -0.6 -0.9 -1.3
Australia 1.5 -4.3 -5.3 -1.1 0.0 0.0 0.2
Brazil -2.8 -3.8 -1.2 -1.0 -0.6 0.1 0.4
Canada 1.6 -4.9 -4.1 0.0 -0.8 -0.4 -0.4
China 0.9 -3.9 -3.9 -0.8 0.4 0.4 0.2
France -2.7 -8.3 -8.6 -5.2 -0.9 -1.1 0.0
germany -0.5 -4.2 -4.6 0.0 0.4 0.8 0.5
India -4.4 -10.4 -10.0 -5.7 -0.5 -1.5 -1.1
Indonesia -1.2 -2.6 -2.1 -1.3 0.0 0.0 0.4
Italy -1.5 -5.6 -5.6 -5.3 0.3 0.7 -0.5
Japan3/ -2.5 -10.5 -10.2 -8.0 -0.2 0.0 -0.4
Korea 3.5 -2.8 -2.7 2.6 0.4 1.6 0.4
Mexico -1.4 -4.9 -3.7 -3.1 -1.0 0.3 -0.2
russia 6.8 -6.6 -3.2 2.2 -1.2 1.8 0.2
SaudiArabia 15.7 5.0 10.0 14.5 0.8 1.3 1.2
SouthAfrica 1.2 -4.4 -4.7 -2.5 -1.6 -1.6 -0.2
Turkey4/ -2.1 -7.0 -5.3 -4.8 -1.2 0.1 0.3
unitedKingdom -2.6 -11.6 -13.2 -6.8 0.0 0.1 0.1
unitedStates5/ -2.8 -12.5 -10.0 -6.7 1.1 -0.2 -2.0
g20Countries(gDPPPPweighted) -1.0 -7.9 -6.9 -3.7 0.1 0.0 -0.6
Advancedg20economies -1.9 -9.7 -8.7 -5.3 0.4 0.0 -1.0
emergingg20economies 0.3 -5.1 -4.1 -1.3 -0.3 0.1 0.0
Memorandumitem:excludingﬁnancialsupport
g20Countries(gDPPPPweighted) -1.0 -7.0 -6.7 -3.7 -0.3 -0.1 -0.6
Advancedg20economies -1.9 -8.2 -8.4 -5.3 -0.4 -0.3 -0.9
emergingg20economies 0.3 -5.1 -4.1 -1.3 -0.3 0.1 0.0
generalgovernmentdebt(gross)
2007 ChangefromJulyFiscalMonitor
Country (Pre-crisis) 2009 2010 2014 2009 2010 2014
Argentina 67.9 60.5 58.1 46.4 10.1 7.5 -2.0
Australia 9.8 16.9 22.7 27.8 3.2 3.7 1.8
Brazil 66.8 68.5 65.9 58.8 -1.6 -2.7 -3.4
Canada 64.2 78.2 79.3 68.9 2.6 2.7 3.5
China 20.2 20.2 22.2 20.0 -0.6 -1.2 -1.3
France 63.8 78.0 85.4 96.3 0.6 1.6 0.9
germany 63.4 78.7 84.5 89.3 -1.1 -2.3 -2.0
India 80.5 84.7 85.9 78.6 1.0 0.9 5.3
Indonesia 35.1 31.5 31.2 27.1 0.4 0.2 -1.3
Italy 103.5 115.8 120.1 128.5 -1.5 -3.1 -3.8
Japan 187.7 218.6 227.0 245.6 1.3 0.9 6.4
Korea 29.6 34.9 39.4 35.4 -0.9 -2.6 -4.0
Mexico 38.2 47.8 47.9 44.3 -1.4 -2.5 -0.2
russia 7.4 7.2 7.7 7.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
SaudiArabia 18.5 14.5 12.5 9.3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
SouthAfrica 28.5 30.8 33.5 34.8 1.9 3.0 5.4
Turkey4/ 39.4 48.1 49.6 52.8 1.1 -1.1 -5.3
unitedKingdom 44.1 68.7 81.7 98.3 0.1 -0.5 -1.3
unitedStates 61.9 84.8 93.6 108.2 -4.0 -6.2 -3.7
g20Countries(gDPPPPweighted) 62.0 75.1 80.2 85.9 -0.9 -1.9 -0.8
Advancedg20economies 78.2 98.9 106.7 118.4 -1.7 -3.0 -1.3
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Annextable3:Supportforﬁnancialandothersectorsandupfrontﬁnancing
need(asofAugust2009;%2008gDP;averageusingPPPgDPweights)1/




(A) (B) (C) (D)
AdvancedNorthAmerica
Canada 0.0 10.9 13.5 1.5 10.9
unitedStates5/ 5.2 1.5 10.6 8.1 6.9
Advancedeurope
Austria 5.3 0.0 30.1 … 8.9
Belgium 4.8 0.0 26.4 … 4.8
France6/ 1.4 1.3 16.4 … 1.6
germany 3.8 0.4 18.0 … 3.7
greece 2.1 3.3 6.2 … 5.4
Ireland 5.9 0.0 198.1 … 5.9
Italy7/ 0.6 0.0 0.0 … 0.6
Netherlands 3.4 11.2 33.6 … 14.6
Norway8/ 2.0 15.8 0.0 21.0 15.8
Portugal9/ 2.4 0.0 12.0 … 2.4
Spain10/ 0.8 3.9 15.8 … 4.6
Sweden11/ 1.6 4.8 47.5 13.9 5.2
Switzerland 1.1 0.0 0.0 24.9 1.1
unitedKingdom12/ 3.9 13.8 53.2 19.0 20.0
europeanCentralBank ………8.5 …
AdvancedAsiaandPaciﬁc
Australia 0.0 0.7 8.8 … 0.7
Japan13/ 2.4 11.4 7.3 1.9 0.8
Korea14/ 2.3 5.5 14.5 6.5 0.8
emergingeconomies
Argentina15/ 0.0 0.9 0.0 5.4 0.9
Brazil16/ 0.0 0.8 0.0 10.8 0.0
China 0.0 0.0 0.0 22.5 0.0
India 0.4 0.0 0.0 8.3 0.4
Indonesia17/ 0.0 0.0 0.1 1.2 0.1
Hungary18/ 1.1 2.4 1.1 13.6 3.5
Poland 0.0 0.0 3.2 5.4 0.0
russia 1.2 1.2 0.5 11.6 2.3
SaudiArabia19/ 0.0 1.2 N/A 30.6 1.2
Turkey20/ 0.0 0.3 0.0 3.7 0.0
Average
g20 2.2 2.7 8.8 9.7 3.7
Advancedeconomies 3.4 4.1 13.9 7.6 5.7
InbillionsofuS$ 1,160 1,436 4,638 2,804 1,887
emergingeconomies 0.2 0.3 0.1 13.5 0.4




in central bank balance sheets from June 2007 to June 2009. While these changes are mostly related to measures aimed at





from the sale of acquired assets. 5/ estimated upfront ﬁnancing need for 2009–10 is uS$990 billion (6.9 percent of gDP),
consistingoftheallocatedamountunderTArP(uS$510bn);TreasurypurchasesofgSepreferredstocks(uS$400bn);andtreasury
supportforCommercialPaperFundingFacility(uS$50bn).
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NotestoAnnexTable3(continued):
6/ Support to the country's strategic companies is recorded under (B) of which ᾬ20 billion will be
ﬁnanced by a state-owned bank, Caisse des Dep￴ts et Consignations, not requiring upfront
treasuryﬁnancing.






10/ Spain created a bank restructuring fund (FrOB) in June, with the current legislative framework
providing for ᾬ9 billion (direct government ﬁnancing of ᾬ6.75 billion, complemented by ᾬ2.25
billion from the deposit insurance funds), to support the possible eventual restructuring of the
ﬁnancialsector.ThesizeoftheFrOBcouldpotentiallybeincreaseduptoᾬ99billion(ninepercent
of gDP) through debt issuance. Column C includes approved bank debt guarantees up to ᾬ100
bn,andanotherᾬ100bnthatwouldbeextended,ifneeded.
11/ Somecapitalinjection(SeK50bn)willbeundertakenbythestabilisationfund
12/ estimated upfront ﬁnancing need is ﾣ289 bn (20 percent of gDP), consisting of bank
recapitalisation fund (ﾣ56 bn), special liquidity scheme (ﾣ185 bn) and ﬁnancing for the
nationalisationofNorthernrockandBradford&Bingley(ﾣ48bn).




















Countries Amountused inpercentof Amountused inpercentof
announcement announcement
AdvancednorthAmerica
Canada …… 5.8 53.5
unitedStates 2.4 46.1 0.7 48.0
Advancedeurope
Austria 1.7 32.7 ……
Belgium 4.7 97.6 ……
France 0.8 58.1 0.4 26.5
greece 1.7 82.0 1.8 55.0
Ireland 5.4 90.9 ……
Italy 0.1 14.5 ……
Netherlands 2.4 72.8 5.5 49.1
Norway 0.0 0.0 7.2 45.5
Portugal …… ……
Spain 0.0 0.0 1.8 44.6
Sweden 0.2 11.2 ……
Switzerland 1.1 100.0 ……
unitedKingdom 3.3 85.2 3.4 24.4
AdvancedAsiaandPaciﬁc
Australia …… 0.5 77.5
Japan 0.0 1.0 1.2 10.9
Korea 0.8 33.0 0.3 4.8
emergingeconomies
Brazil …… 0.3 43.5
India 0.0 9.5 0.0 ….
Indonesia …… ……
Hungary 0.1 9.3 2.0 82.3
russia 0.7 60.4 0.6 54.0
SaudiArabia …… 0.6 51.4
Average1/
g20 1.2 43.9 1.0 27.0
Advancedeconomies 1.5 43.9 1.2 26.1
InbillionsofuS$ 446 … 366 …
emergingeconomies 0.2 44.6 0.3 50.3
InbillionsofuS$ 11 … 17 …
Source:Staﬀestimates.
1/PPPweightedaveragesforthecountrieslistedabove.
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• There is an enormous disparity, in size and composition, in the responses of
industrialisedcountries:itappearsthatnothingsystematiccanbesaid.
Where do we go from here? The trade-oﬀ is obvious (at least in terms of a neo-
Keynesian approach): if the stimulus is withdrawn, there is a negative demand
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A widely-held view is that stimulus packages should be maintained until the




projections to reassure the markets: government spending and deﬁcits are going
up now, but they will come down soon, hence the markets should not fear a
crowding-outeﬀect.
Although I understand the rationale behind this proposal, I am not sure it is
necessarily a good idea: the experience shows that governments use multi-year
projections merely to postpone adjustments. Spending and deﬁcit cuts are
continuallypostponedto'threeyearsfromnow';whenthefuturecomes,thesame
trick will be used. The (announced) intertemporal budget constraint is always in
goodshape,butthebudgetcutsnevermaterialise.
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routine of interest-rate targeting to a multi-pronged triage that wedded traditional
policy tools with new initiatives aimed at reviving an ailing ﬁnancial system. The
triage was controversial because it entailed support that required choices to be
madeovertargetingparticularmarketsandﬁrms.Thesechangesintheoperation
of central-bank policy have been especially jarring following a quarter century of
generally quiescent macroeconomic activity and policy, a period often charac-
terised as the 'great Moderation'. With the crisis receding, the timing, size,
appropriatenessandeﬀectivenessofthemeasurestakenbytheFederalreserve
arethesubjectofmuchdiscussion,analysisandcontroversy.
In this chapter, ﬁrst, we present an account of the multitude of policy actions





structure of banking regulation such as deposit insurance, focused on banks as
being at the centre of the ﬁnancial system. With the emergence of markets, such














traditional tools for responding to the greatest ﬁnancial crisis in the uS since the
1930s. We then conclude with preliminary thoughts on unwinding the Fed's
extraordinary actions and creating a regulation and supervision framework that
acknowledges the dramatic changes that have occurred in the ﬁnancial system
overthelast75years.
The next section of the paper addresses some broader themes that provide
context for analysing the Fed’s response during the crisis. The second section
describes the evolution of traditional policy tools during the turmoil. The third
sectionpresentsataxonomyforclassifyingthenontraditionalpolicyinitiativesand




or vice versa, there is near universal agreement that a well-functioning ﬁnancial
system is part and parcel of a thriving modern economy and that the ﬁnancial
systemisanimportantconduitthroughwhichcentral-bankpolicyinﬂuencesprices
and economic activity. Naturally, a well-functioning ﬁnancial system will evolve
withtheeconomy,andthishascertainlybeentrueintheuS.In1950,depository
institutions (banks for short) accounted for 60 percent of the assets held by the
ﬁnancialsector.By2006thatsharehadfallento30percent.Toparaphrasethework





households and making commercial loans to ﬁrms or mortgage loans to other
households, the ﬁnancial system has evolved so that a lending household might
purchase shares in a money-market mutual fund that holds commercial paper
issuedbyabankthatengagesinarepurchaseagreementwithasecuritiesﬁrmthat





No matter what the driving forces were behind this increase in the layers of
ﬁnancialintermediation–rangingfrommore-eﬃcientallocationofrisk,toregula-
tory arbitrage aimed at avoiding capital requirements – the many layers of
intermediationcreatechainsofinter-linkagesthatcanmaketheentiresystemmore
vulnerable to shocks in any one market or at any single institution. These inter-
linkages dramatically complicate supervision and increase the information
necessaryformonitoringbybothmarketparticipantsandregulators.
Similarly, these intermediation chains and inter-linkages also signiﬁcantly
complicate the ability of a central bank and regulatory authorities to respond to a
ﬁnancial crisis. In a crisis, the classic admonition from Bagehot was for central
bankstolendfreelybutatahighrateofinteresttoilliquidbutnotinsolventﬁrms.
Fair enough, but does this lending need to be extended to every ﬁrm in a long
intermediationchainandhowdoyoudisentangleliquidityandsolvencyforsome









are unlikely to be suﬃcient in a ﬁnancial system characterised by long inter-
mediationchainswithmanymarket-basedintermediaries.
Animportantlegacyofthe1933glass-SteagallActthatseparatedcommercial
banking from investment banking in the uS was to restrict the traditional tools of
theFedtofocusnarrowlyoncommercialbanksandbankholdingcompanies.The
1999gramm-leach-BlileyActrepealedanumberofthelegalobstacleserectedby
glass-Steagall that prevented a commercial bank from aﬃliating with entities
engagedininvestmentbanking(althoughitstillprohibitedacommercialbankfrom
directly underwriting or dealing in many types of securities). Few ﬁnancial
institutions that were not long-standing commercial-bank holding companies,
however, chose to become 'ﬁnancial holding companies' (FHCs), which would
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permit access to the Fed’s discount window. The large investment banks, for
example,preferrednottoberegulatedbytheFederalreserveand,inparticular,be
subject to the minimum leverage ratio (that is, capital to total assets ratio) that













The balance sheet of their counterparty's counterparty thus became crucial to
evaluating the soundness of an institution. It was not suﬃcient, for example, to
knowtheamountofasset-backedsecurities(ABS)orcreditprotectionpurchased
by an institution but information was also needed about the health of monoline
insurers of those ABS and the soundness of sellers of insurance through credit
derivatives held by the institution. Concerns about the 'ﬁre sale' of assets, due to
liquidityorfundingproblemsorrequirementstopostadditionalcollateral,andthe
uncertainties of the exposures, led to 'funding runs'. It then became extremely
diﬃcult to disentangle liquidity from solvency, in particular because in such
circumstances bid-ask spreads widen so much that in many markets the price-
discovery process breaks down. As conﬁdence collapsed, the ﬁnancial system
slammedtoahalt,andwithiteconomicactivity.
Traditionalcentral-bankpolicytoolscanﬂoodthebankingsystemwithliquidity,
but this liquidity may not spill over to the market-based intermediaries when the
ﬁnancialmarketslinkingthevariousinstitutionsarenotfunctioning.Open-market
operations and discount-window lending will increase bank reserves, but there is
noguaranteethatthesebankreserveswillrevivebanklending,muchlesstheentire
chain of intermediation. Bank deposits, protected by deposit insurance, may be
slow to runoﬀ, but bank deposits are a much smaller fraction of the funding of
ﬁnancialactivitythanoncewasthecase.Institutionsincreasinglycametorelyon
the ability to securitise (that is, to sell) assets, to issue short-term commercial
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paper,toﬁnanceportfoliosthroughsecuredrepurchaseagreements,thatis,they
reliedonmarket-basedintermediationratherdeposits.Thus,traditionalpolicytools
can liquefy banks but have little direct eﬀect on either bank traditional lending or
market-based intermediaries. even for banks, but more so for market-based
intermediaries,questionsremainaboutassetqualityandcapitaladequacy.
Inacrisis,ﬁnancialﬁrmsneedaccesstosuﬃcientliquidityandcapitaltoinstill
conﬁdence in counterparties in order to successfully intermediate and thereby
keep the credit channel open to support economic activity. And this liquidity and
capitalmustbeaccessedinatimelymatter.TheuSexperienceduringtheturmoil
indicates that speed is essential in preventing the unravelling of intermediation
chains.
Asthisframeworkmakesclear,theFed’sresponsetothebankingandﬁnancial
crisis must be understood ﬁrst within the context of the limits to its traditional
toolkit,andsecondbytheneedtoinnovatetokeepupwithrecentchangesinthe




Textbook descriptions of central-bank policy usually list three key tools: open-
marketoperations,discountlendingandreserverequirements,beforegoingonto
say that reserve requirements are a relatively blunt and rarely-used tool. As the
ﬁnancial-market turmoil spread in August 2007, the Fed responded in what can
certainlybedescribedasatextbookortraditionalmanner,withanemphasisonthe
target federal funds rate (open-market operations) and the primary credit rate
(discountlending).Bywayofbackground,fromJune2006untilAugust2007,the
target federal funds rate was 5.25 percent and the primary credit rate was 6.25
percent–the100basis-pointwedgebetweenthetworateshavingbeenadopted
atthetimeofthediscountwindowoverhaulinearly2003.
On August 10, 2007, three days after the August Federal Open Market Com-
mittee (FOMC) meeting, in a press release reminiscent of those following the
October 1987 stock-market crash and the September 2001 terrorist attacks, the
FederalreserveBoardannouncedthatitwould'providereservesasnecessary'to
keep the fed funds rate close to its target, and reminded market participants that
'thediscountwindowisavailableasasourceoffunding'.Oneweeklater,theBoard
voted to reduce the primary credit rate by 50 basis points, halving the usual 100
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cut an additional 75 basis points at the March FOMC meeting and the spread
between the target fed funds rate and the primary credit rate was reduced to 25
basis points (non-traditional steps to assist the merger of Bear Stearns and JP
Morgan Chase in March will be discussed below). Following a 25 basis-point


















































2007 appears relatively modest. At that time, however, an increase in primary




achieving the desired result2. From December 2007 until March 2009 the Federal
reserve put in place 16 diﬀerent facilities or programmes to combat the crisis.
Temporarilysettingasidethequestionoftheeﬀectivenessoftheseinitiatives,the
list is impressive both in its length and breadth. even describing, much less
assessing,theinitiativesisadauntingtaskthatcangetboggeddowninalonglist











Jan2007 Aprﾠ 2007 Aug 2007 Dec 2007 Mar 2008 Julﾠ 2008 Novﾠ 2008 Febﾠ 2009 Junﾠ 2009 Octﾠ 2009
US$bns
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ofeasilyconfusedandeasilyforgottenacronyms.Anyattemptatanalysisrequires
anorganisingframework.
Bernanke (2009a) presents a framework that classiﬁes each non-traditional
initiativeintothreedescriptivecategories:lendingtoﬁnancialinstitutions,providing
liquidity to key credit markets and purchasing longer-term securities3. For our
purposes,analternative,functionalframeworkmayshedmorelightonthemeans
bywhichthenon-traditionalinitiativessupportedthebankingandﬁnancialsector.
In particular, the policy initiatives can all be thought of as supplementing the
traditional central-bank policy tools in three ways: broadening the types of
counterpartiesreceivingsupport,broadeningthecollateralrequiredtoaccessthe
support and lengthening the maturity of the support. As discussed earlier, the
traditional tools of open-market operations and discount lending are almost
exclusively aimed at short-term liquidity support for the bank-based piece of the
ﬁnancial system. In particular, the direct eﬀect of these traditional tools is felt on
bankbalancesheetsviaeithershort-termtransactionsinvolvingTreasurysecurities
orthelendingofreservesagainsthigh-qualitycollateral.Dealingwithnewcounter-
parties is critical to extending assistance to important markets and ﬁrms in the
intermediation chain, thereby acknowledging the interconnectedness of institu-
tionsandmarketsthathasevolved.Acceptingawiderrangeofcollateralallowsthe
Fedtosupportaﬁnancialsystemthathasevolvedfromsimplebank-basedlending
towards greater reliance upon securitisation and market-based intermediation.
Finally,extendingthematurityofthesupportgivesﬂexibilityincounteringalong-
lived crisis and gives conﬁdence to market participants that institutions and
counterparties will have a source of funding for longer periods, reducing the
likelihood that sudden liquidity problems force 'ﬁre sales' of assets that could
compromisetheirsolvency.






experience during the great Depression and by the Japanese experience in the
1990s.ThreeoftheﬁvemembersoftheFedBoardatthistime(Bernanke,Kroszner
3. This framework has proven quite popular, see Carlson et al (2009) and the charts available at
(http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/data/credit_easing/index.cfm). Cecchetti and Disyatat (2009)
presentaframeworkbasedonliquidity.
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moving again. Many of his policies did not work as intended, but in the end FDr
deservesgreatcreditforhavingthecouragetoabandonfailedparadigmsandtodo
whatwasneededtobedone.Japanesemonetarypolicyseemstobesuﬀeringfrom




traditional initiatives, commenting where possible on the success of each
programme.
Inaneﬀorttoremovethestigmaassociatedwithdiscount-windowborrowing
and to allow depository institutions access to longer-term federal funds, the Term
AuctionFacility(TAF)wasputinplaceinDecember20074.ratherthanthemainly
overnightborrowingoffundsavailableatthediscountwindow,theTAFinitiallymade
28-day funds available, with the term increasing to as long as 84 days in August
2008.Figure3showstheallocationsforeachoftheauctionsaswellastheamount
ofthebidssubmitted.Ascanbeseen,theFedonlygraduallyincreasedthesizeof
the allocations, despite bid-to-cover ratios that averaged 1.7 during the ﬁrst nine
monthsofoperations.AllocationsdoubledinOctober2008atthepeakofthecrisis
and since then bids have never exhausted the allocation. Outstanding borrowing
under the TAF peaked at almost $500 billion in March, 2009. Most recently,
allocationshavebeengraduallyreducedinlinewithimprovingﬁnancialconditions.
TheTAFwasdesignedtomimicthetendersconductedbytheeuropeanCentralBank





abroad had very strong demand for dollars during the crisis. High demand from
european banks, for example, would often send the federal funds rate up sharply
in the mornings uS time before the european markets closed. After the close in
4. The replacement of discount window adjustment credit with primary credit in 2003 was clearly not
enoughtoremovetheperceivedstigmaassociatedwithaccesstothediscountwindowbyinstitutions
judgedtobe‘sound’.




at the Federal reserve Bank of New York to maintain the target rate. We classify
these swap lines as non-traditional in that they are not typically one of the tools





under the swap, the Fed provides dollars to the foreign central bank, while at
thesametime,theforeigncentralbankprovidestheequivalentamountoffundsin


















Dec2007 Apr2008 Aug2008 Nov2008 Mar 2009 Jul2009 Nov2009
Figure3:termAuctionFacility
Source:FederalreserveBoard




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































no interest on these accounts and has agreed not to withdraw foreign currencies
fromtheseaccounts.Foreigncentralbankswillonlydrawdollarsthroughtheswap
lines as they need them. They will use these dollars to provide liquidity to their
bankinginstitutionsandﬁnancialmarkets.Theforeigncentralbanksguaranteefull
repayment of any drawing, and any interest earnings from lending these dollars
revert to the System. The asymmetric interest payments act as a penalty rate for





(2009) document the importance of increasing the swap lines as a result of runs
on MMMFs in September 2008 (discussed below). Total drawings under the lines
peakedinDecember2008andhavedeclinedsincethen,standingatlessthan$40
billion at the time of writing. In terms of our taxonomy, the swaps expand the
counterparties to which the Fed can provide assistance via the foreign central
banks, which then could lend these dollars directly to their domestic institutions.
Just prior to the December 2007 policy innovations, market anxiety began to
breach the levels seen in September 2007. The lIBOr/OIS spread (discussed
below)rosetomorethan100basispointsinlateNovember,morethantentimes
theaverageduringtheyearspriortothecrisis.FollowingtheimplementationofTAF
and the swap lines, this spread dropped relatively quickly, returning to 20 basis
pointsinJanuary2008.Bythismeasure,theTAFandswaplineswouldbejudged
an initial success at relieving pressure in the inter-bank funding market (see




depository institutions that did not have access to either the discount window or
the TAF. The ghost of glass-Steagall haunted the halls of the Fed because the Fed
didnothavetraditionaltoolstoprovideliquiditytokeyinstitutionsfacingliquidity
crises, whose demise could have had profound eﬀects on the ﬁnancial system.
MovingquicklytomitigatethepotentialturmoilassociatedwiththetroublesatBear
Stearns,theFedintroducedtheTermSecuritieslendingFacility(TSlF),thePrimary




In the week prior to the merger of Bear Stearns, the Term Securities lending
Facility(TSlF)wasputinplacetolengthenthetermoverwhichTreasurysecurities
could be borrowed by primary dealers from the System Open Market Account
(SOMA). The usual overnight lending of Treasuries reached $20 billion in late
February 2008, signalling a clear appetite for a risk-free asset. In an attempt to
relieve additional pressure in the Treasury markets, the maturity on lending was
extendedto28daysinaseriesofweekly,ratherthandaily,auctions.roughlyevery
other week, auctions were held requiring Schedule 1 collateral, followed the next
week with an auction backed by Schedule 2 collateral. Schedule 1 collateral
includes Treasury securities, agency securities and agency mortgage-backed
securities. Schedule 2 collateral adds highly-rated private securities to the list of
eligiblecollateral.Flemingetal(2009)discusstheTSlFindetail.






failure of an institution such as Bear Stearns, and thus for the stability of the
ﬁnancialsystemasawhole.






and exigent'. Since the Fed Board has had only ﬁve members during 2008 and





The Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF) was established to give primary
dealers(mostlyinvestmentbanks)accesstoovernightfederalfunds–eﬀectively
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discount-window access. These dealers pay the same primary credit rate that
depositoryinstitutionsarecharged.AscanbeseeninFigure4,borrowingsquickly
reached almost $40 billion in early April 2008 but fell oﬀ quite rapidly as market
conditions improved. In July and August 2008 the PDCF was almost completely






The assistance to facilitate the March 2008 Bear Stearns-JP Morgan Chase
mergerwastheﬁrstoftheFed’sinitiativesaimedatparticularﬁnancialinstitutions.
AsthemergerwasbeingﬁnalisedinJune2008,theNewYorkFedextendeda$28.8
















Mar 2008 May 2008 Jul2008 Sep2008 Nov2008 Jan2009 Apr2009 Jun2009 Aug2009 Oct2009
Figure4:PrimaryDealerCreditFacility
Source:FederalreserveBoardreleaseH.4.1
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the resolution of Bear Stearns. The broadening of collateral and expansion of the




Markets remained under heightened stress for roughly 10 weeks from March
2008.ConditionseasedslightlyandweremuchlessvolatilefromthemiddleofMay
2008 until early September, and this period saw only one additional initiative on
the part of the Fed – the introduction of options on the TSlF (TOP). These options
were designed to help relieve quarter-end pressures when ﬁrms might feel
heightened need for risk-free assets and all the options required Schedule 2
collateral.Through2008,auctionswereheavilysubscribedwithbid-to-coverratios
averaging1.75.Thetwoauctionsconductedin2009generatedmuchlessinterest
and the programme has been suspended. These options programmes bore some
resemblance to a programme that the Fed created to accommodate the strong
liquiditydemandthatoccurredin2000.
TheconservatorshipofFannieMae(FNMA)andFreddieMac(FHlMC)marked
the beginning of the most virulent phase of the ﬁnancial crisis – September until
December 2008. In the second week of September, investment banks and many
commercialbanksfacedextraordinaryfundingpressuresandthelibor-OISspread
was rising rapidly. Their funding horizons had been shortening as risk appetites
declined,meaningthatanenormousamountofpaperhadtoberolledovernightor
over very short horizons. In many cases, these institutions were having great
diﬃcultyobtainingfundingevenattheseshorthorizonsandeveninfully-secured
overnight borrowing markets, the repo markets. In addition, a number of market
participants were pulling away from institutions where there were rumours or
concernsaboutsolvency–notonlyascounterpartiesbutasclients.Thisimplosion
of their business model stemming from uncertainty about how diﬀerent parties
would be treated in bankruptcy (see Kroszner, 2009a) only made market
participantsmoreconcernedabouttheirviability.




an emergency expedited basis to become commercial bank holding companies
regulatedbytheFed.BankofAmericapurchasedMerrilllynch.Despiteeﬀortsby
theFedandtheTreasury,amergerpartnerforlehman,whichhadbeenstruggling
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tosurviveformonthspriortotheconservatorshipofFreddieandFannie,couldnot
befoundandlehmanenteredbankruptcy.
At the same time, one of the world’s largest insurance companies AIg (a thrift
holdingcompany,becauseitownedathrift,hencesupervisedbytheOﬃceofThrift
Supervision)wasonthevergeofcollapse.AIgfacedcredit-ratingsdowngradesand
large requirements to post collateral due to enormous exposure in the credit-
derivatives markets (particularly credit-default swaps – CDS) taken on by its AIg
FinancialProductssubsidiary.Ithadeﬀectivelysoldlargeamountsofinsurancein
the CDS market but had done so with few reserves. The potential collapse of AIg
raised the possibility of two types of signiﬁcant disruption. First, the impact of its
failure through its enormous set of counterparty inter-linkages could have been
damagingtomanyinstitutionsandmarkets.Second,itsdowngradingandpossible
default would have triggered state insurance regulators to force the underlying
insurance operating companies into receivership which could have voided the
insurancepoliciesofmillionsofindividualsandcompanies.








to $60 billion. In addition, the New York Fed extended credit to the newly created
MaidenlaneIIandMaidenlaneIIIcorporationsthatrespectivelypurchased$22.5
billion in residential mortgage-backed securities and $30 billion in collateralised




pressure, namely money-market mutual funds (MMMFs, also called 2a-7 funds).
Asnotedabove,MMMFsholdroughlyhalfasmuchasbanksdoindepositsandthe
MMMFswerekeyfundingsourcesforshort-termbankpaperandrepoagreements.
MMMF shareholders had traditionally treated MMMFs as near-perfect substitutes
fordepositsbecausetheyhadconsistentlybeenabletomaintainthevalueofeach
share at $1. That began to change in this period because shareholders became
6. On10November2008theratewasreducedto300basispointsabovelIBOr.
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concernedaboutthevalueandliquidityoftheirinvestmentsandbegantowithdraw
their money. As can be seen in Figure 5, the biggest withdrawals were made by
institutionalshareholders.
The net asset value of the Primary Fund, a heavy purchaser of lehman notes
and the ﬂagship fund in the historically important reserve Funds complex, fell
below $1 per share on 16 September 2008 – the ﬁrst time such a major money-
market mutual fund had 'broken the buck'. This signiﬁcantly exacerbated the run
that had begun on MMMFs: redemptions totaled $300 billion in the week of 15
September. In turn, the MMMFs rushed for the liquidity and safety of Treasury
securitiesandshunnedtheirlong-standingroleasfundersofthebankingsystem.
The run on the MMMFs thus led to a 'funding run' on the banks, since the banks
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exchange Stabilisation Fund, provided a temporary guarantee of $1 per share for
MMMF accounts, and funds began to ﬂow back into these accounts. Importantly,
the guarantee was only for the amount in a MMMF account as of the date of the
announcementoftheprogramme.Afullguaranteethatcoveredfutureinﬂowscould
haveprecipitatedaliquiditydrain,orevenarun,onbankdeposits,whichatthetime
were guaranteed up to only $100,000. Soon after, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation(FDIC)wasauthorisedtoincreasedepositinsuranceto$250,000and
provide unlimited guarantees for non-interest-bearing transaction accounts that
aretypicallyusedbybusinesses.
TheFedalsoannouncedasigniﬁcantnewprogrammeon19Septembertotry
to restore the ability of banks to obtain short-term secured ﬁnancing. The Asset-
Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund liquidity Facility (AMlF)
extendsnon-recourseloansattheprimarycreditratetouSdepositoryinstitutions
and bank holding companies to ﬁnance purchases of asset-backed commercial
paper (ABCP) from money-market mutual funds at amortised cost rather than
marketprices.loansunderAMlFcouldbeusedtopurchaseABCPwithmaturities
upto120daysfordepositoryinstitutionsor270daysforbankholdingcompanies.
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honourtheirredemptionsand,thus,increasethewillingnessofMMMFstoreturnto
theirroleofprovidingshort-termsecuredfundingtothebankingsystem.TheAMlF
was accessed immediately (Figure 6) reaching $152 billion on 1 October 2008.
With the turmoil in the ﬁnancial markets reaching a fever pitch, on 20
September, the Treasury department, with the support of the Federal reserve,
submittedlegislationtoCongresstorequest$700billionforaTroubledAssetrelief
Program (TArP) (see Swagel, 2009, for a comprehensive discussion of the pro-
gramme and the politics). In the following week, major ﬁnancial institutions were
eitherfailingorfacingsigniﬁcantfundingandliquiditypressures.evidenceofthese
strains can be seen in Figure 7, which shows one measure of bank fragility, the
lIBOr-OISspread,whichwasreachingextraordinarylevels.







On the same day, 3 October, the emergency economic Stabilisation Act of 2008
(eeSA)waspassedbyCongress.
During early October, the Federal reserve continued to work on relieving the
stressandstrainsinthecommercialpapermarketandon7Octoberannouncedthe
establishmentoftheCommercialPaperFundingFacility(CPFF).Aftergrowingvery
rapidly during the 2000s to become a more-than $1 trillion source of ﬁnancing,





by a New York Fed loan and supported by the uS Treasury, which makes direct




unsecured commercial-paper issues also pay a 100 basis points surcharge. The
spreadswerechosentodiscourageuseoftheCPFFasmarketconditionsstabilise.
The ﬁrst purchases under the CPFF were made in late October and the facility
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held$300billionincommercialpaperbyearlyDecember(Figure10).Holdingsof
theCPFFhavegraduallyrunoﬀsinceJanuary2009andnowstandataround$15
billion. The eﬀectiveness of the CPFF can be assessed by looking at both
commercialpaperoutstandingandcommercialpaperinterestrates.Bytheformer
measure,theCPFFcanbejudgedtohaveslowedthedeclineinissuancewhile,by




was designed to complement both the AMlF and CPFF by providing funding to
privatespecialpurposevehiclescreatedtopurchasecertiﬁcatesofdeposit,bank
notes and ﬁnancial commercial paper with maturities of less than 90 days from
money-marketmutualfunds.Thus,theAMlFﬁnancedpurchasesofasset-backed
commercial paper from money-market mutual funds by banks and bank holding
companies,theCPFFsupportedthepurchaseofcommercialpaperfromanyseller,
notjustmoney-marketmutualfunds,andtheMMIFFwasdesignedtobroadenthe
class of assets to be purchased from money-market mutual funds. Originally, the
NewYorkFedwasgivenauthorisationtolendasmuchas$540billiontothespecial
purposevehiclesundertheMMIFF.However,thepressuresonmoney-marketfunds
eased in late October and November, and the New York Fed has yet to extend any
loansundertheMMIFF.
Also during this period, eﬀective 9 October 2008, as authorised by the emer-
gencyeconomicStabilisationAct,theFedbegantopayinterestonbanks’required
andexcessreservebalances.Initially,banksearned75basispointslessthanthe
target federal funds rate on excess reserves; two weeks later the 75 basis-point
diﬀerentialwasnarrowedto35basispoints;andafteranothertwoweeks,inearly
November, the diﬀerential was eliminated. At the December Federal Open Market
Committeemeeting,therateonexcessreserveswassetat0.25percent,whereit
hassinceremained.
For many years the Fed sought the ability to pay interest on reserves.
Authorisationwasgranted,eﬀective1October2011,undertheFinancialServices
regulatoryreliefActof2006.Payinginterestonreservesremovesthedeadweight
losses associated with the implicit tax on required reserves and allows for better
targeting of the federal funds rate via enhanced control of holdings of excess
reserves. Moreover, the ability to pay interest allows the Fed to better manage its
balance sheet independently of the Treasury, both during the expansion of the
balancesheetduringthecrisisandthemanagingofitsbalancesheetandreserves
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as the crisis fades (see Bernanke, 2009b, and Kroszner, 2009b). While paying
interestonexcessreservesmayhaveprovidedanincentiveforbankstoholdmore
reserves in late 2008 and 2009, this move does not appear to have been all that
quantitativelyimportant7.
On 14 October, two key initiatives supporting the banking sector were
announced.First,theTreasurywoulduseTArPfundstoinjectcapitalintoﬁnancial
institutions through the purchase of preferred stock and warrants, the Capital
PurchaseProgram(CPP).Thisissimilartothepurchaseofpreferredstockinbanks
bythereconstructionFinanceCorporationduringthe1930s(seeKroszner,1994,
and Jones, 1951). On 14 October, nine of the largest banks announced that they
would accept $125 billion of government capital under this programme. Second,
theFDICwouldguaranteetheseniordebtobligationsofFDIC-insureddepositories
and their holding companies under the Temporary liquidity guarantee Program
(TlgP).AsFigure7shows,aftertheannouncementoftheseprogrammesandthe




late November 2008 also saw a ﬂurry of new initiatives. The Fed joined




this amount split 90/10 between the Fed and Citigroup. The loan would carry an
interest rate of 300 basis points above the OIS rate. This guarantee is in place for
10yearsforresidentialassetsandﬁveyearsfornon-residentialassets.Todate,no
FedlendinghasbeenprovidedtoCitigroup.
Two programmes were announced on 25 November 2008. The Term Asset-
BackedSecuritiesloanFacility(TAlF)isajointoperationoftheFedandTreasury.
Againexercisingits13(3)emergencypowerstolendtoindividuals,partnerships,
7. The initiatives put in place in September and October 2008 would result in a large increase in the
monetarybase.Atthetime,Federalreserveoﬃcialsdidnotwelcomesuchanincrease.Therefore,on
17September2008,theTreasuryannounced,attherequestoftheFederalreserve,asupplementary
ﬁnancing programme under which proceeds from the sale of newly issued Treasury bills would be
depositedattheFedinaspecialaccount.TheTreasurysaleofsupplementalTreasurybillsdrainedbank
reserves even as the lending under the new initiatives added to bank reserves. This supplemental
account diminished in importance over the next few months as it became clear that an increase in
reserveswasnotaninﬂationaryconcern.




numberofissuers Debtoutstanding guaranteefees Surcharges
79 $305,376 $9,491 $872
issuancedetail(Percentoftotal)
Instrument Maturity
Commercialpaper 0.0 <2years 20.5
Notes 91.1 Between2and3years 29.4






mean median maximum minimum total
Warrants
Initialinvestment $9,618 $4,850 $25,000 $2,000 $163,514
repaid $7,409 $3,555 $25,000 $2,000 $66,677
Percentoftotal 40.8
Proceeds
Dividendsaccrued $340 $185 $1,055 $64 $5,776




Source: www.FinancialStability.gov Capital Purchase Program transactions. The sample includes 17
ofthe19institutionsincludedingovernmentstresstests:BankofAmerica,BankofNewYork,BB&T,
Citigroup,CapitalOne,FifthThird,goldmanSachs,JPMorgan,KeyCorp,MorganStanley,PNC,regions,
State Street, SunTrust, u.S. Bancorp, and Wells Fargo. The two excluded are Metlife and gMAC –
companiesthatdidnotreceiveCPPfunds.gainsonCitigroupstockholdingsvaluesthegovernment’s
position in Citigroup stock at $4.54 a share (the price as of September 1, 2009) and subtracts the
initialcapitalinvestmentof$25billion.
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any assets received by the New York Fed in connection with the TAlF loans. By
puttingtheTreasuryintheﬁrstlosspositionthroughitspurchaseofsubordinated
debtintheSPV,thestructureoftheTAlFthenpermittedtheFedtobeabletoaccept
a wider variety of collateral and for longer horizons and hence provide direct


















between four and ﬁve years. Here again, this rate and haircut structure should
discourageTAlFissuancewhenmarketconditionsnormalise.
The TAlF was designed to oﬀer liquidity and reduce uncertainty during times
ofstresstorevivethefunctioningofthesemarkets.ThecreationoftheTAlFseems
to have had an impact on stabilising these markets even before the ﬁrst lending
under the programme took place in late March 2009. Spreads on ABS issuances
have come down signiﬁcantly since the TAlF and its extension were announced.
Prices for CMBS securities moved up, for example, upon announcement that the
programme was expanded to include that class of securities. lending under this
programmehasgrownslowlyasmarketsforthesesecuritieshavenormalisedand
currently stands at $44 billion (Figure 11). In some sense, the slow growth of the
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to purchase direct obligations of housing-related government sponsored enter-
prises8 (gSes) as well as mortgage-backed securities guaranteed by Fannie Mae,
Freddie Mac, and ginnie Mae. upon announcement of the programme, their costs
offundingdroppednoticeably.Initially,purchaseswerecappedat$100billionfor
the direct obligations and $500 billion for the mortgage-backed securities.
PurchasescommencedinearlyDecember2008forthedirectobligationsandearly
January 2009 for the guaranteed mortgage backed securities. At the March 2009
FOMC meeting, the caps were increased to $1.25 trillion for mortgage-backed
securitiesand$200billionforthedirectobligations.Todate,almost$850billionin
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Figure11:termAsset-BackedSecuritiesloanFacility
Source:FederalreserveBoardreleaseH.4.1




cost, the spread of 30-year conventional mortgages over 30-year Treasuries has
fallenfromalmost250basispointsinlateNovember2008toaspreadatthetime
ofwritingofroughly60basispoints.Availabilityishardertojudge,givendatalags,
but it appears to be mixed. In the ﬁrst quarter of 2009, net borrowing via agency
andgSe-backedsecuritiesfell,whilenetborrowingviamortgagesincreased.Asof
November 2009, these purchases are to be completed by the end of the ﬁrst
quarter of 2010 and the size of direct obligation purchases was reduced to $175
billion.
In January 2009, the Fed joined the Treasury and the FDIC in providing a
package of support to Bank of America that is quite similar in structure to the
support provided to Citigroup. The Fed’s non-recourse loan guarantees the return
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90/10 between the Fed and Bank of America. To date, no Fed lending has been
providedtoBankofAmerica.
The last nontraditional policy measure to be introduced is the purchase of
longer-termTreasuryissues'tohelpimproveconditionsinprivatecreditmarkets'.
ThisannouncementwasmadeattheconclusionoftheMarch2009FOMCmeeting
and a cap of $300 billion was placed on longer-term Treasury purchases. At the
August 2009 FOMC meeting, it was announced that the full $300 billion is to be
purchased by the end of October 2009. At the time of writing, the $300 billion in
longer-term Treasuries purchases have been completed (Figure 12). The bulk of
thesepurchases,about85percent,haveinvolvedmaturitiesbetweentwoand10




success or failure considering all the other determinants of Treasury yields, in







One of the main lessons from the recent crisis is that supervision, regulation and
the tools of the central bank must keep pace with developments and changes in
ﬁnancial markets and institutions. In the uS, the focus had been too narrow on
commercial banks and commercial bank deposits, partially a legacy of the glass-
Steagall Act. As the crisis revealed, many institutions beyond commercial banks
are crucial to the healthy functioning and stability of the ﬁnancial system and
'funding runs' can pose perhaps a greater threat to the stability of banking and
ﬁnancial institutions than traditional depositor runs. The interconnectedness of





1833 Oceans_8.3.11.qxp:oceans apart book  9/3/11  16:06  Page 176OCeANSAPArT177
lend and lengthen the maturity of its lending were an acknowledgement of the
narrowness of the traditional tool-set for dealing with a modern ﬁnancial crisis.
JudgingtheeﬀectivenessofthenewfacilitiesandemergencyactionsoftheFedis
ofcourseacomplicatedtask,plagued,asalwaysineconomics,bytheabsenceof
the counterfactual had the policies not been followed. As the tone of the previous
sections makes clear, and with recovery seeming to take hold, we judge the
combinationoftraditionalandnon-traditionalresponsestohavebeen,onbalance,
successfulinpreventingthegreatrecessionfromturningintoarepeatofthegreat
Depression. While the eﬀectiveness of individual initiatives will continue to be
debated, the key point is to consider what comes next for the initiatives and how
supervisory and regulatory policy can be shaped to improve the resilience of the
system.
Asnotedabove,allofthefacilitiesandinitiativessummarisedinTable1,with
the exception of the three Maiden lane llCs and direct purchases of longer-term
assets,werestructuredtonaturallywinddownastheirchargesandfeesbecome
more onerous with declining risk spreads brought about by a return to normal
marketfunctioning.ThisnaturaldiminutioncanbeclearlyseenwiththeTAF,TSlF,
PDCF, AMlF, CPFF, and the swap lines. In addition, in the December 2009 FOMC
statement,theFederalreservereiterateditsintentiontoshutterthesefacilitiesby
1 February 2010, with the exception of the TAF which will gradually be reduced in
size (as noted above, the TAF is an eﬀective way to provide the equivalent of
discount window lending while avoiding stigma, similar to eCB credit provision
programmes, so it may make sense to maintain a facility like this over time). The








of growth of the monetary base and the Fed funds rate as the economy recovers
(see Bernanke, 2009b, and Kroszner, 2009b). The initiatives put in place by the
Treasury and FDIC also have, to diﬀering extents, built-in exit strategies. Capital
injectionsunderTArParebeinggraduallyrepaidandtheFDICguaranteeprogramme
fornewbanksecuritiesissuesexpiredinOctober2009.
Nonetheless, moral hazard issues will remain. The rubicon cannot be
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uncrossed and ﬁnancial market behaviour will surely anticipate the return of the
'temporary'programmesandguaranteesintheeventofanothercrisis.Tomaintain
thestabilityofthesystemandtoprotecttaxpayers,the'toointerconnectedtofail'
problem needs to be addressed in two ways: through improvements in the
supervisionandregulationframeworkandthroughimprovementsinthelegaland
market infrastructure to make markets more robust globally (Kroszner, 2009a).
givingsupervisorstheinformationandabilitytomonitorrisksthroughoutthe
system,notjustintraditionalbanks,isanimportantpartoftheimprovementsthat
could be made, and international cooperation will be a necessary part of this.
exactlywhoshouldbeartheresponsibilityofbeingthe'systemic-riskregulator'and











banking embodied in the glass-Steagall Act would insulate banks from ﬁnancial-
marketshocksandhelptopromotestability.Theexperienceofthelastfewyears,
however, does not provide strong support for such an argument9. In the uS, for
example,theinterconnectednessproblemsarosenotprimarilyfromthemixingof
commercial and investment banking at individual institutions. recall that Bear
Stearns, Merrill lynch and lehman Brothers were not commercial bank holding
companies and so their troubles had nothing to do with allowing commercial and
investmentbankingtooccurinthesameholdingcompany.Theexposuresthatled
to the downfall of Indymac, Washington Mutual and Wachovia, for example, were
primarily related to risky choices and concentrations within the traditional
commercialbankingsphereofmortgageoriginationandlending,againnotrelated
toinvestment-bankingactivitiesofunderwritingordealinginsecurities.Inaddition,
re-introducing a glass-Steagall separation in the uS would likely result in greater
fragmentation of the ﬁnancial system, with the likely consequence of increasing
9. The historical evidence also does not support an argument in favour of the glass-Steagall separation
(seeforinstance,Krosznerandrajan,1994,andKroszner,1996).
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ratherthandecreasingtheinterconnectednessofbankinginstitutionsasfunding
sources for other ﬁnancial institutions and markets. Pushing risk-taking activities




mitigating moral-hazard problems and maintaining conﬁdence in the system.
Appropriate capital requirements, however, are only one piece of the puzzle. High
capitalrequirementsonbanksorotherclassesofﬁnancialinstitutions,forexample,
can lead to strong incentives for getting around them, through either oﬀ balance-
sheet activities or activities being undertaken by entities not facing the
requirements.Afterall,regulatoryburdenandhighcapitalrequirementsarepartof
the reasons that ﬁnance moved to the long and increasingly complex inter-
mediationchains.
It is thus crucial for reform to acknowledge the challenges posed by modern
ﬁnancialmarketdevelopmentsandtofocusonmakingmarketinfrastructuremore
robusttomitigatethefragilitiesoftheintermediationchains.Ofprimaryimportance
is improving the resolution regime for large ﬁnancial institutions (see Kroszner,
2009a). uncertainties associated with contract enforcement and delays in
bankruptcymadeitdiﬃcultorimpossibleforﬁrmstoobtainevensecuredfunding,
leading customers and counterparties to pull away, as was evident in September
of 2008. The market-based intermediation chain relies heavily upon clarity in
contractenforcementandrulesforresolution.Thestresssituationin2008revealed
theextentofthoseuncertaintiesandhowtheycouldleadto'fundingruns'.greater
reliance on 'living wills' would give greater clarityabout how a troubledinstitution
will operate as it winds down operations. Pre-packaged bankruptcy could reduce
uncertainty about how various stakeholders will be treated if an institution fails.
greater international cooperation and clarity on the cross-border aspects of
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As the crisis in the uS started to unfold, other jurisdictions at ﬁrst tended to
watch the incipient uS drama with moral and regulatory superiority. This was
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thechangingnatureandlengthoftheintermediationchains
While the changes to ﬁnancial systems in developed economies during recent
decadeswerenotnecessarilyinstrumentalinprecipitatingthepresentcrisis,these
changes have played a signiﬁcant role in how stabilisation and rescue measures
hadtobedesignedandapplied.




In terms of risk management these developments per se increase systemic
vulnerabilityas,otherthingsbeingconstant,riskinavaluechainincreasesrelative
tothenumberoflinks.regulationandsupervisionofﬁnancialsystemsincreasingly
have been undermined by systemic gaps in the chain. These 'black holes' of
supervisionandregulation,throughtheirbackwardandforwardlinkages,increase
risks throughout the intermediation chain in a non-linear manner. Non-bank
ﬁnancialintermediariesandunregulatedproductshaveincreasedinnovationinthe
sector, but have rendered obsolete the concept of the ﬁnancial system as a
comprehensivelysupervisedandregulatedsector.
These developments hampered the Fed’s reaction to the crisis, and generally
haveledglobalcentralbankresponsestobeeclectic,withinterestingdiﬀerences
ininstrumentsbetweenthediﬀerentcontinents.Astherehadnotbeenasystemic









Whilst this may not play a big role in an ex-post analysis of what happened
when and why, it is important in determining the future regulatory landscape for
the sector. The discussion, for example, of separating a heavily regulated 'utility
bankingsector'fromalightlyregulatedinnovativebutriskiersectorhasitsorigins
in recognising these problems. Carving out those parts of the sector that are not
systemically interlinked with the rest of the economy, and thus cannot cause a
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systemic crisis in cases of endogenous failures, would leave only a very small




A further consequence of this elongated value and information chain is the
breakdown of the pricing system because the market valuation of ﬁrms becomes
dependent not only on the health of their own balance sheet, nor even mainly
dependant on the health of the balance sheet of their immediate counterparties,
butonthepresumedhealthofbalancesheetsofunknownintermediariesfardown
orupthechain.Thus,systemicconﬁdenceorlackofconﬁdencehascometoplay
a greater role in determining the liquidity and solvency of the system than the
actual rating of ﬁrms based on balance-sheet analysis, and an assessment of
counterpartyrisk.
KrosznerandMelickprovideadetailedoverviewofwhathappenedasadirect
consequence of these problems when the classical central-bank policy tools of
open-marketoperations,discountlendingandreserverequirementsfailedtojump-
start the frozen system. Although these instruments were heavily used up to the
endof2007,theyhadtobecomplementedbynon-traditionalresponsesfromthe
end of 2007 onwards. The authors provide a very useful categorisation of these
instruments, which also serves well for a taxonomy of post-crisis policy
prescriptions: expanding the type of counterparty receiving support; broadening







were, as was to be expected, forceful and pragmatic, and appear to have avoided
themistakescommittedbytheJapaneseinpreviousepisodes.Bycomparison,the
europeansreactedinamoredeliberatemanner.
Japan's monetary policy approach, including non-traditional measures, had
fortunatelybeenextensivelystudiedattheFed,includingatthehighestlevel.This
ensuredafairlyrapidandﬁrmresponse.Indeed,theFed(asotheruSauthorities)
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couldhaveenjoyedanevenlongertime-spanforpreparingitself,aspublicwarnings










Another reason for the uS ability to use 'trial and error' policy approaches is that
becauseofitsinstitutionaldesignandpolicyapproachtheuScanaﬀordtobemuch
more'experimental'thaneurope.Policiesineuropeneedtobecarefullydesigned
and then steered through institutions that reﬂect a carefully-crafted compromise
of national policy objectives and parameters. going back to the drawing board
wastesvaluabletime,andreopensdebatesnobodywantstorevisit.Thus,whilethe
uS can aﬀord to try out policies and then eventually discard or redesign some as
needed, the europeans have strong incentives to get it right from the outset.
Otherwise,theyriskbeingstuckwithill-designedinstrumentsforlongerthancanbe
toleratedintimesofcrisis.
Further, the uS has a proven ability to unwind measures that have become
obsolete. While this may be disputed by uS analysts critical of their own system,
the uS indeed appears to have a higher capability for policy reversal than the
majority of european and Asian systems (albeit with signiﬁcant time-lags). This
facilitatesexperimentalpolicymaking,becausethenegativeconsequencesofmis-
designmaybefeltforashortertimethaninJapanoreurope.
One may argue that these considerations play less of a role in the design of
central-bankpoliciesthanindesignofgovernmentpolicies.Thisiscertainlycorrect,
but I would argue that in this speciﬁc case we need to look at the interaction of
ﬁnancial rescue and mitigation policies of central banks, supervisors and
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Delimitatationsofsectors
Changes to the perimeter of the ﬁnancial sector will inﬂuence regulatory and
supervisorydesignandpractices.Whiledataonthisaspectmaynotbequiteclear,
the uS ﬁnancial system appears to be more diﬀerentiated than the european
system in functional terms. In europe, the intermediationchain in many cases is
considerablyshorterthanintheuS,withnon-ﬁnancialintermediariesplayingless
ofarolethanintheuS.Theeuropeansystemofretail,commercialandinvestment
banking (with important exceptions, of course) is subject to identical regulatory




the deposit/loan ratio is so near to 100 percent that the ﬁnancial crisis produced
hardly any liquidity stress in national systems. In some european countries, the








a signiﬁcant diﬀerentiation between countries inside and outside the euro area.
TheseareinstitutionalconsiderationstheFedobviouslydoesnothavetocontend
with,makinglifeeasierfortheFedcomparedtotheeCB.
This is obviously not the place to discuss the future regulatory landscape.
Suﬃce to say that the perimeters of regulation and supervision need to become
moreclearlydeﬁned.Diﬀerencesinapplicablerulesandregulations,andresponsi-
bilities, for regulated versus non-regulated sectors, need to be more clearly
perceptible. The uS may have more of an issue from this point of view than the
majorityofotherjurisdictions.
Intermsofunityandclarityofsupervisorystructures,Japanappearstoenjoy














aid and competition policies being among the truly supranational policies with
strong executive powers concentrated in Brussels. National aid and rescue




limitations on executive pay and other policies address the relative role of ﬁrms
receiving aid compared to others, the overall lack of focus on distortions of
competition because of rescue measures has been quite remarkable when
compared to europe. This has facilitated rapid disbursements in the uS, while in
europe implementation lags of several months have not been uncommon. The








streamlining their systems along functional (uS) and national (europe) delimita-
tions. We will require greater clarity on the boundaries of the ﬁnancial system in
order to better distinguish between unregulated and regulated sectors, products
andfunctions.Andthesediﬀerenceswillneedtobespelledoutwithgreaterclarity.
Supervision at the interface of regulated and unregulated activity should become
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Well before the crisis, many authors, from both academic and policy circles,
warnedthatthearchitectureforresolvingdiﬃcultieswithintheeuropeanﬁnancial
singlemarketwasdeﬁcient.Therewasconcernabouttheabilitytomanageliquidity
or solvency diﬃculties. On the liquidity side, concern centred on the absence of
clear guidelines for implementing the eu lender-of-last-resort function in cases
whenpan-europeanbanksexperienceproblems.Onthesolvencyside,therewas
similar concern over the lack of clear arrangements for the resolution of cross-
border banking crises, in particular ﬁscal burden-sharing mechanisms2. even
Alexandre lamfalussy, former president of the european Monetary Institute, con-
cludedthatexistingeuropeanarrangementswere‘suboptimal’(lamfalussy,2004).
Againstthisbackground,thischapterassessestheresponseofeuandnational
authorities to the banking crisis. Our main ﬁnding is that their policy performance




1. respectively Bruegel and université Paris-Dauphine, and université libre de Bruxelles, Bruegel and
CePr.ThispaperisarevisedandupdatedversionofPisani-FerryandSapir(2010).
2. As regards liquidity see Prati and Schinasi (1998 and 1999), Schinasi and Teixeira (2006) and Nieto
andSchinasi(2007).Onsolvency,seegoodhart(2004),goodhartandSchoenmaker(2006),Mayes,
NietoandWall(2007)andNietoandSchinasi(2007).
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institutionalarrangementstheninplaceweresosuboptimal.
Section 2 describes the pre-crisis eu banking scene in terms of both market
integration and crisis management arrangements. Section 3 describes the main
events and the policy responses from the early days of the crisis in mid-2007 to
publicationofthe‘stresstests’inmid-2010.Section4assesseshowthecrisiswas





by eu policymakers as goals since the early days of the european single market.










2004 and 2007. These changes were conducive to greater consolidation and
internationalisation in eu banking. There was extensive activity in the area of
mergersandacquisitions(M&A),mostlyinvolvingdomesticinstitutionsinaninitial
phase, after which cross-border mergers gradually became predominant in value
terms. Through foreign direct investment, western european banks acquired a
dominantpositioninmostNMSincentralandeasterneurope.Asaresult,european
banks were signiﬁcantly more internationalised by 2007 than banks in the uS,
JapanorChina(Véron,2007,andFigure1).
Whilethesinglemarkethadnotmanagedtopromotecross-borderservices,it
had largely succeeded in activating a process of cross-border competition and
integration. However, its early logic was still evident in the predominance of the
home-country principle: banks could operate through branches, they were
supervisedbytheauthoritiesofthecountryinwhichtheywereheadquartered,and












































































































































only the ﬁscal authorities of that country were responsible for bailing them out.
2.2Crisisprevention:thesupervisorysystem
The slow but steady growth of banking integration gradually forced the eu to
confront what Schoenmaker and Oosterloo (2007) have called the trilemma of
ﬁnancialsupervision.JustasinthefamousMundelltrilemma,thereisaninherent




Despite early recognition of this problem, there was no will to tackle it in the
radical way the Mundell trilemma was addressed when the euro was introduced.
No competence was transferred to the eu level. Instead, two main principles,
decentralisationandcooperation,wereemphasisedinthehopethatcoordination
within specialised committees and procedures for information exchange would,
temporarilyatleast,counterthedeﬁcienciesofthesystem3.











The main responsibility for ﬁnancial stability and crisis management in the




The provision of liquidity assistance to banks in the eu is the responsibility of
nationalcentralbanks.Inthecaseofcross-borderbankinginstitutions,thecentral
bankofthehostcountryisresponsible,regardlessofwhethertheforeignbankinits
territory operates as a branch or a subsidiary. Since banking supervision is also
national but with the main responsibility for cross-border institutions assigned to




with the identiﬁcation of the authorities responsible for crisis management, the
information ﬂows required between all authorities involved and the practical
conditionsforsharinginformationatcross-borderlevel.TheMoualsoprovidesfor
the setting up of a logistical infrastructure to support enhanced cross-border
cooperationbetweenauthorities.
The situation in the euro area is similar. liquidity assistance is decentralised
andtheeuropeanCentralBank(eCB)hasnotbeenformallyassignedlender-of-last-
resort responsibility under the Maastricht treaty. Neither does it have any
supervisoryauthorityovernationalsupervisors,orprivilegedaccesstoinformation
fromthem.
3. Cooperation was developed in three areas. First, the prudential framework followed by national
supervisors was largely harmonised by eu legislation. Second, a Committee of european Banking
Supervisors (CeBS) was established in 2003, with a role limited to facilitating consultation among
supervisors and to providing technical advice to the european Commission on regulation and
convergenceofsupervisorypractices.Third,provisionsweremadeforcooperationintimeofcrisis.
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the provision of liquidity is consistent with maintaining the appropriate single
monetary stance (eCB, 2000).Second, although the eCB is not the lender-of-last-
resort responsible for providing liquidity to individual banks, it is responsible, at
least implicitly, for providing liquidity to the euro area as a whole. Cooperation
among central banks on liquidity provision is therefore stronger within the euro




from central banks to treasuries. With no eu or even eurozone treasury, or a
common pool of resources available for this purpose, crisis resolution has been
entirely the responsibility of national treasuries. And there has been no special
provisionforitwherepan-europeanbanksareaﬀected.
Treasuries cooperate with central banks and among themselves, through the
work of ministers and central bank governors for the eCOFIN Council. eCOFIN
decisions in all matters, including crisis management, are prepared by the
economic and FinancialCommittee (eFC) consisting of deputy ﬁnance ministers,
deputycentralbankgovernorsandeuauthorities.
Before2007,theonlyeuﬁnancialcrisismanagementarrangementthatexisted
was a May 2005 Mou on cooperation in times of crisis between banking super-
visors, central banks and ﬁnance ministries in eu countries. It consisted of





and simulation exercises. But it was non-binding and contained no advance
arrangementforburden-sharingbetweennationaltreasuries.






However, a 1994 eu directive (framework law) provided a harmonised
minimum level of deposit protection throughout the eu. Such protection required
that every credit institution should join one of a number of Deposit guarantee
Schemes(DgS),eachofwhichguaranteedanydepositoruptoaminimumlevelof
ᾬ20,000.Thisamountremainedunchangeduntilthecrisis.
Yet the directive failed to address the issue of systemic risk either within
countries or across europe, and most schemes were only able to handle minor
problemswithinnationalborders.
2.4Summingup
The years preceding the crisis witnessed rapid internationalisation of the eu
bankingsector.Yettheeuinstitutionalarchitectureforﬁnancialcrisismanagement
reliedmainlyoncooperationandremainedbasedonweakprocedures,ifnotmere
















1833 Oceans_8.3.11.qxp:oceans apart book  9/3/11  16:06  Page 195196OCeANSAPArT
This clearly suboptimal situation stemmed from an eu strategy which put
marketintegrationﬁrstandsoughttobuildpolicyintegrationonlyasaresponseto
it. Here, the same approach was adopted for ﬁnance as had been successfully
applied elsewhere. The logic was that integration should be driven primarily by





• Phase one started in August 2007 with a general liquidity strain, which
gradually became a crisis of securitisation and leverage. Tensions on money
markets, as measured by the eurIBOr-OIS spread, had ups and downs but
remained consistently above pre-crisis levels (Figure 2). Solvency problems
werefacedbycertaininstitutions,noneofwhichwereengagedin(signiﬁcant)
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• ThesecondandmostacutephasestartedinSeptember2008andwasoverby
mid-2009. It witnessed both a general loss of conﬁdence and institution-
speciﬁcsolvencycrisesatmajorbanks,includingtwosigniﬁcantcross-border
institutions, Dexia and Fortis. The eurIBOr-OIS spread shot up in September




















unlike the Federal reserve, which had to introduce new facilities providing
liquiditytoﬁnancialinstitutions,theeCBwasabletodosowithoutreallyreforming
itsproceduresandoperationalframework(eCB,2009b).Itcouldalreadyaccepta
very wide range of collateral in repo lending because it was based on existing
practices in eurozone countries, which proved to be an asset. The eCB therefore
essentiallyﬁne-tunedtheprovisionofliquiditytothebankingsector.InDecember
2007, it also entered into a swap agreement with the Federal reserve to provide
dollarliquiditytoeuropeanbanksunabletoaccessiteasily.
As general liquidity crises often tend to become solvency crises, it was
fortunatethattheeFCadhocgroupsetupbyeCOFINin2006hadalreadystarted
work. By September 2007, the eFC was able to issue a report containing basic




viewing any crisis in a pan-european ﬁnancial institution as a ‘matter of common
interest’.
The eCOFIN Council of October 2007 further agreed on common principles for
cooperation among national authorities to preserve ﬁnancial stability. These




The common principles committed eu countries to cooperation in crisis
management.Itwasfeltthatmanagementofacross-bordercrisisinparticularwas
a matter of common interest to all countries aﬀected. Where a bank group had
signiﬁcant cross-border activities in diﬀerent eu countries, the Council agreed to
‘carefullycooperateandprepareinnormaltimesasmuchaspossibleforsharinga
potential ﬁscal burden’ on the basis of ‘equitable and balanced criteria’. Yet once
again,therewasnomentionoftheincentivesrequired.TheeuropeanCommission
was invited to propose ways of clarifying cooperation commitments, for adoption
by the end of 2009. Meanwhile, eu countries were simply encouraged to sign
‘voluntarycooperationagreements’betweentheirappropriatenationalauthorities
as soon as possible. Competition and state aid rules were still the only real eu








Council and added procedures speciﬁcally to improve cooperation within and
betweeneucountries6.Itsmaininnovationwastherecommendationthatcountries
with common ﬁnancial stability concerns stemming from the presence of cross-
4. Thereport(eCFIN/CeFCPe(2007)reP/53990)hasnotbeenmadepublic.
5. IKB, Sachsen lB and WestlB in germany; Northern rock in the united Kingdom; and roskilde Bank in
Denmark.
6. unlikeearlierones,thisMou(eCFIN/CeFCPe(2008)reP/53106reV)wasmadepublic.
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border ﬁnancial institutions should develop voluntary but clear cooperation
agreements.Theyincludedthecreationofcross-borderstabilitygroupstofacilitate
themanagementandresolutionofcross-borderﬁnancialcrises.
All in all, the ﬁrst phase of the crisis certainly generated much activity within
theeuropeanﬁnancialstabilitycommunity.Morestrikinghoweveristhat,despite
the urgency, little progress was achieved in terms of building a european crisis
managementframework.Infact,therecommendationsoftheOctober2007eCOFIN




bankruptcy of lehman Brothers. Besides sharply reducing the already deﬁcient
liquidity in various markets, the lehman debacle inﬂicted serious problems of
solvency on several major european banks. On 27 September, the Belgian/Dutch
bank Fortis became the ﬁrst systemic eu bank to be rescued by governments, in
this case those of Belgium, luxembourg and the Netherlands. On 30 September,
further action was taken by Belgium, France and luxembourg to rescue the
Belgian/FrenchbankDexia.Thesameday,theIrishMinisterofFinanceannounced
aunilateralgovernmentdecisiontoguaranteeallthedepositsanddebtsofsixIrish
banks and their foreign subsidiaries – a move sharply criticised by other eu
countries for undermining their own deposit guarantee schemes. This was the
beginning of a series of national initiatives with cross-border implications and
potentialrisksfortheentireeubankingsystem.
Itwasclearfromthesystemicnatureofthecrisisandgovernmentresponses
to it that the r&r guidelines no longer provided the right framework for handling
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Meanwhile, the eCB changed its procedure for reﬁnancing operations. On 8
October, it announced a ﬁxed-rate procedure with full allotment instead of its
variableratetender.Asaresult,bankscouldbecertainthattheirbidsforliquidity
wouldbesatisﬁedinfullattheeCBrate.Thisremoveduncertaintyandloweredthe
cost of liquidity9. At the same time, the list of assets eligible as collateral was
temporarilyexpanded(theratingthresholdwasloweredfromA-toBBB-anddebt
instrumentsdenominatedinforeigncurrencybecameeligible).Incontrastwiththe
ﬁrst period, therefore, the eCB did far more than ﬁne-tune existing procedures. It
introducedgenuinelyinnovativeoperations10.
On Thursday 9 October, markets throughout the world suﬀered one of their




At the european Council of 15-16 October, the Paris Declaration11 on ‘a
concerted european action plan for the euro area countries’, was endorsed by all
eucountries.largelyinspiredbytheBritishplanof8October12,itcoveredthesame
points: a commitment to further liquidity provision by the central bank; a
commitment to the public recapitalisation of banking institutions that needed
capital;andpublicguaranteesforbankborrowing.Italsocommittedthesignatories
toenhancedcooperation.
The Paris Declaration paved the way for three important Commission docu-
ments. Between them, they provided a consistent framework for the rescue and
restructuringofeubanks,sothatnegativespillovereﬀectsbetweeneucountries
couldbeminimised:
• The ‘Banking Communication’ of 13 October 2008 focused mainly on the
conditions that national guarantees covering bank liabilities had to fulﬁl to
complywitheustateaidrules13.Theseconditionsweremainlymeanttolessen
the danger of substantial funds ﬂowing freely towards eu countries with the
9. DetailsofthenewprocedureareprovidedbyeCB(2009b).




12.HM Treasury, “Financial support to the banking industry”, http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/
press_100_08.htm.
13.Communication from the Commission on ‘The application of the State aid rules to measures taken in
relationtoﬁnancialinstitutionsinthecontextofthecurrentglobalﬁnancialcrisis’,OJC270,5.10.2008.
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highestlevelsofprotectionandtoshieldcompetitionfrommassivedistortions.
The Banking Communication was accompanied by eCB recommendations on
the pricing of guarantees14, which also sought to avoid distortions resulting
fromdiﬀerentpricingpracticesamongeucountries.
• The‘recapitalisationCommunication’of5December2008providedconditions
that national funds would need to meet in recapitalising banks to ensure
adequatelevelsoflendingtotheeconomy15.
• Finally,the'ImpairedAssetsCommunication'of25February2009providedthe
framework for cleaning up the balance sheets of ﬁnancial institutions by
removingtoxicassetsandunderperformingloans16.
In October 2008, the Commission called for an increase in the minimum level of




swiftly in the fourth quarter of 2008 and in 2009 to put in place a framework that
respondedtoit.
Implementation was also swift. From October 2008 to July 2009, the Com-
missionapprovedoverᾬ3500billioninstateaidtoﬁnancialinstitutions,ofwhich
ᾬ1500 billion were used. Support measures fell under the four main headings of
capitalinjections(recapitalisation),guaranteesonbankliabilities,reliefofimpaired
assets, and liquidity and bank funding support. Table 2 shows both the approved
and real state interventions for the eu, the euro area (eA) and individual eu
countries, by type of support measure during the period from October 2008 to
August2009.
By the end of August 2009, the total of all approved measures amounted to


















total eﬀective total total
approved capital approved guarantees approved eﬀective
measures injections measures granted measures interventlon
Be 5.3 6.1 70.8 16.3 8.1 8.1
Bg 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Cz 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
DK 6.1 2.4 253.0 2.5 0.3 0.3
De 4.4 2.0 18.6 7.2 1.4 1.4
ee 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Ie 6.6 6.5 164.7 164.7 0.0 0.0
el 2.0 1.5 6.1 1.2 3.3 1.8
eS 0.0 0.0 18.6 2.1 2.8 1.8
Fr 1.2 1.2 16.6 5.5 0.2 0.2
IT 1.3 0.1 NA 0.0 0.0 0.0
CY 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
lV 1.4 0.9 25.7 2.8 10.9 4.7
lT 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
lu 6.9 7.9 12.4 Nr 0.9 0.9
Hu 1.1 0.1 5.9 0.0 0.0 2.6
MT 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Nl 6.4 6.8 34.3 7.7 11.4 5.5
AT 5.5 1.7 25.7 6.8 7.1 2.0
Pl 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
PT 2.4 0.0 10.0 3.3 0.0 0.0
rO 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
SI 0.0 0.4 32.8 6.3 0.0 0.0
SK 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
F1 0.0 0.0 27.7 0.0 0.0 0.0
Se 1.6 0.2 48.5 11.0 12.6 0.0
uK 3.5 2.6 21.7 11.3 16.4 14.7
eA-16 2.7 1.7 24.6 7.8 4.1 3.0
eu-27 2.7 1.7 20.5 7.8 2.1 1.4
Source:europeanCommission(2009).
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Ireland to zero in several new member states. In general, the NMS approved very
fewsupportmeasures,partlybecausetheirbankingsectorsweremainlycontrolled
by foreign banks and partly because of the home-country principle. By contrast,
approvedsupportwasconsiderableinsmalleu-15countrieswithbroadexposure
totheNMS,suchasAustria,Belgium,theNetherlandsandSweden.
The total of all eﬀective measures stood at nearly 12 percent of gDP for the
entire eu. This too was huge compared to the united States in which the corre-
spondingpercentagewasjustunder2.Individualmemberstatescomeunderﬁve
headings: countries with support measures comprising over 100 percent of their
gDP (Ireland); those with measures of between 20 and 30 percent of their gDP
(Belgium,theuK,Netherlandsand,subjecttooﬃcialconﬁrmation,luxembourg);
thosewithmeasuresofaround10percentoftheirgDP(Sweden,germany,Austria




for the eu as a whole, accounting for over half the amount in approved measures
and two-thirds of the eﬀective amount at eu level. However there were major
diﬀerences between countries. Of the ﬁve countries with the highest eﬀective
amounts relative to gDP, Ireland focused almost exclusively on state guarantees,
whiletheuKusedmainlyliquidityandbankfundingsupport.Inluxembourg,asin
Ireland,guaranteesplayedanimportantrole,butsodidrecapitalisation.Bycontrast









uK, germany and Austria. By contrast, healthier banks in other countries have
started raising private capital and repaying government support. Hence, the
variancebetweendiﬀerenteucountrieshasactuallyincreased.
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3.3Thethirdphase:summer2009tosummer2010
The third phase of the crisis was not as severe as the second one, at least for the
banks.Butconcernsovertheextentofthedamagetothebankingsectorremained,
aftertheprovisionofoﬃcialsupporttoitinphasetwo.IMFevaluationsofpotential
write-downs repeatedly highlighted that the eu was behind the uS in recognising









doubtless mainly due to rivalry between european supervisors and national
supervisorswhoweredeterminedtoupholdtheirprerogatives.
The demand for comprehensive and comparable stress tests was eﬀectively
ditched. The results of an assessment exercise conducted under the auspices of
the CeBS (the Committee of european Banking Supervisors) and released in
September2009providedscantinformation.Fewbanksweresurveyed,therewas
no common methodology, and individual bank results were not published. So
rumours continued and spread following the sovereign debt crises in the second






this did not occur, banks released the information themselves using the common
publicationtemplate.Whileassumptionsweresometimesquestioned,thegeneral





















have the soundest possible information on (a) whether a particular ﬁnancial
institution–andthebankingsystemingeneral–faceliquidityshortagesorsolvency
strains, and (b) the systemic implications of any failure of that institution. Public





Throughout the period 2007-10 the situation in the eu persistently lacked
transparencyformarketparticipants,thepublicandpolicyinstitutions:
• Supervisorslackedadequateinformation.AccordingtotheDelarosière(2009)
report, they ‘did not seem to share their information properly with their
counterpartsinothermemberstates’andtherewaseven‘anerosionofmutual
conﬁdence’amongthem.
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• TheeCBhadtotakereal-timedecisionsaboutliquidityassistanceforindividual
ﬁnancial institutions and the ﬁnancial system as a whole, without having
accesstoassessmentsbynationalsupervisorsoftheﬁnancialhealthofbanks.
evenvis-￠-visthemarket,centralbankoﬃcialsquiteoftenfeltunder-informed.
• Following the success of the uS stress tests in restoring some comparability
betweenbigbanksinMay2009,europeanstookoverayeartofollowsuit,and
only did so under market pressure. The seemingly similar exercise that
supervisorsdecidedtoundertakeinmid-2009containedsomanylimitations
that it became almost meaningless. For example, it was stated that the tests
didnotaim‘toidentifyindividualbanksthatmayneedrecapitalisation’20.And






well have been used strategically. For too long, national authorities were given
incentives not to recognise the fragility of some home-based institutions in the
hopethatmassiveprovisionofliquiditybytheeCBatnear-zerointerestrateswould
helprebuildthecapitalbaseofbanks,eﬀectivelyusingtheeCBliquidityassistance
as a form of hidden subsidy. They were also encouraged to provide capital and




of a european Systemic risk Board (eSrB) charged with macro-prudential super-
vision, and reform of the committee structure of micro-prudential supervision
instigated by the De larosière report. The new european System of Financial
Supervisors(consistingofthethreeeu-levelauthoritiesforbanking,insuranceand
securities) and the eSrB are expected to be put in place by 1 January 2011.
However, at the time of writing, ﬁnal decisions are still pending, as legislation
remainsunderdiscussionintheeuropeanParliamentandtheeCOFINCouncil.The
two main questions here are whether european supervisors will receive helpful
20.StatementofCeBSof12May2009.
21.Spain published extensive results for all banks. germany did not publish the banks’ exposure to
sovereignriskanditstestscoveredpartofthebankingsectoronly.
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informationoncross-borderinstitutionsfromnationalsupervisors,andwhetherthe
eSrB will receive the aggregate information necessary to assess overall risks to
ﬁnancialstability.
As regards the ﬁrst question, the September 2009 european Commission
proposalforthecreationofaeuropeanBankingAuthoritystatedthattheAuthority
would have the power to obtain from national supervisory authorities ‘all the
necessary information to carry out [its] duties’ and that it would establish and
manageacentraldatabaseaccessibletocollegesofsupervisors22.Astothesecond
question, the Commission proposal for the establishment of the eSrB stated that
it should have access to all necessary information ‘while preserving the con-
ﬁdentialityofthesedata’.Wherethisinformationwasnotmadeavailable,theeSrB
wouldhavetherightto‘requestdatadirectlyfromnationalsupervisoryauthorities,
national central banks or other authorities of member states’23, a signiﬁcant step
forward. While stronger eu-level authorities are fully supported by the european
Parliament, some national governments insist that supervision should remain
ﬁrmlyrootedatnationallevel,sincedecisionsmayhavebudgetaryconsequences.
4.2Liquiditysupport





uncertainty about whether, in the event of a banking crisis across pan-european
markets,therewillbeacentralproviderorcoordinatorofemergencyliquidity’and
thatitis‘unclearhowafast-breakingliquiditycrisiswillbehandled’.
Such fears proved unfounded. The eCB was the ﬁrst central bank to react to
signsofadrying-upofliquidityontheinter-bankmarket,andtherewasnoevidence
of diﬃculties in coordination between the eCB and the national central banks
throughoutthecrisis.Furthermore,therewasclosecoordinationwiththebigcentral
banks,includingabovealltheFederalreserve.
It was a signiﬁcant achievement for the eCB to distribute tasks within the
22.‘Proposal for a regulation establishing a european Banking Authority (eBA), COM(2009) 501 ﬁnal, 23
September2009.
23.‘ProposalforaregulationoftheeuropeanParliamentandoftheCouncilonCommunitymacroprudential
oversight of the ﬁnancial system and establishing a european Systemic risk Board’ COM(2009) 499
ﬁnal,23September2009.
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eurosystem with little guidance from the treaty and to coordinate action across
currencyzones,despitetheabsenceofpriorformalagreements24.
4.3Depositguarantees
As mentioned in section 2, deposit guarantee schemes are national in scope and
onlylooselyharmonised.Thislackofcoordinationinvolvedtheriskofdepositﬂows
towardscountriesoﬀeringbetterguarantees,andofintra-countryﬂowsfrombanks






at similar moves, which resulted in the swift adoption of a new, higher guarantee
threshold across the eu. Predictably, there was a competitive drive to raise
guarantees before they were harmonised more closely at the higher level. less





restructuring of banks, other than general competition policy provisions for state
aid to individual companies, which were not designed speciﬁcally with ﬁnancial










1833 Oceans_8.3.11.qxp:oceans apart book  9/3/11  16:06  Page 208OCeANSAPArT209
• Second,thatlegitimatenationalactiontosafeguardstabilitywouldresultina










aid to ’remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State’ could be
consideredcompatiblewiththecommonmarket(Art87-3(b)).Theprovisiongave
legal support to a temporary weakening of state aid rules and the monitoring of
nationalaidbytheeuropeanCommissionundercompetitionpolicyregulations.In
the Banking Communication of 13 October, the Commission indicated that eu
countries would ‘have to show that the State aid measures notiﬁed to the Com-






The eﬀectiveness of this monitoring mechanism has been evaluated several
times. A self-assessment by the Commission Directorate-general for Competition
(Dg Competition) published in August 200925 indicated that its objectives had
generally been met. However, it echoed concerns over cross-country diﬀerences
in the pricing of guarantees (in spite of common principles) and the fact that
national support was (plainly or implicitly) conditional on extending credit to
domestic customers, thereby leading to single market fragmentation. An
independent evaluation agreed that ‘Dg Competition has acted expeditiously and
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Dg Competition’s chief economist Damien Neven believes that, in assessing
nationalstateaidtotheﬁnancialsector,theCommissiondraws‘adistinctionamong
distressed banks between those that are in distress because of a defective
businessmodelandthosethathappenedtobedistressedbecauseofthesystemic








started in April 2009. reviews can lead to either a prolongation or a formal
investigationofthestatecase,whoseeventualoutcomeisprolongation,termina-
tionorprolongationconditionalonmandatoryrestructuring.
On 29 June 2010, the Commission ordered restructuring in four cases begun





Dewatripont et al (2010) propose building on the successful intervention by
DgCompetitionduringthebankingcrisistoimprovebankresolutionintheeu.While
callingforthecreationofaeuropeanbankingresolutionauthority,theyrecognise
that this will probably be a long process. In the meantime, Dg Competition could
promotethecoordinationofnationaleﬀortstoachieveresolutionwherevercross-
borderbanksareinvolved.Ifso,itsrolewouldbethatofavoidingnotjustdistortions






26.In 2008 and 2009 the Commission had already imposed mandatory restructuring on four of the ﬁve
bankscitedinfootnote5.Theﬁfth(roskildeBank)wasliquidated.
1833 Oceans_8.3.11.qxp:oceans apart book  9/3/11  16:06  Page 210OCeANSAPArT211
ofprovisionforanticipatoryburden-sharing(Freixas,2003,andVéron,2007).When
thecrisisdeveloped,therewerewidespreaddemandsorsuggestionsforconcerted
action to devise a european solution to the crisis of pan-european institutions
(Alesinaetal,2008,andgrosandMicossi,2008).
Yet calls for burden-sharing in advance were consistently rejected by eu
countries.eventhesuggestionthattheymightallcontributetoacompartmental-
ised fund without exercising joint responsibility fell on deaf ears. Despite the
severityofthecrisisandthehighrisksinvolvedinthefailureofalargecross-border
ﬁnancial institution, governments insisted that there was no european taxpayer
andthatallsupporttothebankingsectorhadtobenational.







banks. Purely anecdotal evidence suggests that banks receiving government
supportwereoftenencouragedtocontinuelendingtotheirdomesticclientele,so
that foreign customers would bear the brunt of any balance-sheet adjustments.
Although,politicallyandeconomically,thiswasthelogicalconsequenceofbanks






had passporting rights to operate as a branch in the european union, and so was
primarily supervised by its Icelandic home supervisor27. Thus when the bank
collapsed in October 2008, the protection of depositors in eu branches (in the
Netherlands and the united Kingdom) was dependent on the ﬁscal capacity of
Iceland and the resources of its deposit insurance scheme, both of which were
inadequate.InthewordsoflordTurner,chairmanoftheBritishFinancialServices
27.ThisisbecauseeusinglemarketrulescoverIcelandasamemberoftheeuropeaneconomicArea(eeA).
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Authority, ‘faced with that reality we either need more european coordination or
morenationalpowers–moreeuropeorlesseurope–wecan’tstaywhereweare’.
either the eu can adopt europe-wide measures to assess how eﬀectively home
countriessupervisebankswantingtoconductretailbusinessthroughbranchesin
othereucountries,orthosebankswillhavetooperateabroadthroughsubsidiaries
fully supervised by host countries, which would mean the end of the eu single
marketinretailbanking.
5.Conclusions
The purpose of this paper was to assess the management of the banking crisis in
theeuagainstthebackdropofpre-crisisinstitutionalarrangementsthatwerefound
tobeclearlysub-optimal.Threeconclusionsemergefromourassessment.
First, the crisis has been managed in accordance with the allocation of
responsibilitieswithintheeu.TheeCBandnationalcentralbanksoutsidetheeuro
area have acted as liquidity providers, national governments have dealt with
ﬁnancial stability, and the european Commission has enforced competition
disciplines. Although some of these players, notably the eCB, have not followed
every prior regulation to the letter, none has gone beyond its original remit. In
particular,therehasbeennoeuﬁnancialbail-outofailingtransnationalinstitutions,
or even a genuine stress test of european banks. Neither has management of the
crisis prompted any meaningful move towards federal solutions, moderate or
otherwise.Decisionstakentostrengthenthepan-europeansupervisoryagencies
haveallbeenmorerecent.
Second, coordination problems have been dealt with by combining ad hoc
discretionary cooperation with reliance on existing instruments, especially those
of competition policy. It is remarkable that coordination has not been seriously
impededbythelocationofthemainﬁnancialcentre,london,outsidetheeuroarea.
However,itishardtoassesswhethertheeuhasmanagedtodealwiththeforegoing
problems because ad hoc coordination was all that was needed, or because the
problems themselves were fairly simple. Fortis, the most complex case of cross-
border failure, involved only three countries each of which had a long tradition of
cooperation.
Finally, the better-than-expected performance of the eu is no cause for
complacency.Thefairlypositiveassessmentofithererelatestoacontextwhichis
indeed‘suboptimal’.Scopeforfurtherimprovementremainshuge.
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options, more complex in europe is the diverse and complex set of countries that
makeuptheeuropeanunion,eachofdiﬀerentsizeandexistinginadiﬀerentﬁscal
space. The ﬁscal resources to devote to a banking crisis in Ireland, Austria and
germany clearly varied ex-ante. This point was not lost on investors in the capital
structures of either pan-european or non-pan-european banks. In essence, the
organisation of a currency union where capital is mobile, yet ﬁscal policy is





In my comments, I suggest that the crisis should prompt the establishment of a
much more rapidly acting and coordinated response infrastructure for facing the
nextﬁnancialcrisis.AfterquicklysummarisingthepaperbyPisani-FerryandSapir
(2009),IdiscusssevenkeyareasforreformthatIthinkbotheuropeandtheunited
States will have to address if they are to promote greater safety and soundness
acrosstheAtlantic.Inalltheseareas,coordinationandsequencingoftheexitwill
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institutionalconstraintsgoingintothecrisis:
Pisani-Ferry and Sapir (2009) correctly identify the challenges that coordination
failure could have caused both for addressing the crisis and for the post-crisis
situation.Theauthorslist,correctlyinmyview,sixspeciﬁcareaswhereinstitutional
arrangementsforcrisismanagementineuropewerefoundwanting:
1) information asymmetries between ﬁnancial institutions (FIs) in europe and
theinvestorcommunityandgeneralpublic,whichtheauthorsarguehavenot
beenadequatelyaddressed.Thisisatransatlanticissue:evenintheuSafter





3) Unspeciﬁed lender-of-last-resort (lOlr) role of the european Central Bank: I
agreewiththeauthorsthatthiswasonefactorthatdidnothelpinachievinga
fast response. However, once the eCB and uS Federal reserve better
coordinated their approaches to foreign exchange swaps and lOlr more
generally, actions were taken speedily and involving many central banks
aroundtheworld,andtheseactionsexceededmarketexpectations.
4) Potentialdisparityinliquidityprovisionacrosscurrencyareas.
5) Clashes between state support to ﬁnancial entities and competition policy
and/orburden-sharingintheeU.Iwillarguethat,aseuropeancountriescome
outofthecrisis,thiscontinuestobeanissueintermsofdegreeofintervention
by the state in the operation of certain banks, particularly those receiving
governmentsupport.Insayingthis,Iamnotsuggestingregulatoryforbearance





issue remains open. At the time of writing, no pre-agreed ﬁscal transfer
arrangementsandfunding,orresponsibilityforoversightandimplementation,
wereinplace.Inmyview,Pisani-FerryandSapirarecorrecttoidentifythisas
a very important action to be taken up front in order to signal that future
recapitalisationsofpan-europeanentitiescanbedonespeedily.However,this
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pot of resources must be linked to the real possibility of aggressive failure
resolutionforanypan-europeanbank.
7) the authors do not say enough about the fact that that there was and still is
no over-arching prompt corrective action (PCA) framework providing extra-
judicialauthorityforresolutionofsystemicFIsineurope.Moreover,whatever
regime is developed, it needs to be consistent across countries. The political
economy within each country to eﬀect such change is complex and country-
speciﬁc.Inpracticalterms,complexitiesacrossthelegalsystemsofcountries
intheregionregardingtheformlegislationwouldhavetotakeandtheissues





to be diﬃcult. Initially, investor conﬁdence was shaken by early developments,
such as delay in settingup the swap lines in dollars;the collapse of the Icelandic
banks; unilateral action by Ireland to implement blanket guarantees without
adequate consultation with other countries in the region; the Fortis crisis or











The authors might do more to document in detail the exact way in which the
facilities run by the eCB work, and provide one detailed table showing collateral
requirements, haircut criteria and ﬁnancing arrangements relating to liquidity
provisiontobanks.Theirapproachcouldbecontrastedwiththedetailprovidedby
Krozner et al (2009), who describe in great detail all the arrangements the Fed
employed. More detail would make the very diﬀerent approaches of the two
1833 Oceans_8.3.11.qxp:oceans apart book  9/3/11  16:06  Page 218OCeANSAPArT219





public the ﬁscal transfers needed between countries to address the ﬁscal stress
causedbybanksinsomecountriesthatareverylarge(suchasuBSinSwitzerland).
The forms of intervention used by the eCB will make exit to some degree less
onerousthanfortheFed.
theroadahead:learningfromthecrisisineuropeandtheUS
Pisani-Ferry and Sapir identify four areas in which work is needed: i) information
asymmetriesandwilleuropeanstresstestshaveanybearingonthisissue?ii)is
thedivisionofresponsibilitiesadequateforaddressingthenextcrisis,andshould
the eCB or Financial Stability Board (FSB) take on a new role looking at systemic
stability in the region, with powers to act? iii) is the risk of zombiebanks real and
is the eCB trapped in cheap liquidity support? iv) how will supervision of pan-
europeanmarketsbecoordinated?Iconsideralltheseareastorequirebetterand
more eﬀective and timely institutional arrangements and agree with the authors.
HoweverIthinkthatincommonwiththeuS,beforetacklingtheseimportantissues,
there are seven fundamental areas that this paper might try to address or weave
into the arguments relating to european arrangements for ﬁnancial-crisis






in deposit insurance coverage and/or pricing; and e) micro-prudential regulatory
changes (leverage/capital and provisioning changes that allow for building of a
buﬀer in good times, and liquidity restrictions). When capital is highly mobile,
changes undertaken unilaterally in any of the above policy areas can create
potentially signiﬁcant cross-border ﬂows of capital, even if growth is improving
across the region. In fact, in emerging-market crises one has a laboratory for
examinationofmanyoftheseexitandsequencingissues.Forexample,inthe1995
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Mexicanﬁnancialcrisistheauthoritiessoughttoonlyunwindtheblanketguarantee
ofliabilitiesoncetheyhadverycarefullystrengthenedandrestructuredthebalance
sheets of their banks. Also, sequencing and timing do not need to be coordinated
everywhereinallareas.
Howeversequencingandtimingdomatteralot,becauseoftheparticularsof
diﬀerent countries’ ﬁnancial institutions and whether they are in the process of
strengtheningtheircapitalbasesorimprovingtheirfundingandliabilitystructure.
Inthisregardauthoritieshavetokeepitsimpleandnotoverlymicro-managebanks
or ﬁnancial service entities, and not impose measures now that will hinder
incentivestolendatthemarginatthisstageinthecycle.
Central banks face formidable challenges in communicating in a balanced
manner when they see the need to take action to retract liquidity or to undertake
macro-prudential action. Presently, many central banks are trying to establish
valuation and other models to try and measure and establish when markets are
becoming 'irrational' and when 'bubbles' are forming. The eCB and the Fed are
experimenting with ways to see how excessive compression in credit spreads
impacts the actual process of credit origination and leads to increased prospects
ofstressanddeteriorationincreditquality.eveniftheselinkscanbeestablished,
there is the additional challenge of deciding what actions should be taken at a
micro-prudential level versus more macro interventions that can entail outright
removal of liquidity or a change from an accommodative to restrictive stance in
monetary policy. research in this area, and into micro-market structure, will be
important in the months and years ahead, but central banks must be extremely
cautiousaboutthespeedatwhichliquidityisremoved.
2)Asymmetricinformation,write-downsandEuropeanstresstests:
The inability from a macro-ﬁscal political economy vantage point for european
nationstomakepublicongoingstresstestsisunderstandableforseveralreasons.
First, there is no pre-agreed ﬁscal agreement setting out a formula for burden-
sharingandestablishmentofarelatedcapitalisationfundex-ante(asnotedbythe




any public disclosure of capital needs would be more uncertain. However
reasonable such considerations for not disclosing more information about the
condition of portfolios might be, the relatively less aggressive approach to write-




massive liquidity/solvency-enhancing operations via its special liquidity facility




in europe as it will be in the uS (see point 5 below) as it can allow authorities to
impose holding actions (elimination of payment of dividends, share buybacks,





regulatory and other burden-sharing or competition-policy intervention in banks






suggested that banks as we know them will have to change and become smaller.
Manyareaskingifadequatecompetitionisheldupbytheconcentrationandsize
of ﬁnancial conglomerates or Too-big-too-fail (TBTF) banks. Others argue (Volcker
etal)thatcertainservicesshouldnotbepartofthebanks(egproprietarytrading
operations). Yet market-making does require by deﬁnition some position taking.





cally important FIs; tougher supervision; more aggressive competition policy
thresholds; a more credible threat that being large will not allow an implicit
extensionofthesafetynet;andgreaterinterferenceincompensation.
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4)Capital,leverageandliquiditybuﬀers:
Thecapital,leverage,andliquiditybuﬀersforeuropeananduSbanksaregoingto




is in the midst of the crisis because this is the point when consensus can be
obtained to improve the quality of capital. However, these actions will reduce the
return on assets, delay normalisation in credit markets and make overall growth
lessrobust,everythingelsebeingequal.
Aswellasthelevelofcapitalandtheprecisedeﬁnitionandleveloftheliquidity
buﬀer, and the ability or not to include required or excess reserves, there is the
issueoftheprecisedeﬁnitionofleverage.ForexampleashasbeenshownbyMatt
King et al (2009), a leverage criterion based on total assets versus risk-weighted
assetswilltendtoforcelargeradjustmentsandcapitalneedsoneuropeanbanks
compared to uS banks, along with diﬀerential extent of write-downs. Table 1
illustratesthesubstantialdiﬀerence.









and home-country regulators in the event of a banking crisis within or across
borders, needs to be better organised. The authors may want to provide a clearer
visionofhowthiscouldbedone.
The g20 initiative that all banks should have contingency plans, and should
havedevelopedaformof'livingwill'withsuﬃcientdetailsothatitcanactuallybe
executed rapidly, can help authorities in their own contingency planning in the
eventofanothercrisis.Howeveristhisentireconceptrealisticandwhatisneeded
to make it a reality? I think a very long road lies ahead, but I think it is better to
attempt to come up with a decent PCA and Pr regime, even for very large banks,
than to ignore the problem. For example, designing a PCA and Pr regime across
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europewillrequirethatcertainagencies(home-countryregulatorsormaybesome




actions). There would need to be some clear indicators for taking such regulatory
supervisoryactions,whichcouldbemonitoredinacrediblemannerbysupervisors.
Theprocessofidentifyingwhentotakeactionwillnotbeindependentofthequality













information is also being required of the FIs in europe that have been deemed
systemicallyimportant.Thisinformation,whencombinedwiththatwhichdeposi-
tories and clearing corporations already have, will allow regulators (if the data is
properlyanalysed,whichiseasiersaidthandone)tohaveamuchbetterpictureof
inter-connectedness.




ClS and Swap Clear (of lCH) that apply to foreign exchange and rate derivatives
respectively,thestressoftheﬁnancialcrisiswashandledrelativelywell.Theeﬀorts
in the uS and elsewhere to ensure that CDS and other credit contracts are also
clearedandsettledproperly,andaresubjecttomultilateralnettingviaCCPs,willbe
an improvement. These actions will make it easier for regulators to have a much
morecompletepictureofnetexposuresbetweenFIs.
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Fourth, there is the issue of whether and when a derivative contract is
suﬃcientlystandardisedsothatitshouldsomehowbeexchangetradedaswellas
cleared and settled via a CCP. This could even apply to so-called end-users of




they will have to pass these costs on to ﬁnal consumers in the prices of the
productstheysell.Thesechangeswillimpacttheircompetitiveness.
Fifth,therearemanycontractsthatwillnotwarrantuseofaCCPandtradingon
an exchange because they cannot be seen as standardised even if they may
appear so. An example would be FX options (FXOs). There will be non-trivial
challenges if they are to be put into a CCP versus a more sophisticated trade-
matchingsystemlikeClS2.Speciﬁcally,forFXoptioncontractstobeplacedonan
exchangeandclearedandsettled,itwillrequirethatvirtuallyalllargedealingbanks
agree on the precise mathematical surface to be used to price these contracts
(where today this is proprietary for each dealer). A massive number of OTC FX
options would have to be re-valued intra-day and daily. Agreement on initial and
variationmarginingwouldalsohavetobesoughtwherethereisaninﬁnitearrayof
currencypairs,strikes,expirationdatesandexpirationtimesspeciﬁedinsuchFXOs.
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World Bank publication (see Constantinos Stephanos, 2009), does a good job of
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FIs,makingmarketdisciplinelesseﬀectiveasadiscipliningdevice.




of bank boards, too many board members were not chosen on the basis of their
excellenceinunderstandingmoresophisticatedcontractsandrisks,suchasthose
associatedwithcomplexderivativeandcorrelationtrading.Thereisalreadysome
evidence that in many FIs the function of Chief risk Oﬃcer (CrO) is getting more
stature, and the procedures within trading for crossing-referencing information
betweenmanytrading-productheadsisbecomingfarmoreeﬀective.
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1. IMFand Visiting Fellow at Bruegel. Some of the material in the paper reﬂects ongoing work with Vitor














able to weaknesses in large and complex systemically important ﬁnancial




to improve our ability to identify and manage systemic ﬁnancial risk, which is a
broaderchallengerequiringinmanyinstancesoversightactivitiesthatentailwhat
aretraditionalmicro-andmacro-prudentialeﬀorts.
Third, in crafting reforms for safeguarding ﬁnancial stability in the future, the




and if supervision and regulation are to be eﬀective in preventing and resolving
systemic crises. Accountability is another area requiring fundamental reform
eﬀorts.
Fourth, perhaps because I worked in a central bank for a decade, it is my
judgmentthatmonetaryandﬁnancialstabilitygohandinhand.Intheabsenceof
one, the other is at risk. As the past two years demonstrated, central banks that
conduct monetary policy in fast-paced modern ﬁnancial markets dominated by a
relatively small number of large, highly complex ﬁnancial institutions cannot






preventing systemic problems and crises and for managing and resolving them
whenpreventionfails.Italsodiscussestheweaknessesintheframeworkrevealed
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bytheglobalcrisis.SectionIIIprovidessomebroadreﬂectionsorlessonsfromthe






time based in part on the realisations that ﬁnance is subject to market imper-
fections and that ﬁnancial stability is a public good. Frameworks diﬀer across
countries,butthereareimportantcommonfeaturesamongthem.Thesecommon
features can be portrayed as a series of lines of defence against ﬁnancial im-
balancesthatcouldarise,andhavearisenoftenenough,fromunderlyingstructural
market imperfections and unexpected shocks. The lines of defence have been
designedtopreventimbalancesfrombecomingsystemicandtoresolvesystemic
diﬃculties should one or more of the defences be breached. This section brieﬂy







can usefully be classiﬁed into the three broad components of ﬁnancial systems:




the main channels through which problems in one national ﬁnancial system get
transmitted to another one. In addition to these ﬁnancial channels, the global
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macroeconomicpolicymakersandnotthispaper.
Toprovideaspeciﬁccontext,Table1summarisessomeﬁnancial-sectorpublic-
policy issues and concerns around which the existing policy framework has
evolved. roughly speaking, the issues involve one or more market imperfections
(ormarketfailures).
Morespeciﬁcally,threebroadglobalpolicychallengesarisetovaryingdegrees
from three potential channels of systemic concern3. The policy challenges, which
makeuptherowsofTable1,areprotectinginvestorsandmarketintegrity;dealing
with the consequences of safety nets and moral hazard; and assessing and
mitigating cross-border and systemic risk. The three channels of systemic risk,
which make up the columns of the table, are global ﬁnancial institutions, FX and
otherglobalmarkets,andunregulatedactivitiesandentities,suchastheactivities
of hedge funds and other institutional investors (such as insurance and re-
insurancecompaniesandpensionfunds),SIVs,andotherspecialpurposevehicles.
All three policy challenges are relevant for banks generally and cross-border




Taking this classiﬁcation as given, to what extent have the tools of ﬁnancial
policiesbeendesignedtoaddresstheserisksandpublicpolicyconcerns?Table2
is one, perhaps exaggerated, way of answering this question. The columns of the
table represent three important sources of global systemic ﬁnancial risk: global
ﬁnancialinstitutions–primarilylarge,internationalbanks/groups;globalﬁnancial
markets – FX, bond, and over-the-counter derivatives markets; and unregulated
ﬁnancialactivities–includingthoseofinstitutionalinvestors(insurance,pensions,
hedgefunds).
Financial infrastructures – such as clearance, settlement, and payments
systems – are also a source of systemic risk, but they are not discussed in this
paper,inpartbecausetheyperformedwellduringthecrisis.Thelargeglobalbanks
typicallyaremajorparticipantsindomesticandinternationalclearance,settlement,
and payments infrastructures – both public and private – as well as the major
trading exchanges. Many of them co-own parts of the national and international
infrastructures and have a natural interest in their performance and viability.
Incentives are to some extent aligned to achieve both private and collective net
3. Minimisation of the social costs of safeguarding ﬁnancial stability and restoring it through crisis
resolutionswhenitislostisanadditionalimportantpolicyconcernthatisexcludedfromthislexicon.
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table1:Publicpolicyissuesandconcerns
PolicyDomainofCross-BorderSystemicConcern
Policyissues Cross-Border global(FX) unregulated
andconcerns Institutions markets activities




Moralhazard Yes;and Possiblyfrom No
from home/hostburden g3centralbank
safetynet? sharingissues liquidity
Cross-border Maybe;depends Yes,viaOTC Yes?,viaopacity,
andsystemic onsize, marketsand complexity,andw/




linesof globalﬁnancial globalmoneyand unregulated
defence institutions OTCderivatives activities
markets
Market Partial Primarily exclusively
discipline
Financial Nationalwith Notreally, Nc
regulation cooperation over-the-counter
transactions
Prudential Nationaland n.a. Nc
supervision home/hostissues
Market Indirect,as Direct,nationaland Indirect,as
surveilance participant international participant
Source:AdaptedfromtablesinSchinasi(2007),'remarksoncausesandconditionsforcross-
borderthreatstoﬁnancialstability',chapterinFrBChicagoConferenceVolume.
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beneﬁts. Increasingly, however, internationally active banks have been more
heavilyinvolvedinover-the-counter(OTC)transactions,whichdonotpassthrough
these infrastructures. As is discussed, this poses systemic risk challenges many
of which have surfaced dramatically in the ongoing global ﬁnancial crisis. In
addition,andasdiscussedmoreextensivelybyPetergarberinhisremarksonthis
paper,therearebroaderaspectsofﬁnancethatcanalsobeconsideredaspartof
the infrastructure that did pose systemic risks – such as the frameworks for risk
management,theverynotionofriskdiversiﬁcation,andsegmentsofmarketsthat
provide‘utility’servicestothebroadermarketplace,suchattherepomarket4.
The rows of Table 2 represent what can be characterised as lines of defence
againstsystemicproblems:marketdiscipline–includingprivateriskmanagement
andgovernance,alongwithadequatedisclosureviaﬁnancialreportingandmarket
















At the other extreme of regulation and supervision are unregulated ﬁnancial
activities(andentities),ascanbeseenintheright-mostcolumnofTable2.These
ﬁnancial activities and entities are neither regulated nor supervised. Many of the
ﬁnancialinstruments–OTCderivativesforexample–theseunregulatedentitiesused








global nature and fungibility of the hedge-fund business model. Some market
activities of unregulated entities are subject to market surveillance just like other
institutions,butthisdoesnotmaketransparentwhoisdoingwhat,howtheyaredoing
it, and with whom they are doing it. Investor protection is not an issue for most
individual unregulated entities, as they restrict their investor base to institutions
(pensionfunds,insurancecompanies,hedgefunds)andwealthyindividualswilling
toinvestinrelativelyhighminimumamounts.ProbablybeginningwiththeAsiancrisis
and then long Term Capital Management (lTCM), and intensifying with the their
tremendousgrowthoverthepastseveralyears,hedgefundsareincreasinglybeing
seenaspotentiallygivingrisetosystemicriskconcerns.
global ﬁnancial markets – the third source of systemic risk identiﬁed in the
middle column of Table 2 – fall in between being and not being regulated and
supervised. What is meant by global markets? examples are, the FX markets and
theirassociatedderivativesmarkets(bothexchange-tradedandover-the-counter)
and the g3 ﬁxed-income markets as well as others associated with international
ﬁnancial centres (pound, Swiss franc, etc) as well as their associated derivatives
markets. Dollar, euro, and yen government bonds are traded more or less in a
continuousglobalmarket,andtheassociatedderivativesactivitiesarealsoglobal.
global markets are only indirectly regulated. They are subject to surveillance
through private international networks and business-cooperation agreements,
through information-sharing by central banks and supervisory and regulatory
authorities, and through oﬃcial channels, committees, and working groups. Parts
of these markets are linked to national clearance, settlement, and payments
infrastructures, so they are also subject to surveillance through these channels.
The risks they potentially pose are less of a concern to the extent that the major




the-counter derivatives markets, which are unregulated and where there is little
oversight except through the regulation and supervision of the institutions that
engage in the bulk of these markets’ activities. Both investor protection and
systemicriskarechallengingpublic-policyissuesforthesemarkets.
Table 2 goes as far as to summarise the policy framework in place for




components: deposit insurance protection to prevent bank runs; appropriate
liquidityprovisionbycentralbankstokeepmarketssmoothlyfunctioning;lender
of last resort operations to prevent market dysfunctioning and illiquid but viable
ﬁnancialinstitutionsfromfailing;andrecapitalisation,restructuring,andresolution
mechanisms (private preferred to public) to maintain orderly transitions for
institutions that are not viable. This paper does not dwell on these important
aspects of the lines of defence against systemic problems. One missing element




Although the crisis is often characterised as being caused by the uS subprime
mortgagecrisis,theuSproblemcanbeseenassymptomaticofaneconomicand




• Dysfunctional markets for liquidity and their supporting derivatives markets,
reﬂecting an underlying breakdown of trust in systemically important
counterpartyrelationshipsamongthelargeglobalactiveﬁnancialinstitutions.
• Dysfunctionalcreditmarketsandtheirsurroundingderivativesmarkets,which
create further pressures in markets for liquidity, which further increase the
intensityofunderlyingcreditworthinessissues.
• growing perceptions of increasing risks of a prolonged and possibly deep uS
andglobaleconomicrecession.




(extended terms and access), extended facilities to nonbank ﬁnancial
intermediaries,andotherinnovations.




• uS Treasury-led legislative initiatives to remove toxic assets and recapitalise
weaksystemicallyimportantinstitutions;manydetailsunresolved.
What this list reveals is that the existing policy framework described – roughly
comprisedofrelianceonabalanceofmarketdisciplineandoﬃcialoversight–and
whose aim is to prevent systemic threats to ﬁnancial and economic instability,
failed to prevent and adequately resolve the kind of imbalances from arising that
created systemic risk and systemic events. Moreover, the frameworks for crisis
managementandresolutionprovedtobeinadequate.Inshort,thelinesofdefence
againstthreatstosystemicstabilityprovedtobeinadequateandwerebreached:
• Private risk management and market discipline failed and markets dysfunc-
tioned, the result of a combination of imperfect information, opaque
instruments and exposures, poor incentive structures, excessive leverage,
inadequate governance/control by top management, insuﬃcient ex-ante
marketdiscipline,andlossoftrust.
• Oﬃcial supervision failed to promote safety and soundness of major
institutions.
• Marketsurveillancefailedtoidentifythebuild-upofimbalances.









purpose vehicles; (2) the national orientation of prudential oversight; and (3) the
bank (functional) orientation of oversight to the exclusion of other systemically
important ﬁnancial institutions (SIFIs). Key unresolved questions are: can the
existing national frameworks be reformed to anticipate or to prevent problems in
cross-border institutions or are new mechanisms necessary? In the transatlantic
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or global spheres, for example, can international groupings and committee
structuresbereformedtoprovidesuﬃcientearlywarnings?
Asecondsourceofbreachesinthelinesofdefenceisthatthecentralbanksin
the major centres did not have all of the tools they needed to address the
immediacyofliquidityproblemsinthemodernﬁnancialsystem.Centralbanksfell













ponsibility for ﬁnancial market stability but it does not have supervisory
authorities and must rely on cooperation with the uK Financial Services
Authority,whichclearlywasnoteﬀective.Intheeuroarea,whilesomenational
central banks within the european System of Central Banks (eSCB) have
supervisorypowerstheeuropeanCentralBankhasnoformalresponsibilityfor
ﬁnancialsupervision.
• Central banks had neither the comprehensive authority to obtain relevant
timely information from all SIFIs and other unregulated ﬁnancial institutions
nor the authority to intervene (place in administration, liquidate, resolve) all
SIFIsifandwhennecessary.
Athirdsourceofbreachesoflinesofdefencewastheabsenceofregionalandglobal
ﬁnancing mechanisms to recapitalise systemic cross-border institutions when
deemedappropriateandnecessary.
A fourth related source of failure was that coordinated government eﬀorts to
recapitalise cross-border institutions (for example, lehman Brothers) reverted
immediately to national ring-fencing and solutions. even in the case of Fortis in
europe,forwhichitcanbearguedthatexcellentpre-conditionsforcoordinatinga









Before moving on to a brief description and assessment of reform proposals, this
section provides some broad reﬂections or lessons from the supervisory and
regulatory failures described above. They pertain very broadly to the failures
observedincrisispreventionandcrisisresolution.
A.Prevention
In the united States, the Federal reserve System was broadly conceived and has
had since its inception the responsibility for maintaining both monetary and
ﬁnancial-market stability. It is the quintessential broadly-mandated central bank
with multiple objectives – as opposed to the eCB, which is a narrowly-mandated
centralbankwithasingleobjective5.TheuSframeworkor‘architecture’foridenti-
fying, monitoring, and assessing the potential for systemic problems has been in
placeforsometime.AlthoughotheruSagencieshaveregulatory,supervisoryand
surveillance responsibilities, system-wide risks fall within the responsibilities of
theFederalreserveSystem.
In the period 2004-05, it was reasonable to assume that the Federal reserve
wasinagoodposition,withthemandate,tools,andablestaﬀtomakereasonably
reliable assessments of systemic risk. And, given its explicit mandate, expertise,
and resources, there was at least the possibility prior to the crisis for the Fed to
monitortheactivitiesofsomeofthemostrelevantﬁnancialinstitutions(bothon-
and oﬀ-balance sheet activities, and their market activities) and the build-up of
credit and counterparty exposures that ultimately unravelled and which are still
beingde-leveraged6.
From this perspective, the uS ﬁnancial crisis can not reasonably be seen as
5. SeeFolkerts-landauandgarber(1992)onthiscomparison.
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occurringprimarilybecauseitdidnothaveacrisis-preventionframework.Wenow
know it is deeply ﬂawed and needs to be reformed. It is also safe to assume that




the key uS and global money and short-term credit markets. These activities
importantly include those in the uS and global over-the-counter derivatives
markets. Neither the Federal reserve nor any other regulatory authority had
oversight responsibility for over-the-counter derivative markets. These activities
areunregulated.





and hedge funds. Moreover, the collapse of the hedge fund lTCM in 1998 was a
wake-upcallthatover-the-counterderivativesmarketsembodiedthepossibilityof
systemicrisks.Althoughthewake-upcallledtomanyprivateandoﬃcialgroupsto
write reports recommending reforms of counterparty risk management and other
reforms,thecrisispassedwithoutsystemicconsequencesandfewreformswere
adequatelyencouragedandimplemented.









out their responsibilities eﬀectively. This stems in part from the lack of technical
6. There are many Fed speeches and congressional testimonies in which the Fed’s responsibilities for
maintainingﬁnancialstabilityareacknowledged.Arecentoneisasfollows:“Maintainingthestabilityof
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know-howabouthowtoprocessalloftheavailablemarketintelligenceandinpart
from the lack of information about exposures in key institutions and markets,
notably the over-the-counter derivatives markets. In eﬀect, ﬁnancial authorities
around the world, including in meetings in international forums and committees,
utilisedtheinformationavailabletothemtothebestoftheirabilitiesin2007and
again in early 2008 and simply under-estimated the extent of systemic risk. Part





reduce the probability of systemic breakdowns. reform eﬀorts must tackle all of
theseformidablechallenges.
Ineurope,thelessonisabitdiﬀerent.AsintheunitedStates,theframeworks




The same can be said about the resolution of failed banks in europe, where
thereisnotaeuropeanarchitectureforrecapitalisingbanks,althoughtheeuropean
Commission’s Dg-Competition has the mandate to ensure national approaches to
recapitalisation do not produce an unlevel playing ﬁeld of competition among
ﬁnancial institutions in europe. To the extent that individual european countries




policy making alongside pan-european markets and pan-european ﬁnancial
institutions.Thereisnoformalframeworkforsafeguardingstabilityofthemarkets
and only unenforceable agreements to safeguard the safety and soundness of
individual SIFIs with substantial cross-border exposures both within europe and
acrosstheAtlantic.
regarding the united Kingdom, there are divided opinions that date back to
thecreationoftheexistingtri-partiteapproachtosafeguardingﬁnancialstability.
7. Some have claimed for that the greenspan Fed contributed to the build-up of ﬁnancial imbalances by
executing a regulatory policy of passivity – as part of an overall philosophy that placed excessive
relianceonallowingmarketstodisciplinethemselves.
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At the time the labour party created the uK FSA and moved responsibility for




the largest banks operating in domestic markets and the greatest threats to
ﬁnancialmarketstability.
There is room for debate, but it is not unreasonable to conjecture that the
speciﬁc manner in which the uK’s ﬁnancial crisis began – with a bank run – and
then evolved into a market run was the result of fundamental ﬂaws in the uK tri-
partite framework for safeguarding stability. There were also acknowledged
inadequaciesinimplementingtheframework–boththesupervisionofindividual
institutions by the uK FSA as well as shortcomings in the Bank of england’s







universal banks, or whatever you call them – is incapable today of an orderly
liquidation. No country has the legislation and apparatus in place to resolve
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ofresolvingthroughitsusualmethodsthelargeﬁnancialconglomeratesthatwere




important investment banks (like Bear Stearns or lehman Brothers), insurance
companies (such as AIg), and hybrid ﬁrms (such as gMAC, ge and others). It is
possible,ifnotlikely,thattheFDICwillbegivenabroadermandatetoresolvelarger
and more complex institutions than it has heretofore resolved, but how far its
mandate will be broadened and its balance sheet expanded remains to be seen.
In europe, each country has its own resolution regime and has the strong
incentive to design its resolution strategies to satisfy national objectives. For
example, in the case of the resolution of Fortis, although a cooperative and
coordinated resolution was initially sought by all parties, it did not take long for
negotiations for a coordinated solution to break down and devolve into national
solutions in which each country resolved the domestic parts of Fortis indepen-
dently as the nations saw ﬁt. It is clear from this one example that the existing
architecture for coordinated resolutions of european cross-border institutions is
ineﬀective. The de larosière report recommends that a transparent and clear
frameworkformanagingcrisesshouldbedeveloped;thatallrelevantauthoritiesin
the eu should be equipped with appropriate and equivalent crisis prevention and





focus of the remainder of this paper, is that the existing national, regional,
transatlantic, and global frameworks for safeguarding ﬁnancial system stability
proved to be ineﬀective. Financial regulation, supervision, and surveillance need
to be more eﬀective in the future if systemic crises are to be avoided and better
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States are in the process of considering reforms of their frameworks for safe-
guardingﬁnancialstability.Anticipatingwhatwillbeconcludedlater,myreadingof




about the ﬁnal reform packages and how they are formulated into legislation and







The reforms proposed by the uS Treasury can be described succinctly as
comprisingthefollowingﬁvemainareas10:
• Systemicriskregulation,withtheFederalreserveassumingresponsibilityfor
supervision and regulation of all systemic ﬁrms, tighter prudential standards
forlargeandinterconnectedﬁrms,registrationofhedgefunds,andthecreation
of a Financial Services Oversight Council chaired by the Treasury to identify
emergingsystemicrisksandcoordinateagencies11.
• Market regulation, including enhanced transparency and strengthened
incentives for securitisers (‘skin in the game’), as well as better regulation of
creditratingagenciesandover-the-counterderivativesmarkets12.
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ProtectionAgency,andstrongerandmoreuniformrules.
• Crisis-management tools, namely for non-bank resolution and revised
emergencylendingpowersfortheFederalreserve(requiringwrittenapproval
fromtheTreasurySecretary).
• Raise international standards, including through stronger and better-coordi-








As a result, there is considerable uncertainty about both the shape of reform and
thetimingofitscompletion.








whole, not just the safety and soundness of individual institutions, and that
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fordepositoryinstitutions,thatwouldallowﬁnanciallytroubled,systemically
important nonbank ﬁnancial institutions to be wound down without broad
disruptiontotheﬁnancialsystemandtheeconomy;
• enhancedprotectionsforconsumersandinvestorsintheirﬁnancialdealings;












sees as important for improving supervision and regulation matches the outlined
reformsoftheuSTreasuryaswellasthereformsbeingconsideredbycountriesin
europeandtheeuropeanCommission(seebelow).Therearetwomajordiﬀerences




uS Treasury Secretary. Neither of these diﬀerences are likely to be resolved until
Congresscompletesitswork.TherearealsootherareaswheremembersoftheuS
CongresswouldliketolimitthepowersoftheFed.





in the resilience of the uS ﬁnancial system and an improvement in the eﬀective-
nessofsupervisionoftheSIFIsandthemultitudeofsmallerﬁnancialinstitutions.
Much depends on the ability of the supervisory authority for SIFIs – probably the
Federalreserve–toimprovetheabilitytosuperviselarge,highlycomplex,multi-
businessﬁnancialinstitutions.Notably,manyoftheﬁnancialholdingcompanies
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thattheFedalreadysuperviseswereatthecoreofthecrisis–theyplayedmajor
rolesincreatingthecreditexposuresandwerecausesof,andseverelyaﬀectedby,




should be done? Should serious consideration be given to reducing the size and
scopeofexistingSIFIs?
The creation of a broader uS ﬁnancial-institutions resolution regime – for
example, modeled after the FDIC’s prompt corrective action framework, with
adjustments to accommodate the resolution of nonbank SIFIs – could lead to an
improvement in the ability to eﬀectively resolve SIFIs without threatening market
stability(asdidthebankruptcyoflehmanBrothersandthethreatofinsolvencyof
AIg) and without the government having to take major ownership stakes in them.
ThistoowillbeanuphillbattlewithdiﬀerentpoliticalpressuresintheuSCongress
about how to revamp bankruptcy laws and possibly even uS anti-trust legislation
– not the least of which is emanating from the still very powerful lobbying eﬀorts
oftheuSﬁnancialindustry.
In short, the uS reform proposals and process could lead to signiﬁcant
improvements in ﬁnancial resilience and the oversight framework and thereby
improvetheabilityofauthoritiestoexerciseeﬀectivesystemicriskmanagement
andresolution.Havingsaidthis,evenifperfectlydesignedandimplemented,the
oversight architecture that would emerge from a full implementation of the uS
Treasury’splanwouldstill,inmyview,notaddressalloftheconcernsrevealedby
the crisis, including some of the weaknesses in the pre-crisis architecture. There




proposals aimed at addressing the weaknesses revealed in europe by the crisis.
The Commission’s initiatives are presently being transformed into speciﬁc
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• EU macro-prudential surveillance, through the creation of the european
Systemic risk Board (eSrB) – comprised of eu central bank governors and
possibly chaired by the eCB president – with a mandate to assess systemic
risks,toissueﬁnancialstabilityriskwarnings,andtorecommendandmonitor
implementation of macro-prudential actions by national supervisory
authorities.
• EUmicro-prudentialsupervision,throughthecreationoftheeuropeanSystem
of Financial Supervisors, comprised of three new authorities – european
Banking Authority, european Insurance Authority, and european Securities
Authority – to ensure consistency of national supervision and strengthened
oversight of cross-border entities through supervisory colleges and the
establishment of “a european single rule book applicable to all ﬁnancial
institutionsinthesinglemarket.”
• Reform of over-the-counter derivatives – require standardisation and trading
onplatforms/clearinghousestomakethemmorerobustandtransparent.
• OtherEUinitiatives,includingregulationofalternativeinvestmentmanagers14;
amendments to capital requirements for trading book exposures and highly
complex re-securitisations15; enhanced disclosure of complex securitisation
exposures;andbankremunerationpolicies.
The Commission’s systemic-risk oriented reform eﬀorts outlined in the ﬁrst two
bullets are the recommendations of the de larosière group. The group was





and consistent with addressing weaknesses revealed by the ﬁnancial crisis in
europe. It is reasonable to conclude from a close reading of the report that if the
europeanunionagreedtoimplementfullytherecommendationsasdescribedby
the group in the report, that europe would thereby establish a new european
framework for ﬁnancial stability that could – if properly executed – constitute an




1833 Oceans_8.3.11.qxp:oceans apart book  9/3/11  16:06  Page 247248OCeANSAPArT
reproducesthedelarosièrereport’sgraphicrepresentationofthenewframework.
As with the u.S. reform proposals and process, in europe, the devil is in the
details of the ultimate resulting legislation and regulations that come out of the
european reform process. That is, it remains to be seen how far the de larosière
group’s recommendations will be agreed collectively by eu member states. Thus
as regards reform eﬀorts in the united States, the reforms actually implemented
couldfallwellshortofwhatisrequiredtoprovideeuropewiththekindofﬁnancial
stability framework in which both systemic risk assessment and supervision of
SIFIs would take place at the european level rather than primarily at the national
levelalongsidecommitteestructureswithperhapsstrongerbutstillinformalpeer
pressure to implement national policies to help manage european systemic risk.
eveniftheeuﬁnancial-stabilityreformeﬀortfallsshortofwhatisrequired,itis
possible that the euro area would come up with a framework for safeguarding
stability across the euro area. The eCB has the statutory authority under its
monetarypolicymandate(Article5.1oftheStatuteoftheeSCBandoftheeCB)to




information it deems necessary for conducting its monetary policy directly from
thelarge‘european’banksandSIFIsthatareitsmaincounterpartiesinitsmonetary
policy operations – in particular in the money markets in which it operates. How-
ever,suchapossibilityislimitedbecauseobligationsimposeddirectlyonnatural
or legal persons would require a decision by the Council of Ministers covering the
deﬁnition of the natural and legal persons subject to reporting requirements, the
conﬁdentialityregime,andtheappropriateprovisionsforenforcement17,18.
Thus, in principle if not in practice, through its statutory mandate to conduct







on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the eCB and after receiving the assent of the
europeanParliament,conferupontheeCBspeciﬁctasksconcerningpoliciesrelatingtotheprudential
supervision of credit institutions and other ﬁnancial institutions with the exception of insurance
undertakings.”


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1833 Oceans_8.3.11.qxp:oceans apart book  9/3/11  16:06  Page 249250OCeANSAPArT
european ﬁnancial markets. What is required is suﬃcient support inside the
governingCouncil.Thisissueiscoveredinthedelarosièrereportwhereitisargued
that access to information is crucial to the proper exercise of the functions of the
european Systemic risk Board. However, it is possible that political obstacles will
leadtoaless-than-fullimplementationofthedelarosièregrouprecommendations.
V.Concludingthoughts
As discussed in the paper, the proposals being considered on both sides of the
Atlantic represent potentially comprehensive reforms to the existing frameworks
forsafeguardingﬁnancialstability,managingsystemicrisk,andresolvingsystemic
crises. If these proposals are properly and entirely translated into speciﬁc
legislation and regulations, fully implemented as translated, and eﬀectively






reﬂected in outcomes, it would be a formidable challenge for regulators and
supervisors around the world to implement the new frameworks to safeguard
stabilityinthefuture.
An additional multi-faceted qualiﬁcation is warranted. The reform proposals
themselves do not address all of the fundamental weaknesses revealed by the
crisis. There are unaddressed and unresolved issues, ﬁve of which are discussed
belowasconcludingthoughts.
1.Criseswilloccuragain,soeﬀectiveresolutionframeworksarenecessary.
Much of the reform agenda has focused on crisis prevention. In particular, the
creation of a uS systemic risk council and a european systemic risk boards are




ﬁnancial imbalances becoming systemic and threatening ﬁnancial stability.
AuthoritiesonbothsidesoftheAtlanticshoulddevoteconsiderableresourcesand
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politicalcapitaltoimprovingearlywarningsystemstothepointwheretheybecome
morereliable.
Having said this, authorities should have realistic expectation about how
eﬀective these early warning systems will be. The reality is that crises will occur
again, and it can not be ruled out that the next systemic crisis is just around the
corner.Thecostlyandattimeschaoticresolutionofthecurrentcrisisprovidesclear
evidence that no country has an eﬀective mechanism for closing or liquidating
systemically important ﬁnancial institutions with signiﬁcant cross border
exposures. The objective ought to be to put in place a legal framework that allows
fortheorderlyresolutionofsystemicallyimportantﬁnancialinstitutionsinatimely




greater reﬂection is warranted on what constitutes an eﬀective balance between
relying on market discipline and relying on oﬃcial oversight. The balance prior to
the crisis relied too heavily on ex-ante private market discipline to prevent the
buildupofsystemicallythreateningimbalancesandnotheavilyenoughonoﬃcial
oversight. Presently, it could be argued that the balance is relying too heavily on
oﬃcialinterventionandnotheavilyenoughonmarketdiscipline.Incraftingreforms
forthefuture,akeychallengeistherealignmentoftheprivateincentivesthatdrive
business decisions and the incentives that determine the actions or inertia of
regulatorsandsupervisors.Ineﬀect,theincentivesandrulesofthegamethatguide
private ﬁnance and oﬃcial oversight need to be realigned so that they are
compatiblewithandnaturallyreacttopreventthekindofself-inﬂictedweaknesses
and imbalances that arose in the years prior to the crisis. This is a diﬃcult set of




fail, and the crisis has revealed some were too big to manage and too diﬃcult to
save without massive injections of taxpayer monies. reform eﬀorts are aiming to
address these issues by creating regulatory and supervisory frameworks more
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capableofoverseeingSIFIsandresolutionregimescapableoforderlyliquidations
and closures. This is one possible approach and only time will tell if reform
proposalsleadintherightdirection.
Beforesuchanapproachisengravedinstone,greaterreﬂectioniswarrantedon
alternative approaches. Over the years, authorities in all of the major ﬁnancial
centreshavethroughexplicitpoliciesorinactioneitherpromoted,encouraged,or
acquiesced to the emergence of these very large global institutions often on the
grounds of claims of economies of scale and scope. However, the extensive
economics and ﬁnance literatures are inconclusive about the actual gains of
economic eﬃciency from economies of scale and scope alleged and sought by
universalbanks,ﬁnancialholdingcompanies,globalﬁnancialconglomerates,and
otherSIFIs.Itmaywellbethecasethateconomiesofscale–forexample,having







inter-temporal eﬃciency gains to their societies of combining M&A, asset
management, securities origination and underwriting, foreign exchange trading,
commercial banking, and other ﬁnancial services all under one roof in relation to
the inter-temporal social costs now being experienced? Can the alleged gains be
capturedbymorespecialisedinstitutionsthatarelesslikelytogeneratethesocial




4. Consider global regulation and surveillance of the global over-the-counter
derivativesmarkets.
Although authorities in all of the major ﬁnancial centres agree that the over-the-
counterderivativesmarketsneedtobeeﬀectivelyregulated,creatinganeﬀective
regulatory framework is likely to pose signiﬁcant operational and politically
contentious challenges. Over-the-counter derivatives markets constitute a global
network of counterparty relationships among and between primarily SIFIs – a
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network in which these institutions act as dealers and market makers, manage
ﬁnancial risks, and trade on their own account (capital). In eﬀect, this network is
theglobalinterbankmoneymarket.Itisatthecoreoftheglobalﬁnancialsystem,


















opacity, and systemically threatening counterparty relationships. For these
reasons,leadershipatthehead-of-statelevelmayberequiredtoforgeaconsensus
thataglobalregulatoryframeworkandplatformisnecessarytoregulatetheactivi-
ties in these markets and conduct continuous eﬀective surveillance over them.
5.Ensurecentralbankshavetoolstoco-managemonetaryandﬁnancialstability.
Astheglobalcrisisconvincinglydemonstrated,monetaryandﬁnancialstabilityare
inextricably intertwined. The necessarily unconventional central bank policy
responses to systemic events have provided dramatic illustrations of the natural
roleandinherentcompetenciesofcentralbanksincrisispreventionandmanage-
ment,andcrisisresolution.Infast-pacedmodernﬁnancialmarketsdominatedby
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thecapabilitytorestoreﬁnancialmarketstabilityifandwhennecessary.Incrafting
ﬁnancial-system and central-banking reforms, decision makers should strive to
ensurethatcentralbanksretaintheindependencerequiredtoconductsuccessful
monetarypoliciesandobtainthenecessaryauthorities,discretionaryinstruments,
and policy mandates required to ensure the smooth functioning of ﬁnancial
marketsandthestabilityofﬁnancialsystemsmoregenerally19.Centralbanksare
likelytofaceseriouschallengesinthesedimensions.likewise,theyarealsolikely




in safeguarding global ﬁnancial stability. The major countries have reshaped
governancemechanismsbyinitiatingag20processatthehead-of-statelevel.This
process has already been successful in bolstering and reforming the multilateral
institutions to help safeguard systemic stability in countries and across borders.




tion if global ﬁnancial stability is to be restored and maintained. As already
mentioned,theregulationoftheglobalover-the-countermarketsrequiresaglobally
coordinatedeﬀortifitistobeeﬀectiveinreshapingthesemarketssothatembody
signiﬁcant less systemic risk. likewise, many of the SIFIs are truly global
enterprisesoperatinginmanylegalandregulatoryenvironments.Itwouldimprove
resilience of the global ﬁnancial system if a global agreement could be reached
abouthowtosupervisetheseinstitutionseﬀectivelyandhowtoresolvetheminan
orderlyfashionwithoutrequiringmassiveinjectionsoftaxpayermonies.
An additional unmet global governance challenge is that of objective
surveillanceofglobalﬁnancialmarketsfreefromnationalandpoliticalinﬂuences.




genetic code. It was – and, I would be inclined to say, still is – an integral part or an inseparable
componentofthecentralbankasabank,ofitsmonopolyonultimateliquidity,ofitsroleasthebankers’
bank,andofcommercialbanksascreatorsofmoneythemselves.”
1833 Oceans_8.3.11.qxp:oceans apart book  9/3/11  16:06  Page 255256OCeANSAPArT
process from political inﬂuences. An alternative is to create a new independent
organisationwithafullyprofessionalstaﬀwhoseonlyremitistoidentifysources
ofsystemicriskandvulnerabilities,includingemanatingfromspeciﬁccountriesor
ﬁnancial systems. eﬀective objective surveillance would require that this
organisationbepoliticallyindependentandcapableofholdingcountriestoaccount
forthenegativeexternalitiescreatedbytheirﬁnancialsystemsandpolicieswithout
consequences for their budget or mandate. The organisation must be free to
communicate its assessments and recommend actions without being subject to
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policy structure, what went wrong during the crisis, the lessons that we should
learn,andthevariousreformproposals.ButthereisalistofsmallitemsthatIwould
addtohisdescriptivesectionsandsomeideasthatIwouldputalittlediﬀerently.
Also, there is now a concrete proposal from the uS administration to reform the
derivatives markets. I will discuss this in some detail, including the results that I
expectittohaveifitpassesasproposed.
1. Thispaperexaminesacrisisemanatingfromtheﬁnancialsystemandspread-
ing into the real economy, with the public sector putting into the ﬁeld its
defensive weapons to prevent or control the crisis. Indeed, the 2007-8 crisis
partly arose in the private ﬁnancial system. But since central banks and
treasuries are part of the global ﬁnancial system, disruption of the real
economy has in the past been caused by them as well. Most macro-crisis
models worry in particular about this causal direction. Many ﬁnancial crises
havebeentheprivatesector’sresponsetogovernmentmoralhazardorpolicy
inconsistency. So I would add a column in Schinasi's schematic table that
indicates the roles of central banks and treasuries. For example, market
disciplinehasbeenoneoftheweaponslaunchedbytheprivatesectoragainst
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governmentinterestrates.Crisisitself–speculativeattacks–hastraditionally
beenoneoftheprivatesector’slinesofdefenceagainstgovernmentbadpolicy.
2. In some crises, for example, the crash of 1987, ﬁnancial infrastructure failed
andeitherdirectlycausedthecrisisorcontributedtoitsseverity.garrySchinasi
recognises this as a potential source of problems but leaves it out of the
discussiononthebasisthatinfrastructuresuchaspaymentmechanismsdid
notfailin2007-8.However,thelehmancollapsecausedaseriousfailureinthe





3. Just to expand on that, I also count the basic theories of ﬁnance and all the
arbitrageconceptsandcorrelation-basedhedgingandtradingstrategies,and
the computer based methods that back these up as part of the market’s
infrastructure.Allofthesefailed,eﬀectivelycreatinganegativeandlong-lasting





5. In the section on what went wrong this time, I would add a bullet point that a
feature of the crisis was the revelation of the danger of excessively large
ﬁnancialcentresrelativetothecountry’ssupportingtaxbase.
6. evengovernment-sponsoredﬁnancialinstitutionscollapsedandwerepartof






7. To the list of reforms in the uS and eu, I would add the remarkably concerted
drivetobringtoheeloﬀshoreﬁnancialcentres.Thisisbeingdoneaccordingto
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entities like AIg and the diﬃculty in settling and netting the gross positions of a














The Commodity Futures Trading Commission and Securities and exchange
Commission (who will split the regulatory responsibility by underlying product
type) can impose position limits in the aggregate and on individual participants.
These regulations cover all uS domiciled or regulated entities wherever they
transacttheirbusiness.Buttheyarelimitedonlytotransactionswhereoneofthe
counterparties is uS domiciled. A foreign counterparty to a uS domiciled entity
wouldbesubjecttothesameregulation.
It remains to be seen what will be the ﬁnal outcome of this proposal after
Congress gets done with it. The expectation is that these changes, especially
requiring exchange trading, will be destructive of revenue at the dealer banks by
bringinginspreadsandsowillleadtoopposinglobbyingeﬀorts.Thesebankswill
also race to set up alternative trading platforms. It is also expected that the
establishment of position limits will be a competitive disadvantage for uS-based
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marketsanduS-regulatedordomiciledparticipantsbecauseitwilllimittheirability
to undertake operations to hedge or make markets. The european Commission is
thesecondmoverinthisandwilldeliveritsproposalslaterthisyearandisexpected
toproducealessradicalsetofproposals.Clearly,thedesireofboththeuSandeu
to have a clearinghouse on their own territories can lead to an outcome of
competitive industrial policies to capture this industry. I will close on this happy
thought.
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Since the end of the 1980s, following the implementation of the Basel rules, g10
countries have introduced bank capital requirements based on risk-weighted
assets. At the microeconomic level, the reasons for capital regulation include
potentially excessive risk-taking by bank managers induced by ﬂat-premium





While there is strongrationale for their adoption, a potential drawback of risk-
based capital requirements is that they could amplify the cyclical ﬂuctuations of
the economy (ie they may generate pro-cyclicality). In theory, in a frictionless
economy they should not, but imperfections in capital markets do exist, and an
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economy(AdrianandShin2008).Therefore,risk-basedcapitalrequirementscould
generatepro-cyclicality,becauseriskitselfiscyclicalbothinquantityandinvalue5.
The debate on the additional pro-cyclicality generated by capital regulation,




it). Second, it should be ascertained that the banks’ response to the regulatory
changes does not oﬀset the additional pro-cyclicality (eg via voluntary accumu-
lation of countercyclical capital buﬀers). Finally, one should check that any
resultingadditionalcyclicalityinbanklendingaﬀectsrealactivity6.
Althoughourknowledgeabouteachoftheseconditionsisverylimited,aswe
argue below, in the aftermath of the current ﬁnancial crisis a consensus has
emerged that the Basel II capital rules should be amended. Widely discussed
proposals, to be implemented once the crisis is over and allowing for a gradual
phasing-in, focus on the level and the dynamics of bank capital. They include:
strengthening the capital base of banks; implementing mechanisms for building
capitalbuﬀersandforward-lookingprovisionsinperiodsofbuoyantgrowthforuse
indownturns;harmonisingthedeﬁnitionofeligiblecapitalandimprovingitsquality;
complementing Basel II rules with non-risk based limits to leverage; introducing





in the absence of a consistent framework, which would allow a more structured
approach to the issue of capital regulation. Moreover, the proposals pursue the
twofold objective of increasing the resilience of the ﬁnancial system and of
mitigating the pro-cyclical eﬀects of capital regulation, at times without clearly
distinguishing between these two objectives. Finally, in our view, the recent
contributionsbyregulators(BaselCommittee,2010b,MacroeconomicAssessment





6. These conditions have been pointed out by several authors. See Taylor and goodhart (2004), for
example.
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cost-beneﬁtanalyses.
Movingfromtheseconsiderations,thepresentpaperrepresentsaﬁrstattemptto








To address these questions we cast the regulator problem within a macro-
economicmodel.Speciﬁcally,webuildontheDSgemodeldevelopedbygeralietal
(2009)toexaminethefunctioningandpossibleshortcomingsofrisk-basedcapital
regulation, and potential policy measures aiming to mitigate pro-cyclicality. This
model features a simpliﬁed banking sector with capital, capturing the basic
elementsofbanks’balancesheets:ontheassetssidethereareloanstoﬁrmsand
households; on the liabilities side there are deposits held by households and
capital.Wesupportthismodelbyintroducingheterogeneityinthecreditworthiness
ofthevariouseconomicoperators.Wealsointroducerisk-sensitivecapitalrequire-
ments and quantify the extent to which they induce excessive lending and
excessive gDP growth in booms, and vice-versa in downturns. We assess the
eﬀectiveness of stylised countercyclical tools on the basis of the model. In
particular, we look at the response of the key macroeconomic variables to higher
capitalrequirementsandtopassiveandactivecountercyclicalcapitalpolicies.
A ﬁnal section is devoted to the practical aspects of the implementation of
countercyclicalcapitalrules.Inparticular,wefocusontwotools:(i)theaccumula-
tionofBaselIIcapitalbuﬀerscalibratedondownturnconditions(egadoptingsimple
correction factors based, for instance, on the ratio between downturn and current
PDs); (ii) dynamic provisioning based on through-the-cycle expected losses. We














current ﬁnancial crisis – eg maturity mismatches, derivative products, liquidity
issues, heterogeneity across ﬁnancial institutions. regarding these clear weak-
nesses, it is worth recalling that the ﬁnancial sector was entirely absent in DSge
models of the previous generation. The ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism of
Bernanke, gertler and gilchrist (1999) has been only recently reconsidered in
standard medium scale DSge models. One possible reason why the empirical
literature,inparticular,hastypicallynotconsideredthismechanismisthatitdoes
notsigniﬁcantlyamplifytheeﬀectsofmonetarypolicyshocks.
Second, we try to integrate this simpliﬁed but rigorous framework with a
discussion of the main policy proposals. This approach stands in sharp contrast,
ontheonehand,withexistingliteratureonﬁnancialstabilityissues,typicallybased
on reduced-form, partial equilibrium models, and on the other hand, with the
theoretical macroeconomic literature, typically not concerned with the practical
implementation of policy proposals. We are aware of one paper only that studies
the additional pro-cyclicality introduced by Basel II relative to Basel I in a similar




until recently, the ﬁnancial sector was largely overlooked in macroeconomic
modelling. Seminal contributions, starting from Bernanke, gertler and gilchrist
(1999),havestartedtoﬁllthegapbyintroducingcreditandcollateralrequirements
in quantitative general equilibrium models. More recently, models have begun to
study the role of ﬁnancial intermediaries in general and banks in particular
(Christiano,Mottoandrostagno,2007,andgoodfriendandMcCallum,2007).These
models,however, mainly emphasise the demand side of credit. The credit spread
thatarisesinequilibrium(calledtheexternalﬁnancepremium)isafunctionofthe
riskiness of entrepreneurs’ investment projects and/or their net wealth. Banks,
operatingunderperfectcompetition,simplyaccommodatethechangingconditions
fromthedemandside.




Iacoviello (2005) and a set of real and nominal frictions as in Christiano et al
(2005) or Smets and Wouters (2003), they add a stylised banking sector with
threedistinctivefeatures.First,banksenjoysomedegreeofmarketpowerwhen
setting rates on loans to households and firms. Second, the rates chosen by
these monopolistically competitive banks are adjusted only infrequently – ie
they are sticky. Third, banks accumulate capital (out of retained earnings), as
they try to maintain their capital/assets ratio as close as possible to an
(exogenously given) optimal level. This optimal level might derive from banks
becauseofamandatorycapitalrequirement(likethoseexplicitlysetforthinthe
Basel accords). In a deeper structural model, the optimum level might relate to
the equilibrium outcome from balancing the cost of funding with the benefits of
having more ‘skin in the game’ to mitigate typical agency problems in credit
markets. The model is estimated with Bayesian techniques using data for the
euroareafrom1998to2009.
Banksmakeoptimaldecisionssubjecttoabalance-sheetidentity,whichforces
assets (loans) to be equal to deposits plus capital. Hence,factorsaﬀectingbank-
capital impact on the capital/assets ratio, forcing banks to modify leverage. Thus,
the model captures the basic mechanism described by Adrian and Shin (2008),
whichhasarguablyplayedamajorroleduringthecurrentcrisis.
Inthischapterwemodifythemodelbygeralietal(2009)tostudytheroleof






The model describes an economy populated by entrepreneurs, households and
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8. The adjustment cost adopted in equation 1 is quadratic, and hence symmetric. An alternative, more
realistic version should be asymmetric – the cost of falling below a regulatory minimum is arguably
higherthanthecostofexcesscapital.However,theﬁrstorderapproximationofthemodelwhichweuse




9. In practice, a dynamic version of equation 2, in which bank rates are sticky, is employed in the model
(seegeralietal,2009).Itisassumedthatbanks,atanypointintime,canobtainﬁnancingfromalending
facilityatthecentralbankatarateequaltothepolicyratert.Ano-arbitrageconditionbetweenborrowing









proﬁts. The balance sheet is simpliﬁed but captures the basic elements of banks’
activity.Ontheassetssideareloanstoﬁrmsandhouseholds.Ontheliabilitiesside
are deposits held by households and capital. Banks face a quadratic cost of
deviatingfroman‘optimal’capitaltoassetsratioѵ8.
(1)
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The optimal choice for banks is to choose a level of loans (and thus of leverage)
suchthatthemarginalcostofreducingthecapital/assetsratioexactlyequalsthe
spreadbetweenRitandRt.Thepresenceofstickinessinbankratesimpliesthatthe
costs related to the bank capital position are transferred gradually to the interest
rateonloanstohouseholdsandﬁrms.Bankcapitalisaccumulatedoutofretained
proﬁtsˀ,accordingtothefollowingequation:
(3) Kb,t = (1 – ʴb)Kb,t–1 + ʠb,t–1
where the term ʴbKb,t–1 measures the cost associated with managing bank
capitalandconductingtheoverallbankingintermediationactivity.
Monetary policy is modelled via a Taylor rule with the following speciﬁcation:
(4)
The values of the parameters of the model are reported in gerali et al (2009).
2.2Keychangestotheanalyticalframework
We’ve introduced a few changes in the basic framework of gerali et al (2009) in
ordertoadaptittoourpurposes.Speciﬁcally,weassumethatloanstoﬁrmsandto
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10.Themodeldoesnotfeaturedefaults,astheyareruledoutasequilibriumoutcomes(seeKyiotakiand
Moore, 1997, and Iacoviello, 2005). However, the device we adopt mimics well the eﬀect of capital
requirementsbasedonriskweightedassets.
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where the lagged term wit–1 models the inertia in the adjustment of the risk-








PIT ratings represent an assessment of the borrower’s ability to discharge his
obligationsoverarelativelyshorthorizon(egayear),andsocanvaryconsiderably






Summing up, the results in the following sections can be interpreted as a
comparisonbetweentheBaselIandBaselIIframeworks,butalsoasacomparison
between the PIT and the TTC approaches of the Basel II framework. While in our
comments we shall mainly refer to the ﬁrst interpretation for brevity, the second
shouldalsobekeptinmind.
Aﬁnalremarkconcernstheinterpretationofѵ,the‘optimal’capital/assetsratio
appearing in equations 2 and 5. As mentioned above, ѵ can be thought as a
minimumcapitalratioestablishedbytheregulator–egthe8percentbenchmark
imposed by the Basel regulation, plus a buﬀer. The buﬀer captures the idea that
bankstendtovoluntarilykeeptheircapitalabovetheregulatoryminimum,toavoid
extra costs related to market discipline and supervisory intervention, or to meet
i= F, H ()() ( )
i
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11.The results illustrated below remain broadly unchanged if the business cycle is measured using the
deviationofoutputfromitssteadystatelevel.
12.ForacomparisonofPITandTTCcomponentsofdefaultrisk,seel￶ﬄer(2008).






Whereas there is a relatively broad consensus that Basel I – as any capital
regulation–increasedthepro-cyclicalityoftheﬁnancialsystem,theissueofhow
muchadditionalpro-cyclicalityBaselIIgeneratesrelativetoBaselIisstillopento
debate14. This issue is diﬃcult to address empirically, in view of the extremely
recentapplicationofBaselII(ineuropemostbanksdeferreditto2008).Thescant
available evidence derives from counterfactual and simulation exercises, or from
comparisons with similar past experiences of regulatory change. Many authors




regulation on lending patterns15. Overall, a tentative summary of the available
literatureisthatBaselIImayincreasethepro-cyclicalityofbanklending,butthat
this conclusion must be treated with caution. Furthermore, as we argued in the
introduction, little if any evidence is yet available on the impact of the new
regulation on the real economy – ie on gDP and its components, and lending –
whichiswhatultimatelymatterstoassesspro-cyclicality.
Thissectiondevelopssuchanalysis.Speciﬁcally,weusethemodelaugmented
with the estimated versions of (6) to compare the model dynamics under Basel I
and Basel II, and assess whether Basel II induces extra swings in both bank
variablesandthekeymacrovariables,andthesizeoftheseswings.Tothisend,we
compute impulse response functions to various shocks. We focus on technology
shocks, which are arguably the main drivers of the business cycle, but we also
considermonetarypolicyanddemandshocks.
13.SeeFurﬁne(2001).
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We use the parameterisation of the model reported in gerali et al (2009). To
make the model operational we need to estimate the parameters of (6). Applying
this equation to the data presents several challenges, due to the fact that no




were not available to us). We input these time series into the Basel II capital
requirementsformula,andusingaseriesofassumptionsconcerningtheotherkey





to the cycle (the parameter ˇ) is relatively large for commercial and industrial
enterprises while it is not statistically diﬀerent for residential mortgages. The
methodologyusedtoobtaintheweightsisreportedintheAppendix1.
3.1Baselineresults
Figure 1 shows the results for the technology shock, modelled as an unexpected
increaseinthetotalfactorproductivity(TFP).ConsidertheresultsunderBaselIﬁrst
(representedintheﬁgurebythedashedlines).
The two top panels report the response of the key macroeconomic variables.
The main eﬀect works through investment: ﬁrms react to the positive technology
shockbyincreasinginvestmentbyaboutonepercentaboveitssteadystatelevel




The ratio between bank capital and assets declines over the ﬁrst two-three
years.Theminimumvalue,closeto0.4percentagepointsbelowtheninepercent
steadystatevalue,isreachedafter10quarters(panelD).Thedeclinereﬂectsthe





Hence, as the policy rate is reduced by the central bank, the interest rate margin
1833 Oceans_8.3.11.qxp:oceans apart book  9/3/11  16:06  Page 272OCeANSAPArT273
Basel I Basel II
Quartersafter shock
















































In a nutshell, the system’s responses are qualitatively similar, but slightly more
pronouncedthanintheBaselIscenario.Thereductionintheriskweightswitisthe
key driver of the system’s enhanced response. Both weights decline in the two
years after the shock, reﬂecting improved macroeconomic conditions and the
relateddeclineintheriskinessoftheloans.ThesharperdeclineofwtFisduetoits
higher sensitivity to cyclical conditions (a higher ˇi in (6)). This drives the ratio
betweenbanks’capitalandrisk-weightedassetsawayfromthedesiredvalueѵ.To




for banks’ capital/assets ratio17. The expansion in bank credit boosts investment
growth: the deviation from steady state peaks about two years after the shock, at
about 1.4 percent, compared with about 1.3 under Basel I. The eﬀect on output is
alsomagniﬁedbutmuted.
Figure 2 shows the results for an expansionary monetary policy shock. The
eﬀects on the macroeconomic variables are qualitatively analogous to those in
Figure 1: in the ﬁrst 8-10 quarters the curves for Basel I are systematically below
those for Basel II. However, the diﬀerence is negligible, as the curves virtually
overlap. The limited impact of Basel II reﬂects the behaviour of the time varying
weights wit: whereas the technology shock described in ﬁgure 1 induced a large
andpersistentdeclineintheweights,themonetarypolicyshockcausesareduction
of the risk weights that is too small and short-lived to alter signiﬁcantly the
dynamics of the bank and macro variables. In turn, this is due to the small and
short-lived reaction of output to a monetary policy shock (a relatively common
ﬁndingintheDSgeliterature).Thesmalladditionalpro-cyclicalityinducedbyBasel
II according to the exercises in Figure 2 echoes several ﬁndings in the literature,
accordingtowhichﬁnancialfrictionsdonotsigniﬁcantlyamplifythetransmission
of monetary policy shocks (see, among others, De Fiore and Tristani, 2009, De
graeve,2008,andIacoviello,2005).Atthesametime,ourresultisincontrastwith
16.empirically, the diﬀerential between loan and deposit rates is countercyclical. See eg Aliaga-Diaz and
Olivero(2008)forevidenceontheuS.
17.Thisdeclineisalsoduetothefallofbankproﬁts,whichissharperunderBaselII.
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Aguiar and Drumond (2009), the only other paper which focuses on the Basel I v




Asathird experiment, weexamined apositivedemandshock,modelledasa




and Wouters, 2007). A feature of this type of shock is that it typically generates
opposite movements in consumption and investment. This does not match the
patternobservedinreality,asthecorrelation,alongthebusinesscycle,between
consumption and investment is strongly positive in most economies. Thus, the
quantitativeimportanceoftheseshocksforthebusinesscycletendtoberelatively




our purposes, it is important to remark that after this type of demand shock
investment falls, and so do bank loans; these movements are dampened (ie the
contraction is more modest) under Basel II. Overall, output growth is (slightly)
stronger under Basel II, as the growth in consumption oﬀsets the fall in invest-
ment19. Thus, using a strict gDP-based interpretation of the deﬁnition of
pro-cyclicality proposed in the introduction (an arrangement is pro-cyclical if it
ampliﬁes the cyclical ﬂuctuations of the economy), we can still conclude that
adoptionofBaselIIproducesa(modest)increaseinpro-cyclicality.However,the
muted contraction of bank loans (and investment) under Basel II makes one
18.Thisdiﬀerencemaybeduetoalternativemodellingchoices.AguiarandDrumond(2009)buildonthe
Bernanke, gertler and gilchrist (1999) framework, whereas our model is based on the ﬁnancial
acceleratormechanismofKyiotakiandMoore(1997).
19.Thedecreaseinthehouseholds’discountfactormakesthemmoreimpatientandcausesanincreasein
consumption and output, and a reduction in savings (deposits fall by around 0.6percent). The fall in
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wonderwhethersimplylookingatthebehaviourofoutputistheproperthingtodo.
Summingup,ourﬁndingssuggestthatthetransitionfromBaselItoBaselIIcan
amplify the dynamics of bank loans and capital/asset ratio and, ultimately, the
ﬂuctuationsoftherealeconomy.Furthermore,recallingthatourexercisesinﬁgures
1and2canalsobeinterpretedasacomparisonbetweenthe‘pointintime’(PIT)v
‘through the cycle’ (TTC) rating approaches under Basel II, our evidence also




are at least two reasons why, ceteris paribus, the above exercises may over-
estimatetheextrapro-cyclicalityinducedbyBaselII.Oneisthattheyonlypartially
incorporate banks’ optimal response to shocks and regulatory changes. As we




in section 5.1. Another potential source of overestimation is that our estimates of
equation 6 are based on quarterly delinquency rates, and should therefore
approximateapurePITapproach.
Second,severalshortcomingsofthemodelmayhaveanambiguousimpacton
the magnitude of the Basel II v Basel I eﬀect, thereby increasing the conﬁdence





Therefore, we will now assess the sensitivity of our ﬁndings to alternative values
for ˁi and ˇi, the key parameters in equation 6. We gauge the impact of modifying
theseparametersonoutputandbankloans,thekeyvariablesthatcharacterisethe
results of ﬁgures 1 and 2. We replicate the exercise underlying the ﬁgures under
diﬀerent values of for ˁi and ˇi. These ﬁgures are judgmental – ie they are not
20.Ourassessmentofthepro-cyclicalityofcapitalregulationmaybeaﬀectedbytheparametermeasuring
thecostsofadjustingthecapital/assetsratio,ʺb,inequation1.Weanalysetheissueinsection3.2.
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onlyreporttheresultsforthetechnologyshock,asthoseforthemonetarypolicy
shockremainvirtuallyunchanged.
For ease of comparison, the intersections of the row and columns labelled
‘baseline’reportresultsfromFigure1,BaselIIscenario.Forinstance,considerthe
eﬀect of the technology shock on output (left-hand side of the table). using the
baseline estimates of ˁi and ˇi one obtains a maximum deviation of investment
fromitssteadystatevalueof0.6percent.Thisvalueisthemaximumoftheimpulse




the autoregressive parameters ˁi ﬁxed at their estimated baseline levels, and
increase the sensitivity ˇi of the weights to the business cycle. Second, we move
the autoregressive parameters ˁi above or below their estimated baseline levels








Basel II increases the pro-cyclicality relative to Basel I. Pro-cyclicality is also






0.70 Baseline 0.97 0.70 Baseline 0.97
Baseline 0.6 0.6 0.6 1.1 1.0 1.0
ˇi Baseline*5 0.7 0.7 0.7 1.9 1.4 1.1
Baseline*10 0.8 0.9 0.7 3.1 2.4 1.5
Note:thebaselinevaluesfor iand i(i=F,H)arethosereportedintheappendix,andusedinFigures
1 and 2. The estimated is in the range 0.90-0.93 (ie larger than 0.7 and smaller than 0.97) for both
householdsandﬁrms.
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steady state value. Overall, the eﬀects would remain modest even if we were to
admitthatourbaselinewassigniﬁcantlyunderestimated.
Next,lookattheeﬀectonloans,ontheright-handsideofthetable.Theabove




We also check the sensitivity of the results to the estimated value of ʺb, the
parameter measuring the cost of deviating from the optimal capital/assets ratio ʽ
in(1).Tothisend,weincreasethisparameterupto10timesitsbaselinevalue,and








output and investment to shocks is relatively larger under the Basel II regime
compared with Basel I. However, our results indicate that the magnitude of this
ampliﬁcationeﬀectdependsonthetypeofshockconsidered,andappearscontained.
Thisconclusionissubjecttoaseriesofcaveats.Tobeginwith,themagnitude
of this impact depends on a number of model features (discussed in section 5),
whichmakeourestimateparticularlyuncertainatthisstage.Inaddition,admitting
that the extra pro-cyclicality induced by Basel II is small does not entail that one
should do nothing about it: if the cost of eliminating it were likewise small, then it
wouldbeoptimaltoaddresstheproblem.Finally,AguiarandDrumond(2009),who
employasimilarDSgeframeworktoaddresstheissue,ﬁndthattheampliﬁcation
1833 Oceans_8.3.11.qxp:oceans apart book  9/3/11  16:06  Page 279280OCeANSAPArT
eﬀectinducedbyBaselIIislargerthansuggestedbyourestimates.
Therefore, in the rest of the paper we consider possible remedies to the pro-




in some detail. In short, they can be grouped under the following headings: (i)
smoothingtheinputsofthecapitalfunction(forinstance,bankscouldberequired
to mitigate the cyclicality of their PIT estimates of the PDs, or to move to TTC
estimation methods); (ii) adjusting the capital function (for instance, some
parameters such as the conﬁdence level or the asset correlations could be
appropriately changed over the cycle); (iii) smoothing the output of the capital
function (ie, allow capital requirements to move in an autoregressive or counter-
cyclical fashion); (iv) adopting countercyclical capital buﬀers; (v) adopting
countercyclicalprovisions.











So far, we have worked under the assumption that the key parameter ѵ is time
invariant. This is in keeping with the current policy framework, under both Basel I
andII,andwiththeideathatbanksliketokeepvoluntarycapitalbuﬀersconstant
attheminimumpossiblevalue.However,anaturalextensionistoconsideratime-
varying ѵ. Within our framework, this represents the most straightforward way to
assess the eﬀect of countercyclical capital requirements. Consider the following
equation:




with a sensitivity equal to the parameter ˇv. Assuming that the latter is positive
amounts to imposing a countercyclical regulatory policy: capital requirements
increase in good times (banks hold more capital for the amount of loans they
providetotheeconomy),andviceversa.
Note that adding (7) to the model aﬀects the cyclical pattern of the main
variablesbutnottheirsteadystatelevels,andisthereforeneutralinthissense.The
reasonisthatthesteadystateofthemodelisaﬀectedonlybythevalueofѵ ̅ and
not by the dynamics of ѵ, which are inﬂuenced by the sensitivity of capital













and co-ordination between the two authorities was limited). However, models,
includingours,featureseveralfrictions,someofwhicharerelatedtothepresence
of nominal rigidities (prices and wages) and others to the presence of borrowing
constraints on households and ﬁrms. Therefore, an additional instrument might
improveontheresultattainablewhenonlymonetarypolicyisavailable21.
() () ( ) 1 4 log log 1 1 ! ! + ! ! + ! = t t t t y y " # $ # " # " " " " "
21.Woodford(2003)showsthatinasimpleeconomywithonefriction,optimalmonetarypolicyiscapable
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Theliteraturehasonlyveryrecentlystartedstudyingoptimalmonetarypolicy
in the context of models with ﬁnancial frictions. Cúrdia and Woodford (2009) ﬁnd
that in the simple new Keynesian (NK) model with time-varying credit (arising
becauseofﬁnancialfrictions),theoptimaltargetcriterion(ietheoptimalmonetary
policy)remainsexactlythesameasinthebasicNKmodel:thecentralbankshould
seek to stabilise a weighted average gap between inﬂation and output. In the
contextofasimilarsmall-scalemodel,DeFioreandTristani(2009)showthatinthe
presence of a credit channel, near-full inﬂation stabilisation remains optimal in
responsetospeciﬁcshocks.
In this section we interpret equation (7) as a simple capital requirement
reactionfunction,wheretheparameterѵ ̅ measuresthesteadystatelevelofcapital
requirements ѵt and ˇv>0 measures its sensitivity to the business cycle. As in
section 3, we look at the eﬀects of the introduction of (7) on the dynamics of the
modelbyexaminingtheresponsestovariousshocks.Forcomparison,theﬁgures
report the curves from ﬁgures 1 and 2 obtained under Basel I, a useful baseline
sincewehaveseenthatitspro-cyclicalityisalowerbound.
The results are shown in Figure 3. As usual, we start with a positive tech-
nology shock. Consider the responses of investment, in panel 3.1A. The two top
lines in the figure illustrate the reaction under Basel I and Basel II. They are
exactlythosereportedinfigure1,foreaseofcomparison.Thetwonewlinesare
obtained with a countercyclical management of the capital requirement – ie
simulating the model augmented with equation (7). Specifically, the curve
labelled ‘Basel II: countercyclical K requirement’ is obtained by setting ˁv= 0.90
andˇv=20in(7).Thefigureclearlyshowsthatthispolicycanundotheextrapro-
cyclicality induced by Basel II relative to Basel I, and indeed, to improve upon
BaselI.Howisthisstabilisationachieved?Thebasicmechanismisthesameas
illustratedinsection3.Thestabilisationpolicydampensloansgrowth(panelC).
In turn, this is due to the fact that the expansion of output drives up the capital
requirement ѵt. The above parameterisation for ˁv and ˇv in (7) causes ѵt to
gradually increase from its steady stage of nine percent to a maximum of 9.3
percentafterabout8quarters(panelD).
The response of output, in panel B, conﬁrms this message from a qualitative
viewpoint, although the small dimension of the eﬀects, documented in section 3,
causes the curves to be very similar. Notice that in this case, the risk weights in
panels(e,F)arehardlyaﬀected,andconsequentlyplayaminorrole.
Toassessthesensitivityoftheresultswesimulatedthemodelsettingˇv=100.
The resulting responses are labelled ‘Basel II: strongly countercyclical K
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Basel I BaselII:no countercyclical K.req.
Basel II:countercyclicalK.req. Basel II:strongly countercyclical K.req.
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requirement’. A look at the usual sequence of panels in Figure 5.1 reveals
signiﬁcantchanges.Theresponsesofinvestmentandoutputarenowwellbelow
the Basel I benchmark, pointing out that the dampening eﬀect on pro-cyclicality






minimise pro-cyclicality, say, or maximise welfare. We leave this task for future
research. The point of the simple exercise just described is to show that a
countercyclicalcapitalrequirementpolicycanachieverelativelypowerfulresults.
Panel2ofFigure3replicatestheexerciseforamonetarypolicyshock.Overall,







and using buﬀers of resources in a countercyclical fashion may yield beneﬁts,
relativetoanenvironmentinwhichonlytheinterestrateinstrumentisavailableto






held by banks (eg to face unexpected losses) because the current version of the
model does not distinguish between capital and provisions. Therefore, one may
view equation 7 as an admittedly rough way to let banks – not the regulator –
22.Aswithpreviouscases,wealsoconsiderademandshock.Theresults(notreported)conﬁrmtheanalysis
oftheprevioussections.Conditioningonthistypeofshocks,thesuccessofthecountercyclicalKrequire-
ment policy is clear cut if one sticks to a strict deﬁnition of pro-cyclicality (output increases, and the
increase is dampened under the countercyclical policy); it is ambiguous if one considers the entire
economy(loansandinvestmentdecline,andthedeclineisenhancedunderthecountercyclicalpolicy).
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choose a (possibly countercyclical) capital buﬀer. Indeed, as mentioned above,
variousauthors(repulloandSuarez,2008,andTarullo,2008)arguethatforward-
looking banks will ﬁnd it optimal to manage their excess capital buﬀers in a
countercyclical fashion, and that this endogenous response has the potential to
oﬀset to a signiﬁcant extent the extra pro-cyclicality induced by the new
regulation23.Ifthiswerethecase,regulatoryinterventiononcapitalrequirements
couldprovetobelargelyredundant.





Figure 4 reports the impulse response of bank gross proﬁts (ie before capital
depreciation)totheusualtechnologyandmonetarypolicyshocksunderthefour
regimes discussed in the previous section: the Basel I and Basel II regimes
underlying Figures 1 and 2; the Basel II regime with the countercyclical and
‘strongly’countercyclicalpolicy(7)underlyingFigure3.
look at the ﬁrst panel, reporting the response of bank proﬁts to a technology
shock. gauged with the yardstick of bank proﬁts, the worst regime is Basel II with
ﬁxed capital buﬀers; next comes the Basel I regime; then, the Basel II with time-
varying, countercyclical capital buﬀers (countercyclical K requirement). The best
is the Basel II with strongly countercyclical K requirement. Thus, it seems that a
countercyclical accumulation of voluntary capital buﬀers would be in the banks’
owninterest.
Next, consider panel 2, reporting the response of proﬁts to the expansionary
monetary policy shock. Here the results become ambiguous. Speciﬁcally, the
ordering of the curves depends on the time horizon: a policy of countercyclical
capital buﬀers accumulation would initially harm proﬁts. When a countercyclical
policy is implemented, capital requirements are increased exactly when the
capital/assets ratio falls because of the expansion in lending. As a consequence,
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linewiththatofpanel1.
Summing up, several authors argue that, faced with the Basel II regulatory
change,bankswillﬁnditoptimalto(partly)oﬀsettheadditionalpro-cyclicalityby
choosing appropriate voluntary capital buﬀers. Our analysis provides only partial
supportforthisargument.Asisoftenthecaseinthecontextofanalysesconducted
with DSge models, the eﬀectiveness of certain economic actions is not uniquely








and aﬀecting many intermediaries at once, triggered a deleveraging with far-
reaching consequences. Clearly, the adjustment could have been much less
dramaticifthecapitalbasehadbeenlarger–ieiftheleverageofthesystemhad
been lower. However, in the current policy debate proposals to increase banks’
regulatory capital are seldom explicitly motivated with the need to reduce pro-
cyclicality(seeFSF,2008and2009,forexample).Thisisprobablyduetothefact
that the link between pro-cyclicality and the level of capital is not obvious.




key macroeconomic variables25. In more intuitive terms, the eﬀect of ѵ on the
system dynamics may be seen as working through bank leverage: raising ѵ
24.ThispointiswellsummarisedbyBrunnermeieretal.(2009):“requirementsbasedonminimumcapital
ratios do not provide resilience, since they cannot be breached. They represent a tax, not a source of
strength”.Theythussuggesttointroducehighertargetlevelsofcapital,withaspeciﬁc,rule-basedladder
ofincreasingsanctions.
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increasesthesteadystatevalueofthecapital/assetsratio,reducingleverage.While





impulse response functions of bank variables and key macroeconomic variables







Figure 5.2 replicates the same exercise for an expansionary monetary policy
shock.Sinceunderthebaselineparameterisationthecurvesvirtuallyoverlapinall
the panels, we plot the responses obtained setting ˇi ﬁve times larger than the
baseline; this magniﬁes the diﬀerences without altering their sign. The results
appear now to be reversed, although they are not clear cut. The rate of growth of
bankloansishigherintheﬁrstsixtosevenquartersaftertheshock,butbecomes
lowerafterwards.Increasingthecapitalrequirementseemstohaveapro-cyclical
impact on investment and output, although the eﬀects are negligible and short
lived.
As in section 3.1, we also considered a positive demand shock (ﬁgure not
reported).Theresultsobtainedwiththebaselineparameterisationofthemodelare
somewhatambiguous:theresponseofoutputispositiveandincreasinginѵ.loans
decline, reﬂectingthe fall in investment. However, the fall is dampenedfor higher






Figure 5.2 is already drawn under the assumption of ˇi ﬁve times larger than the
baseline.Settingitto10timesthebaselinemagniﬁesthepattern:highervaluesof
26.The curves in Figure 3 are derived from models with diﬀerent steady states. They are comparable
becausetheyareexpressedintermsofpercentagedeviationfromthesteadystate.









































E:Weight on loans to ﬁrms
Quarters after shock






F: Weight on loans to households
Quarters after shock
(2)Expansionarymonetary policy shock



























5 x10-3 D: K/L ratio







E: Weight on loans to ﬁrms
Quarters after shock






F: Weight on loans to households
Quarters after shock
BaselII: ￿=0.09 BaselII: ￿=0.12 BaselII: ￿=0.15
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ѵ yield higher pro-cyclicality. The same holds true for the demand shock
experiment:whenˇiisincreased,higherѵisassociatedwithalargerresponseof
outputtotheshock.
Summing up, the impact of higher capital requirements on pro-cyclicality is
virtuousunderthebaselineparameterisationofourmodel.However,itdependson




exercise. In each panel, values of ѵ ranging between 9 and 15 percent are
measuredonthehorizontalaxis.Theﬁgureoﬀersseveralinterestinginsights.
First,outputmonotonicallydecreasesasѵisincreased(panelA).Thisresult
appears intuitive: higher capital requirements should make the economy more
stable, but at a cost, along an ideal eﬃciency/stability trade-oﬀ. Second, the
decline in output is modest: the steady state level of output under ѵ=15 percent
would be only 0.2 percent lower than under the baseline ѵ=7 percent. However,
this eﬀect must be qualiﬁed. To begin with, the decline in output takes place in
concomitance with an increase in the equilibrium amount of hours worked: to
prevent consumption from falling, workers choose to work more (panel B). This
implies that a broader measure of welfare would signal that the cost of higher
capital requirements are larger than suggested by simply looking at traditional
measures, such as gDP and its components. In addition, the decline in output
reﬂectsdivergingpatternsforitscomponents.Speciﬁcally,thesteadystatelevel





to assuming that banks make up for the extra cost by increasing eﬃciency.
However, in practice banks might also react by shifting part of the cost to their
clients, eg by increasing loan rates, or by reducing dividends. In this case the
output loss due to higher requirements will be larger. Preliminary estimates
conducted with a version of the model in which these alternative channels are
allowedtooperateconﬁrmthatthesteadystateoutputlossmaybelarger,butstill
relatively modest on average27. Summing up, output, as well as the aggregate
27.See Angelini and gerali (2010). See also Macroeconomic Assessment group (2010) and Basel
Committee(2010).


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































These results suggest some policy implications concerning proposals to
increasecapitalrequirements.Ontheproside,highercapitalrequirementsincrease
the ability of the banking system to withstand shocks29. However, their eﬀective-
ness in terms of dampening pro-cyclicality is dubious: they may dampen or
enhance the sensitivity of bank variables and the key macro variables to the








for many other macroeconometric works. Below is a list of technical issues that
warrant this statement or that could lead us to suspect a bias of some sort in our
baselineestimates,and,inparticular,inoneofourkeyresults(thattheextrapro-
cyclicalityinjectedbyBaselIIissmall).
i) The model used in the present paper belongs to a family which rules out ﬁrm




seen if a diﬀerent macroeconomic environment could alter our conclusions.
ii) The model does not diﬀerentiate between required capital and buﬀers
voluntarily held by banks. As discussed in sections 3.2 and 4.1.1, there are






the fact that higher capital requirements reduce banks’ probability of failure, an important factor of
stabilisation.
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iv) Banks’ lending rates incorporate changes in the capital requirement via




v) In the current version of our estimated model, the steady state ratio between
investmentandoutput(deﬁnedasthesumofconsumptionandinvestment)is
around 13 percent. This compares to 26 percent on average using euro area
data. This is likely to induce an underestimate of true eﬀects because in our
environmentBaselIIworksprimarilythroughitseﬀectoninvestment.
vi) In our model bank capital has an implicit cost, given by the depreciation rate,
butnoexplicitcost.underalternativemodelingchoices,capitalcanbemadea








our analysis conﬁrms that the transition to Basel II has to some extent enhanced
the eﬀects of banks’ capital on the dynamicsof loans and, ultimately, on the real
economy. Our results suggest that the magnitude of this eﬀect may have been
overemphasised so far. However, they are consistent with the view that some
correctiontothecurrentprudentialframeworkiswarranted,andthatpolicymakers
should eliminate potential pro-cyclical eﬀects of capital regulation. Our analysis
also suggests that this additional safeguard is better obtained through counter-
cyclicalbuﬀersthanbyasimple,ﬁnalincreaseincapitalrequirements.
Ourmodelcannotdistinguishamongthevariousproposalssincetheyaretoo
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complex and detailed to be shaped in our simpliﬁed framework. Hence, in this
sectionweﬁrstreviewthemainproposalsforintroducingcountercyclicaldevices






generally, in most rating systems, the PDs are assigned in a two-stage process.
First, a rating grade is assigned to a counterparty; next, a PD is assigned to an
individual rating grade. Cyclicality can result from (i) migrations (ie individual
counterparties are assigned better or worse ratings as the cycle improves or
deteriorates),and(ii)fromrecalibrationofthemappingfromratinggradetoPDs(ie
counterparties in a given rating grade will be assigned a diﬀerent PD) or from a
combinationofthetwo.




migrations to diﬀerent rating grades are rare and their role as a driver of pro-






II provisions under Basel II, and particularly stress tests. Bank supervisors are
already responsibile for assessing capital adequacy in the light of cyclical
conditionsandmacro-prudentialconcerns.Inparticular,PillarIIgivessupervisors
the discretion to require banks to increase capital resources above the Pillar I
30.Basel II expresses a preference for TTC systems, but it does not force banks to adopt them. Indeed, in
europe,mostbanksimplementedhybridsolutions,includingbothPITandTTCcomponents.




to run stress tests based on common recessionary scenarios set by supervisors
andadjusttheircapitalbuﬀersaccordingtotheresultsofsuchsimulations.
6.1.3Adjustingthecapitalfunction
Time-varying conﬁdence levels: Kashyap and Stein (2004) note that the new
prudentialdisciplineaimstoensurethattheprobabilityofdefaultofasinglebank
stays below a given threshold, regardless of economic conditions. The time
invarianceofthethresholdimpliesthatinrecessiontheobjectiveofreducingthe
probabilitythatbankswilldefaultisover-weightedandthatkeepingsuﬃcientcredit
ﬂows to the economy is under-weighted (and vice versa during expansions).
Kashyap and Stein (2004) conclude that a policymaker who cares about both
objectives could adopt conﬁdence intervals that change over the business cycle.
ThisconclusionissupportedbyrepulloandSuarez(2008),whoshowthatsimple
cyclical adjustments in the conﬁdence level used to compute Basel II capital
requirementscouldsigniﬁcantlyreducepro-cyclicality.
Time-varying asset correlation: Another option is the adjustment of the asset




systematic risk (ie the business cycle), which is captured in the model through
assetcorrelation.
6.1.4Smoothingtheoutputofthecapitalfunction
Adjustments based on autoregressive mechanisms: gordy and Howells (2006)
proposetosmooththeoutputofthecapitalrequirementsformula,arguingthatthis
willreducepro-cyclicalitywhilepreservingtheinformativevalueofPITratings.They
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individual bank, so that shocks are absorbed into the regulatory minimum over
severalyearsratherthanallatonce.
Adjustments based on time-varying multipliers: A second group of proposals
envisagesapplyinganonbank-speciﬁc,time-varyingmultipliertotheoutputofthe




of gDP growth from trend. goodhart and Persaud (2008) propose to use credit
growth.Himino(2009)proposesequityprices.
6.1.5Buﬀersbasedonrisk-sensitiveconditioningvariables
An alternative approach for dealing with cyclicality is to rely directly on risk-
sensitive variables. CeBS (2009), for instance, proposes a mechanism for
measuringthegapbetweenbanks’capitalneedsinrecessionandinnormaltimes.
Sincetheprobabilitiesofdefaultarethemostrelevantsourceofcyclicalityinbanks’
rating models, CeBS proposes to rescale the PDs estimated by banks in order to
incorporate recessionary conditions. In practice, the proposal puts forth a scaling
factor,whichdecreasesinarecessionandincreasesinexpansionaryphases.This
scaling factor would be used to multiply the current PD in the regulatory capital
formula. The approach can be applied at the portfolio-level (ie at the level of each
assetclassinthebankingbook).First,thePDoftheportfolioattime(t)iscalculated
as the average of grade PDs weighted by the number of counterparties in each
grade.ThePDoftheportfoliowouldobviouslychangeoverthecycleastheresultof
twodiﬀerentfactors:
• Transition of borrowers across grades (which is more pronounced in more PIT
ratingsystems);
• Change of grade PD (which is more pronounced in more TTC rating systems).
Then, a scaling factor can be computed as the ratio of the downturn PD and the
current PD, which is close to one in a recession and assumes values higher than
oneinexpansionaryphases.Theﬁnalstepistoadjustgrade-PDsusingthescaling
factor and compute the buﬀer as the diﬀerence between the regulatory capital
requirementsbasedontheadjustedPDsandthosebasedontheunadjustedPDs.
ThekeyelementoftheCeBSproposalisthattherequirementobtainedinthis
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fashion should be used as a benchmark for supervisors when assessing the













which states that provisions should reﬂect the losses that banks estimate will be
producedbyaportfolioofloansoveritsentirelife.
AnotherproposalhasbeenputforwardintheTurnerreview(seeFSA,2009a,
2009b). The proposal links provisions to the stock of outstanding loans. The
proportionofprovisionstototalloansisextrapolatedfromhistoricalexperienceand
aims to capture latent losses in the overall loan portfolio. In order to avoid over-
provisioning,acapwouldbeimposedtototalprovisioning.
So far, though, the only practical example of countercyclical provisions is the







thus, the diﬀerence between the two is added to the stock of provisions accumu-
lated in previous years through the same mechanism.In recessionyears generic
provisions will tend to be smaller than speciﬁc provisions, and the diﬀerence is
coveredbydrawingontheaccumulatedstockofprovisions.Therulesincludeupper
and lower limits to the stock of general provisions, set by the Banco de espa￱a
takingintoaccounttheimpactofpastsevererecessions.
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6.2Criticalassessmentoftheproposals
The model used in this paper does not help select an ideal system. However, we
believe that an analysis of the pros and cons of the proposals just described
providesargumentsforrulingoutsomeoftheapproaches.
requiring banks to use TTC rating systems does not seem either feasible or
desirable. As gordy and Howells (2006) point out: i) TTC ratings would impair the
comparabilityacrosstimeofthecapitalrequirementandwouldmakeitdiﬃcultto
infer changes in portfolio risk from changes in a banks’ capital ratios; ii) they are
poorlysuitedforinternalpricingandrisk-managementpurposesandmaythusfail
the ‘use test’ provided for by the Basel II framework, which envisages that risk
estimatesusedforthecalculationofcapitalrequirementsareeﬀectivelyemployed
forinternalriskmanagementpurposes.
reinforcing stress tests is certainly a promising avenue, but it may pose
challengeintermsofinternationalconvergenceofmethodsandapproachesunder
PillarII.
Conversely, the revision of the capital functions would be impractical. The
currentcalibrationoftheregulatoryformulaeistheresultofalongprocessaiming
to ensure a consistent risk assessment across asset classes, so that changing it
would likely require new, lengthy quantitative analyses32. We also note that the
proposalsfortime-varyingcapitalfunctions,whileappealinginprinciple,arehardly
workable in practice since they rely on supervisory authorities identifying the
correctphaseofthebusinesscycle.Inaddition,ascyclesdiﬀeracrosscountries,
a common recalibration would be probably inappropriate, and country-speciﬁc
adjustments would need to be applied. This might reduce the meaningfulness of
cross-countrycomparisonsofbanks’solvencypositionsandincreasethedegreeof
discretionlefttonationalauthorities.Furthermore,implementationproblemscould
be signiﬁcant for large cross-border players: it would not be obvious how the
conditioning variable (credit expansion, equity prices, etc) should be deﬁned,
especiallyifhostandhomesupervisorshavediﬀerentviews33(Borioetal,2001).
Similarcriticismsapplytotheproposalforadjustingthecapitalrequirements
based on time-varying multipliers. In turn, each variant for the deﬁnition of the
multiplierhasitsownadvantagesandproblems.Firstofall,marketvariablessuch
32.OntheprocessthateventuallyledtothecalibrationofBaselII,seeCannata(2007).
33.For instance, the former may wish to impose higher capital ratios on banks operating domestically
becauseoflocalconcerns;however,thelattermayﬁnditunjustiﬁedtoimposeahighercapitalratioat
theconsolidatedleveliflocaldevelopmentshaveonlyasmalleﬀectonthebank’soverallriskproﬁle.
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asstockpricesorCDSspreadsarenotnecessarilyrobustindicatorsofcreditcycles,
especiallyforbanksthataremainlyinvolvedinretailsegmentsandloanstosmall-
and medium-size enterprises. Moreover, establishing a link between capital






portfolio risk rapidly (gambling for resurrection) because required capital would
adjust only slowly. Moreover, the calibration of adjustment speed would pose
practical challenges. In fact, the timing of capital restoration after a crisis would
largelydependonthechoiceofthisparameter,whichmaybediﬃculttoestimate.
Moreimportantly,mostofthevariantsdiscussedsofarshareamaindrawback:
as they deﬁne aggregate, system-wide adjustments, they do not capture the
speciﬁcfeaturesofindividualbanksandmaythusintroducedistortionsandraise
concernsaboutanunlevelplayingﬁeld.Abankwithdecliningloansshouldnotbe
required to increase capital due to the application of a rule linking capital require-
ments to aggregate credit growth. Furthermore, the proposed adjustments would
fail to discriminate between banks with TTC and PIT approaches. reliance on TTC
estimateswouldthusbediscouraged,asTTCbankswouldinanycaseberequired
tobuildupbuﬀersjustlikebanksusingPITmeasuresofcreditrisk.
The proposal put forward by CeBS does not suﬀer from this shortcoming: it is
bank-speciﬁc; it is based on risk-sensitive conditioning variables and meets
thereforetheincentivestructureprovidedforbyBaselII(TTCbankssystemsshould
berequiredtoholdlowerbuﬀersthanthoseadoptingPITsystems,whichhavemore
pronounced cyclical ﬂuctuations of capital requirements). These featuresreduce
theriskofregulatoryarbitrage,whichislikelytoariseifnon-risksensitiveadjust-
mentsareapplied.Inaddition,thereisnoneedforsupervisorstodeﬁnerecessions/
expansions, since PD ﬂuctuations and, thus, the dynamics of the scaling factor
approximatetheevolutionofthebusinesscycle.Moregenerally,theapproachdoes
notrequireanycalibrationofthebuﬀer;infact,eachbankwouldberequiredtohold
buﬀers that are consistent with the cyclicality of its capital requirements: if
cyclicalityisasmallproblem,thesolutionwouldbesmallandviceversa.
While we ﬁnd the proposal sensible, there are some issues that should be
34.Otherﬁnancialvariables(egspreadsoncreditdefaultswaps)arelikelytosuﬀerfromsimilarproblems.
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pointedout.First,thisapproachaddressesthepro-cyclicalityofcapitalregulation,




in recessions. Second, the proposal might lead to wrong outcomes for banks that
experienced signiﬁcant structural changes in portfolio composition – eg through
M&As–andwouldfacerequirementsbasedonpastmeasuresofriskthatarenot




the supervisory review process. This means that supervisors would enjoy some










of capital requirements, but it contributes to the build up of buﬀers in good times
that can be used during recessions. The technical speciﬁcation of the instrument
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6.3TheproposalsoftheBaselCommittee
Where does the preceding discussion leave us? As we have seen most proposals
haveprosandcons,whichmayhelpexplainwhynoclear‘winner’hasemergedso
far.ItisthusnotsurprisingthattheBaselCommittee(2009,2010a)optedforaset
of tools which should ideally complement each other. More speciﬁcally, the
proposal put forward includes measures for: 1) dampening the cyclicality of the
minimum capital requirement; 2) promoting more forward looking provisions; 3)
inducing banks to conserve capital; 4) achieving the macroprudential goal of
protectingthebankingsectorfromperiodsofexcesscreditgrowth.
For smoothing the volatility of minimum required capital, the Committee
aims at developing a set of supervisory tools – including PD adjustments ￠ la
CeBS – to assess the adequacy of banks’ capital buffers in relation to the
differingratingsmethodologiesusedbybanks.Strongerprovisioningpractices
wouldresultfromrevisedaccountingrulesthatallowanexpectedlossapproach
to be followed and that are not limited to incurred losses. The Basel Committee
then proposes a capital conservation buffer, based on mechanisms that
constrain dividend distribution (or bonus payments) in order to meet a pre-
defined solvency target. The farther the actual solvency level from the target,
the tougher the limits to payout ratios. Finally, the building up of a macro-
prudential buffer is pursued through a regime which would adjust the capital
bufferrangewhentherearesignsthattheeconomyisoverheating,forexample
when aggregate credit has grown to excessive levels with respect to the long-
termtrend.Thiswillensurethatallbanksbuildupcountercyclicalcapitalbuffers
in time of excessive euphoria, which can be released when authorities – using
theirdiscretion–announcethatbadtimesareapproachingandbringthecapital
buffer back to normal levels.
All proposals are still under development, but they seem to go in the right
direction. There are however some important issues that, in our view, should be
properly addressed in order to make the countercyclical package eﬀective and
avoidunworkedconsequences.
First,theidentiﬁcationofthesupervisorytoolsfordealingwiththecyclicality
of the minimum capital requirement should be a top priority. We believe that the
capital conservation buﬀer and the macroprudential buﬀer – ‘one-size-ﬁts-all’
measures–mayhaveperverseeﬀectsifnotproperlycomplementedbyatoolfor
smoothing the ﬂuctuations of the regulatory minimum. With no smoothing the
minimumdevice,ingoodtimes,banksusingTTCratingswouldberequiredtohold
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higher buﬀers than those using PIT methods, endangering the functioning of the
wholecountercyclicaltoolkit.
We are also concerned that the capital conservation buﬀer – as currently
designed – is primarily a tool for deﬁning supervisory prompt corrective actions
and does not seem to deliver any countercyclical beneﬁt. In that respect, the
countercyclicalandthecapitalconservationbuﬀersmightbeprobablypackedinto
a single tool, with a time-dynamics linked to the evolution of aggregate credit,
penalties in terms of dividend restrictions and clear mechanisms for allowing the
buﬀerstobe(almost)entirelydepletedwhennecessary.
Finally,concerningprovisions,webelievethatitisimportanttorecognisethat
the concept of expected losses used thus far is probably too narrow, and that
provisionsshouldbeaccumulatedvis-￠-visabroaderconcept.TheSpanishsystem
proved eﬀective in the current crisis – an important advantage relative to other
similar proposals, which have not been implemented and tested yet – and would
beavaluableoption.However,inthelightofaccountingstandardsetters’concerns,
the Basel Committee developed an approach that leverages their proposals. This
sounds a pragmatic way forward, but attention needs to be paid to the technical
speciﬁcationoftheinstrument.
7.Conclusions
In the aftermath of the current ﬁnancial crisis, a consensus has emerged that the
BaselIIcapitalrulesshouldbeamended.Widelydiscussedproposals,whichareto
be implemented once the crisis is over, focus on the level and dynamics of bank
capital.Muchemphasisisplacedontheneedtoreducethepro-cyclicaleﬀectsof




their costs. We’ve addressed the problem of regulation using a macroeconomic
model, which allows us to examine the functioning and possible shortcomings of
risk-based capital regulation, and potential policy measures aiming at mitigating
pro-cyclicality.Ourresultsarerelativelyclearcutandreasonablyrobustwhenset
against a series of alternative assumptions about certain model features and
parameters.Atthesametime,itmustbeopenlyacknowledgedthattheamountof
uncertainty surrounding our estimates is certainly higher than for most other
macroeconometricwork,partlyduetothelimitationsofourDSgeframework,which
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models the ﬁnancial sector in a very simpliﬁed fashion. Therefore, the following
answerstothefourquestionsraisedintheintroductionmustbereadinthelightof
thisimportantcaveat.
First, our results conﬁrm that Basel II can increase the pro-cyclicality of the
banking system, relative to Basel I. Our simulations suggest that, following a
technologyshock(akeydriverofmacroeconomicﬂuctuationswithinourmodel),
themaximumdeviationofoutputfromsteadystateis0.64percentagepointsunder
the Basel II framework, against 0.62 under Basel I – a negligible diﬀerence. The
eﬀectmainlyworksthroughinvestment,wherethediﬀerenceismorepronounced
but still small. A monetary policy shock yields an even smaller diﬀerential eﬀect.
The robustness of this result was assessed by changing key model parameters







debate, although seldom motivated on grounds of reducing pro-cyclicality) may
dampenthepro-cyclicaleﬀectsofcapitalregulation.However,theireﬀectdepends
on the type of shock aﬀecting the economy: in a Basel II regime, the reaction of




Third, there does seem to exist room for a countercyclical regulatory policy.
Simulationconductedwiththemodelaugmentedwithasimpleregulatoryreaction
function,whichincreasescapitalrequirementsduringperiodsofbuoyantgrowth,
and vice versa, can easily oﬀset the pro-cyclicality induced by the move to Basel
II,andevenreduceitbelowtheBaselIbenchmark.
Wouldsuchapolicyofcountercyclicalcapital(orprovisions)bespontaneously
implemented by banks via voluntary accumulation/depletion during periods of
boom/recessions? As above, our results suggest that the answer to this question
dependsonthetypeofshockaﬀectingtheeconomy:inaBaselIIregime,apolicy
ofcountercyclicalbuﬀeringisbeneﬁcialforbanks(ieitincreasesproﬁts)ifittakes
place in reaction to a technology or a demand shock; it reduces proﬁts under a
monetary policy shock. Thus, our analysis provides only partial support for the







Fourth, we address the issue of the macroeconomic cost (eg in terms of gDP
growth)ofpoliciesaimingatmitigatingpro-cyclicality.Ourﬁndingssuggestthata
permanentincreaseofthecapitalrequirementwouldhavenegativeconsequences
on welfare. The negative eﬀect on steady state output would be accompanied by
an increase in the number of hours worked, so that, in terms of welfare, the loss
could be larger than suggested by simply looking at output. By contrast, the
adoptionofacountercyclicalcapitalpolicywouldhavenoeﬀectonthesteadystate




Indeed, the idea that capital (or provisions) should be adjusted in a counter-
cyclicalfashionrepresentsthecommondenominatorofmanyproposalscurrently
being debated. Our model is unable to provide guidance on the practical imple-




In summary, our review of the debate prompts the following considerations.
TheBaselIIframeworkhasdesirablefeaturesthatshouldnotbediscarded.Therisk
of pro-cyclicality should be contained by means of a package including counter-
cyclicalcapitalbuﬀersanddynamicprovisions.Inourview,theproposalsrecently
advanced by the Basel Committee represent a reasonable option for addressing
pro-cyclicality, but they may require some amendments to avoid unintended
consequences.
First, greater focus should be given to the tools for reducing the cyclicality of
PIT rating systems, the ﬁrst and essential building block of any countercyclical
package. Second, all buﬀers should be genuinely countercyclical, that is banks
shouldbeallowedtoreleasetheminbadtimes.Inthatrespect,thetime-dynamics
of the capital conservation buﬀer is still undeﬁned, which may be interpreted by
marketparticipantsasanattemptbyregulatorstointroduceanew(albeitsofter)
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minimumrequirement.Itisalsocrucialtoﬁnalisetheworkondynamicprovisions,
developing methods that ensure that provisions are aligned to truly TTC expected
losses.
Aﬁnalcommentonthetrade-oﬀbetweenrulesanddiscretion.Wepointedout
that automatic mechanisms may be diﬃcult to calibrate and could be negatively
aﬀected by the diﬃculty of getting precise macroeconomic forecasts; in addition
theirrigiditymayturnouttobeunsuitableforspeciﬁccontingencies.Ontheother
hand, discretionary judgement could put supervisors under strong political
pressure, making any countercyclical tool inter-temporally inconsistent and,
therefore, not credible. The Basel Committee opted for measures that leave to
national authorities a constrained discretion. This is probably reasonable, but it




parameters, particularly the probability of default (PD) and the loss-given-default
(lgD),whichaﬀecttherisk-weightsviatheregulatoryformulae.
In the setting of the model used in the paper, the parameter ˇ in equation 6
representsthesensitivityoftheBaselIIriskweightstomacroeconomicconditions
(ie the degree of cyclicality of the Basel II capital requirements). Ideally, the
calibration of ˇ should be based on the time-series of the risk-weights calculated
accordingtotheBaselIIrules.unfortunately,inmostcountriesthenewprudential







of Basel II, we estimate ˇ starting from available proxies and exploiting the set of
regulatoryformulaeprovidedforbytheaccord35.Inparticular,we’veproceededas
follows.First,we’veuseduSdataonthedelinquencyratesofloanstohouseholds
and ﬁrms as proxies for the probability of default of these loans36. Second, we’ve
35.SeeBaselCommittee,‘AnexplanatoryNoteontheBaselIIIrBriskWeightFunctions’,2004.











PDs we’ve employed the delinquency rates for uS loans. In other words, we’ve
assumed that the behaviour of PDs goes hand in hand with that of credit losses.
Thisisclearlyanapproximation–asforward-lookingPDsdonotnecessarilyexactly
match backward-looking historical losses – but a reasonable one, as one would
expect the PDs to be closely correlated with actual credit losses in the long term.
Since we have separate time-series for ﬁrms and households’ delinquency
rates, we’ve apply the method described above to each of these two categories.
For non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms we’ve used the corporate regulatory function with no
size-adjustment. This is equivalent to assuming that ﬁrms have sales of at least
ᾬ50million.Thisalsomeansthatwe’veassumedhigherassetcorrelationand,thus,
greater cyclicality than in a SMe portfolio to some extent we are overestimating
cyclicality.Theloss-given-defaultissetat40percent,consistentlywiththeﬁgures
reported in the ‘5th Quantitative Impact Studies for g10 ﬁrms’ (the most recent
publiclyavailableinformationontheriskparametersoftheBaselIIframework)37.
The maturity of the loans was set at 2.5 years, as in the standardised approach.
For households, since data refer to mortgages, we’ve used the residential
mortgage function, with a lgD equal to 20 percent, following the QIS5. Both
functions include the 1.06 scaling factor. using the regulatory formulae we’ve
obtainedthecapitalrequirements(asapercentageoftheexposureatdefault),that
aresubsequentlymultipliedby12.5inordertoobtainrisk-weights.
The results of the regression estimated using these data are reported in the
tablebelow.Theregressionestimatesthelog-linearversionofequation6,sinceit
36.DelinquencyratesareprovidedbytheFederalreserveBoardovertheperiod1991-2007onaquarterly
basis; they are annualised and seasonally adjusted. For households we used delinquency rates on
single-familyresidentialmortgagesfrombanksranked1stto100thlargestinsize(byassets).Forﬁrms
we used delinquency rates on business loans from banks ranked ﬁrst to 100th largest in size (by
assets).Tothebestofourknowledgesimilardataisnotavailableeitherfortheeuortheeuroarea.
37.BaselCommittee(2006),resultsoftheﬁfthquantitativeimpactstudy(QIS5).
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isexactlyinthisformthatitentersthemodel:
w ˆ i
t = (1 – ˁ) ˇi(log Y ˆ
t – log Y ˆ






Businessloans 0.92(0.03) -14(4.6) 0.97
residentialmortgages 0.94(0.04) -10(8) 0.89
Note: Nonlinear least squares. In the case of households standard errors are corrected for
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation of residuals of order2. Sampleperiod: 1991:Q1 To 2007:Q4.
Forhouseholdsweuseddelinquencyratesonsingle-familyresidentialmortgagesfrombanksranked
1stto100thlargestinsize(byassets).Forﬁrmsweuseddelinquencyratesonbusinessloansfrom
the 100 largest banks (by assets). Data are taken from the Federal reserve Board
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years, which led to an unprecedented loss of output (and, most plausibly, of
potential growth also), the search for preventive remedies is high on the agenda.
Thissearchbeginswithrulesandregulationsaswellasregulatoryinstitutions(their
design), which evidently did not prevent the crisis from developing. even worse,
some hold that the regulatory set-up, in particular capital requirements, being by
constructionpro-cyclical,contributedtotheboomandultimatelythebust.Whileit
took a while to acknowledge that we were facing a serious crisis, highly dys-
functionalﬁnancialmarketshave–inparticularafterthelehmanshock–vividly
capturedthelevelofprevailinguncertainty.Inparticular,interbankmoneymarkets
showed a dire but truthful picture of the fundamental stress in the system.
ultimately,asystemicimplosioncouldonlybepreventedbyforcefulpublicsector
interventions – central bank liquidity support on an unprecedented scale, extra-
ordinary countercyclical ﬁscal policies and exceptional underwriting of the
functioningofbankingsectors.
Whiletheworstofthecrisisappearstobeover,alltheextraordinarymeasures
taken come at price: they have to be reinedin as otherwise they are likely to sow
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Overthemedium-termitisparamounttocreateinstitutionsthatminimisethe
probabilitythatsuchacrisis,withallitsattendantsocialcosts,happensagain.re-
thinking risk-sensitive capital requirements for banks is one of the topics high on
theto-dolistofinternationalregulators.That’swhyitissolaudablethatAngeliniet
al have put this issue within the consistency-enforcing framework of a DSge
(dynamicstochasticgeneralequilibrium)model.
The main features of the model are, as concerns the behaviour of consumers
and entrepreneurs, standard DSge fare (including New Keynesian frictions in
borrowing – collateral restrictions – and lending as well as real and nominal
stickiness). What is new is the integration of a banking sector where banks are
interest-ratesetters,respondonlysluggishlytodemand-supplydisequilibriaand
accumulate capital out of retained earnings. The latter they do in order to achieve
atargetcapital-to-assetratio.Thecostsofdeviatingfromthisoptimallevelʽ–which
capturesregulatoryrequirementsaswellas,possibly,abuﬀer–arequadratic.Via
a mark-up to loan rates they are shifted on to consumers. In equilibrium, banks
balancethecostofreducingʽ(whichisevidentlytheinverseoftheleverageratio)
with the spread between loan rates and funding costs, largely inﬂuenced by
monetary policy via a Taylor rule. By introducing diﬀering degrees of risk for
householdsandﬁrmsintothecostofcapitaladjustmentfunction,arisk-weighting
ofassetschemeasinBasel(IorII)emerges.Thisleadsinastraightforwardwayto
an equation [6]. Here two parameters are of interest: (1) the adjustment of risk-
weights over time, captured by ˁ. A large ˁ-coeﬃcient would amount to a




to address in various simulation exercises if Basel II’s purported pro-cyclicality
indeed exists. (The model – via setting the risk weights appropriately – can also
accommodate a Basel I set-up.) To do this, they compute impulse-response




created ﬁnancial market shocks. (One is at least entitledto ponder this premise).
In their ﬁrst simulation run they use the historical uS default experience (for
households and non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms), plus a number of assumptions, to compute
risk weights as required for their equation explaining the risk weights’ trajectory




the reduction of risk weights being the main drivers. Monetary policy shocks
generatequalitativelysimilarresultsbutareeconomicallyunsubstantial.
Ageneralﬁnancialirrelevanceresultcomesintobeingatthispoint–whichis
of course, given the recent (but also the not so recent) experience (Kindleberger
1996) we have had, somehow puzzling. Finance, being introduced – as a
consequence of the g in DSge – mainly as a friction only, does not signiﬁcantly
impact the dynamics of the system. It is barely more than a temporary veil, to be
cut through rapidly. This almost-irrelevance proposition however might also be a
trait of this model since it excludes bank defaults, hence cost of distress which,
bearinginmindlehman,AIgandothers,canbeawesomeindeed.
Nonetheless, making apparent its attack plan, the model can be used to
generate very attractive propositions. First, it is of course helpful to go beyond
partialequilibriumanalysisreasoning,thatis,totakeaccountofinterdependences
and repercussions. Here, the DSge approach, by forcing consistency on an
argument, is very useful. At the same time, there is probably too much






shows, Angelini et al’s model lends itself convincingly to policy evaluation. This
holds at least true from a qualitative angle. While we don’t see that banks – given
the competitive environment they are in and hence the return on equity require-
ments they have to obey – can signiﬁcantly deviate from a conventional capital
buﬀer (which is deﬁned by regulators as well as by the market), the model
straightforwardlyshows–conﬁrmsourprejudices–thatequitycapitalwasmuch
toolowforcomfort.Orleveragetoohigh,forthatmatter.Atthesametime,Angelini
et al also show that higher capital requirements do not necessarily reduce pro-
cyclicality. But they do increase stability, ie individual banks’ capacity to absorb
shocks.Andifoneacceptsthemodel,theydoit–intermsofeﬃciencylosses–at
rather low costs. Admittedly, the social opportunity cost which we currently face
makes us rather conservative with regard to any emphasis put on Harberger
triangles.
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Wehavetoadmittotwothings:wearenotparticularfansoftheDSgeapproach,
in particular if it is not pragmatically attended. At the same time Angelini et al’s
modelisclearlyusefulinanumberofpolicy-relevantcontextsfordealingwiththe
pro-cyclicalityofcapitalrequirementsargument.(Incidentally,itisremarkablethat
this topic, which has been raised since the mid-1990s by Martin Hellwig, Thomas





A number of questions obviously remain. The most daunting is whether and
howthemodelcandealwithmaturitymismatches.Anapproachmainlylookingat
risk-weighted assets does not address the issue of endogeneity of (funding,
market)liquiditycrises.Thishoweverhasbeenamaindriveroftheself-reinforcing
downward spiral that we saw in wholesale funding markets. Systemic illiquidity
does arise out of interaction (see Brunnermeier et al, 2009). This leads to the
question of the importance of liability side (versus asset side) perspective. It
encompasses questions about limits on the composition of the liability side or
maturitytransformation.
Quite obviously, there are additional, powerful sources of pro-cyclicality: the
margining behaviour (haircuts), leverage or ﬁre-sale and inter-connectedness
externalities which do have a systemic dimension. In other words, reality is a bit
too messy for DSge’s comfort. Consequently, in conceiving regulations,
practitionerscannotbutrelyonsomesigniﬁcantdoseofeclecticism.
references
Brunnermeier, Markus, Andrew Crockett, Charles goodhart, Avinash Persaud and
Hyun Song Shin (2009) The Fundamental Principles of Financial Regulation,
london,CentreforeconomicPolicyresearch
Kindleberger, Charles (1996) Manias, panics and crashes: a history of ﬁnancial
crises,NewYork,JohnWiley










Pro-cyclicality has been widely recognised as one of several problems in our
regulatoryandsupervisorysystemthatcontributedtotheextentofthecrisis.Pro-
cyclicalitywasnotattheoriginofthecrisisbutithasmadethecrisisworse.
Financial markets are inherently pro-cyclical. Human nature is pro-cyclical.
Periodsofexcessiveoptimismarenormallyfollowedbyover-pessimism.Boomand
bust cycles will always happen. It is therefore important that the regulatory,
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Theg20hasrecognisedtheproblemofpro-cyclicality.Thereisareferencetoit
in every g20 communiqué. The meeting of g20 ﬁnance ministers in early
September 2009 called for counter-cyclical capital buﬀers. earlier g20 summits
asked the Financial Stability Board, the Basel Committee and the accounting
standardsetterstoﬁndwaysto‘mitigatepro-cyclicality’and‘toworkonapproaches
toaddressanyexcessivecyclicalityofminimumcapitalrequirements’.
The paper by Paolo Angelini and his colleagues is very useful as it tries to
quantify in a rigorous way how much pro-cyclicality was added to the system
throughBaselII,comparedtoBaselI.Thisisusefulbecausenotmanymodelsincor-
porated a ﬁnancial sector until recently – perhaps another reason for the crisis?
The paper argues that Basel II added some but not much additional pro-
cyclicality.Otherstudieshaveconcludedthattheeﬀectmightbesomewhatlarger.








even if there is a growing consensus to move to a system with higher capital
requirements and counter-cyclical capital buﬀers, a number of unanswered
questionsremain:
• Will such a new system be implemented in a discretionary way, based on
judgement(eginthecontextofmacro-prudentialsupervision)orshoulditbe
rules-based?
• If based on judgement and discretion, who would decide when ‘good times’






Answers to these questions will probably diﬀer from country to country because
institutionalsituations,transmissionmechanismsandtime-lagsdiﬀer.
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The authors show a lot of sympathy for the Spanish system of ‘dynamic
provisioning’,whichIshare,eventhoughtheSpanishapproachblursthedistinction





and thus avoids implementation problems based on discretion. But could the




These are diﬃcult issues and the paper correctly highlights these problems. It is
thereforeimportanttolookalsoatotherwaysandtools–notjustcapitalrequire-
ments–thatcouldreducepro-cyclicality.Accountingrulescouldbeexamined,for









In the uS and the united Kingdom, ﬁscal policy was particularly pro-cyclical
before the crisis, as indicated by ﬁscal deﬁcits of close to three percent of gDP in
2007, even after ﬁve years of relatively strong growth. The economic boom, in
particular asset bubbles, led to substantial windfall revenue (and we are not very
good at calculating cyclically adjusted ﬁscal balances). In 2007, most advanced
economies,certainlytheuS,theuKandtheeuroarea,shouldhavebeeninsurplus.
It is likely in my view, that the positive output gap in these countries in 2006-07
was quite large (unfortunately, this will only be conﬁrmed in a few years time),
which would imply that structural ﬁscal deﬁcits in those years were substantial.
Monetary policy, globally, was too loose for too long after the bursting of the
equitybubblein2001.Iconsiderthattobeoneoftherootcausesofthiscrisis.We










many at the start of this crisis, the ﬁnancial and economic fallout from a problem
triggeredintheuShousingmarketreverberatedaroundtheworld.




the integration of the global economy and ﬁnancial system, it has indicated that
analyses of the lessons for future policy must take into account the rest of the
world.ThewideningoftheFinancialStabilityBoard,toincludeallg20countries,is
a recognition of this. When we are analysing the crisis, and thinking about future
crisesandpolicyimplications,weshouldrememberthis.
I shall return to this soon. But before that I would like to make two other main
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Before the crisis, there was unwarranted complacency on both sides of the
Atlantic about the dangers lurking in the ﬁnancial system. The complacency
certainly had diﬀerent forms. In the uS, a common view among policy makers,
academics and market participants was that the uS ﬁnancial system was very
robustandeﬃcient,thatmarketsweredeepandliquid,andthatmuchofthecredit
for this was due to the relatively free play of market forces. This permissive
environment led to rapid ﬁnancial innovation and an impressive parcelling and
spreading of risk to those who could aﬀord and bear to take it. On this side of the
Atlantic, in europe, there was more skepticism about markets and new ﬁnancial
products, as well as some concern about the impact on risk-taking of a relatively
‘easy’ uS monetary policy that allowed a long period of low interest rates. To
caricature: the uS viewed its ﬁnancial market participants as masters of ﬁnancial




late in understanding the depth of the problem and the fragility of the system.
Muddling, piecemeal approaches staved oﬀ disaster for a while but ultimately
madeitworse.
Finally, and most importantly, the eventual policy response on both sides of
theAtlanticwasstrikinglysimilar.Abig,comprehensive,politicallysupported,and
eﬀective response involved–both in the uS and europe–ﬁnancial policies with
extensiveguarantees,governmentcapital,nationalisationinsomecases,monetary
policies with unprecedented use of traditional and nontraditional tools to support
the system and ease policy, and ﬁscal policies that were deliberately counter-
cyclical and coordinated to provide a global stimulus. A remarkable feature of the
crisis response, in contrast to 60 years earlier, was global cooperation to support
the global economy and ﬁnancial system. One thing that at least economists can
feelgoodaboutisthateconomicpolicyprescriptionsbasedoncarefulanalysisand
researchhaveindeedhelpedtoavoidasecondgreatDepression.





in the uS, the euro area and the united Kingdom. In the uS, policy explicitly
considered output as well as inﬂation, although not asset prices. In the european
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On ﬁscal policy, governments on both sides of the Atlantic ran procyclical




for this, the speed with which policy could react and its eﬀectiveness diﬀered
dependingonthemagnitudeofautomaticstabilisers,theﬁscalrulesinplace,and
thebudgetarysystem,includingtheconcentrationofbudgetpowerinthecentral
executive. In europe, automatic stabilisers played a large role, for example,
comparedtotheuS.
Finally on ﬁnancial policies, there were very diﬀerent systems for
approaching regulation and crisis resolution. This governed the kind of approach
taken by central banks and others to resolve the crisis, especially in the early
days. But a key feature of all these systems was a fragmentation that certainly
complicated crisis management and had probably contributed to its buildup. In
the uS, the fragmentation was, of course, internal with the plethora of regulators
andsupervisors.Withineurope,thelackofapan-europeanﬁnancialregulatorand
european-level oversight was a weakness. And of course, in the uK, what looked
like an analytically pure and simple division between the Financial Services
AuthorityandtheBankofenglandturnedouttobeafatalsplinteringthatledtoan





I would like to highlight six points, for emerging market countries, but also
industrialisedcountries.
First,theworkingsoftheglobalsystemarecomplicated.Itisimportanttotake
preventive measures against crisis. But don’t believe anybody, whether they are
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an academic or a policymaker, who predicts that instability will be banished.






well as capital ﬂows. For a number of countries, especially in Africa and Asia, the
mainimpactofthecrisishasbeenviaitsimpactontradeandtherealeconomy.So
thereisnotalessonhereaboutcapitalaccountopenness.
Third, it is important to be realistic about the limitations of regulation and
supervision. Some have argued that the ﬁnancial collapse was just a failure of
ﬁnancialsupervision,withtheimplicationthatbettersupervisionwouldhavesaved
the day. But ﬁnancial activities and innovation will always move faster than










IMF’s developing early-warning exercise aims to identify potential systemic






ﬁscal policy, one element of resilience comes from automatic stabilisers. Finally,




during the initial period of ﬁnancial stress. For policymakers to get ahead of a
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ﬁnancialcollapse,theyneedtoanticipatetheworst.Butunderstandably,political
andﬁnancialdecisionmakersoftenﬁndthishard.Inthiscrisis,asinmanyothers,
the failure to get ahead of the curve left fewer, and worse, policy options as the
crisis deepened. The comprehensive and large-scale eventual response turned
the corner. But it has left a lot of extraordinary and diﬃcult complications for an
exitstrategy.
Finally, and this is an optimistic note, we’ve learned that global cooperation
does actually matter. For those of us who have been going to global meetings, of
variousgs,foryearsnowitisgoodtohaveananswertotheperennialquestionof
whatdotheyachieve.Asoneofthosewhohelpedsetuptheg22,theprecursorof











closely together, even to the point of coordinating some of their actions. Indeed,
yourememberthattheﬁrstinterestratereductionintheeasingcycle,on8October
2008,wasacoordinatedmovebyanumberofmajorcentralbanks.
Market interest rates are now at very similar levels. For instance, the money
marketinterestratesatthetwelve-monthhorizonbothintheuSandtheeuroarea
arecurrentlyjustbelow1.3percent(asatSeptember2009).
Central banks on both sides of the Atlantic have also resorted to a number of
non-standard measures to provide additional support and stimulus to their
respective economies. The choice and design of those measures reﬂects the
structural characteristics of those economies. The non-standard measures
implemented by the european Central Bank have focused primarily on banks, as
banksarethemainsourceoffundingintheeuroareaeconomy.IntheuS,however,
market-basedﬁnancingplaysamoreimportantrole.
The eCB’s framework for non-conventional measures comprises ﬁve main
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building blocks: meeting in full the banks’ liquidity requests at a ﬁxed rate,
expandingthelistofassetseligibleascollateral,lengtheningthematuritiesoflong-
termreﬁnancingoperations,providingliquidityinforeigncurrenciesand,sinceJuly




ﬂattening the yield curve over the short-term horizon and restarting the market
for covered bonds – an important instrument through which banks ﬁnance
themselves.
Somuchforrecentmeasures.Today,though,Iwouldliketolookaheadandtalk




let me make it quite clear: this is not yet the time to implement the exit




to realise that the current policy is temporary and will be reversed when it is no
longer appropriate, in particular when risks to price stability re-emerge and
conditionsinﬁnancialmarketshaveimproved.Asfarastheeuroareaisconcerned,
the primary goal of monetary policy remains price stability, and the eCB will do
whatever is needed to carry out its mandate. Inﬂation expectations over the




won’t touch upon the how – the instruments – as both chairman Bernanke and
presidentTrichethaveexaminedthisparticularquestionrecently1.
Instead, I will address the issue of the when from an analytical point of view.
The concrete implementation will depend on many imponderables, not least the
prospectsforeconomicrecoveryandforthestabilisationofﬁnancialmarkets–and
1. SeethespeechbyeCBPresidentJean-ClaudeTrichet,‘TheeCB’sexitstrategy’,Frankfurt,4September
2009, and testimony by Federal reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke before the Committee on Financial
Services,uSHouseofrepresentatives,WashingtonDC,21July2009









If the decision to exit is taken too late and monetaryexpansioncontinues for
too long, fresh seeds of instability in the ﬁnancial sector are sown. On the other
hand, if the decision is taken too early, the economic recovery might be
undermined. Mistakes in the timing, both premature and tardy (what I would call
typeIandtypeIIerrors),havebeenmadeinthepast.
Thesolutionistodoitright,obviously.
Some might think that these errors are not so worrying because they can be
remediedwhiletheexitpolicyisbeingimplemented.Ifthedecisiontoexitistaken
too early, for instance, the central bank might slow things down. If, however, the
decisionistakentoolate,theexitcanbespeededup.Itsoundsnice,butisabittoo
easy.
Why? Because the decision to exit is bound to have an impact on agents’
interestrateexpectationsthroughoutthewholeyieldcurve,andleadtosubstantial
portfolio reallocations. This is desirable, and inevitable, as the purpose of the exit
strategy is indeed to change the behaviour of the private sector. But if the adjust-
mentinexpectationsislarge,itcanleadtodisruptionsthataﬀectﬁnancialstability
andinturnjeopardisethesustainabilityofthewholeexitstrategy.Inparticular,any
late exit which needs to be accelerated could produce unexpected shocks, for
instance in the form of losses in the ﬁxed income market which could hamper
attempts by ﬁnancial institutions to progressively regain access to the funding
market.Theeﬀectsofsuchadelaymightleadtoaprolongationofthenon-standard
measures which were supposed to be phased out. remember the 1994 episode,
whenamere25-basis-pointincreaseintheFedfundsrategaverisetomajorlosses
inthebondmarket(reﬂectingthefactthatitwasprobablyabittoolate).Thelosses
then constrained the future moves, which had to be relatively more gradualistic.
The second issue relates to the uncertainties surrounding the analytical
frameworkthatcentralbankshaveattheirdisposalinordertodecideontheoptimal
interest rate path. Ideally, the stance of monetary policy should be calibrated in
suchawayastoavoidanimpliciteasingofmonetaryconditionsastheeconomy
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recovers.Thisimpliesthattheinterestrateshouldberaisedastheeconomystarts
growingaboveitspotentialrateandastheoutputgapstartsclosing.Theproblem
with this framework is that it is very diﬃcult to estimate potential growth and the
size of the output gap, especially after a shock like the one experienced over the
lasttwoyears.lookingatthepast,themajorpolicymistakeshavebeenmadeasa
resultofoverestimatingpotentialgrowthandthesizeoftheoutputgap,inparticular
during a recovery. This has led monetary policy to be overly activist and has
delayedthetighteningphase,thusfuellingﬁnancialinstability.
The two-pillar strategy of the eCB has helped to reduce this type of risk, as
monetary and credit aggregates have been used as indicators of a strengthened
economy,whileinﬂationarypressureswerestillsubdued.Inthecurrentphase,we
might have to take into consideration the fact that the ongoing process of de-
leveraging in the ﬁnancial sector, which is likely to take place for some time as a





state level that will need to be attained. The latter is in itself very diﬃcult to
determine,giventheuncertaintiesaboutsomeofthelonger-termdevelopmentsin
theeconomy.Thiswill,asusual,presentsomecommunicationchallenges,suchas
having to answer the question commonly put to central bankers under these
circumstances:‘Whyareyouraisinginterestratesifthereisnoinﬂation?’
Thepaceofthetighteningwillobviouslydependontheunderlyingconditions,
in particular the speed of the recovery. given the uncertainties, it would be
inappropriatetocommittoanyspeciﬁcpathex-ante.
Another issue to take into account is the exit strategy from ﬁscal policy. I will
notdwellonthisissue,whichisundoubtedlyachallengingoneperse.Butthereis
a link with the exit from monetary policy and it will have to be considered. In
particular,themoredelayedtheﬁscalexit,ceterisparibus,themorethemonetary
policy exit might have to be brought forward. Indeed, given the level of the debt
accumulatedinmostadvancedeconomies,anydelayintheﬁscalexitislikelyto
have an eﬀect on inﬂation expectations, and may even disanchor them. This is a
risk that monetary policy cannot take, as it would undermine its overall strategy.
On the subject of inﬂation expectations, allow me to digress brieﬂy. Inﬂation
expectations are an important indicator for central banks, as they reﬂect their
credibility in achieving price stability. However, recent experience suggests that
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centralbanksshouldnotbetoocomplacent,evenwhenexpectationsappeartobe
anchored, as the private sector might not always be a good predictor of future
developments. Over the previous cycle, inﬂation expectations seemed to be well
anchored, but partially concealed the build-up of asset market instability and
longer-run threats to price stability. Well-anchored inﬂation expectations are a
necessary condition for an appropriate monetary policy, but not a suﬃcient one.
letmetouchonaﬁnalissue,relatedtoﬁnancialstability.Theexitstrategyfor
the interest rate policy will be deﬁned on the basis of the primary objective: price
stability. In this respect,ﬁnancialstabilitycan only be a secondary objective. If it
were given the same priority as price stability, the latter would obviously be
compromised.
The exit from the non-standard measures is likely to be linked to the state of
the ﬁnancial markets, and in this respect can partly be disconnected from the
interestratepolicy.giventhedesignofthenon-standardinstrumentsimplemented
by the eCB, the exit from those instruments can take place before or after the
interestratedecision,withoutmajoreﬀectsonit.However,ifatthetimeoftheexit
a number of ﬁnancial institutions are still addicted to central bank liquidity, the
transmissionchannelofmonetarypolicymightbeimpaired.
It is not the central bank’s task to continue providing liquidity to ﬁnancial
institutionswhicharenotabletostandontheirownfeet,oncetheturmoilisover.It
istheresponsibilityofthesupervisoryauthorities,andultimatelyofTreasuries,to
address the problems of these addicted banks as soon as possible, through
recapitalisation and restructuring, as appropriate, and to ensure that all banks in
their jurisdictions can stand on their own feet even without the central bank’s
facilities.
To conclude, I have tried to identify some of the issues which will have to be
considered in implementing the exit strategy on both sides of the Atlantic. My
observations have been purely analytical, and do not aim to provide any insight
intospeciﬁcmonetarypolicydecisionsoverthenextfewmonths.Mypurposewas
to explain parts of the analytical framework in which central banks will have to
operate,onthisandtheothersideoftheAtlantic.




ultimately, if we want to avoid ‘being too late’ or ‘being too early’, the only
solutionisto‘berightontime’.Andthisiswhatwearecommittedtodoing.
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marcoButi
let me say ﬁrst of all that it is normal but also useful at such events to dwell on
identifyingdiﬀerences.Itismoreexcitingtolookfordivergencesthanacknowledge
convergences. However, when I look at the responses to the crisis, I see dramatic
convergence. less than a year ago I attended the Washington Summit and if you
compare Washington, london and what has been prepared for Pittsburgh there is
an enormous convergence of views such as on regulation, on macroeconomic
policy and on reform of international ﬁnancial institutions (IFIs) (though we have
notdiscussedthishere,itisanimportantpartoftheresponsetothecrisis).Ithink
it has to be stressed that to a certain extent the divergences one detects reﬂect
institutional diﬀerences rather than diﬀerences in purpose or fundamental
diﬀerences in views. The current economic juncture is also testimony to the fact
thattherehasbeenanimportantpolicyresponseandaconvergentone.unlikethe
conclusionsattheg20inWashington,wheretherewasasetofbroadorientations,
the london meeting was at least followed up with action and not just intentions.
Since we talked about an exit strategy, the question here is what kind of
convergence one would want to see in these strategies. On exit strategies, as
lorenzo Bini-Smaghi stressed, there is an issue of design and implementation on
the monetary side. On this, I think we have to go beyond what one may call ‘the
state-contingencymantra’,becausenoweverybodyagreesthatitisagoodtimeto
designthepolicybutnotyettoimplementit.But,aspointedoutduringdiscussions
yesterday and this morning, it is important to go beyond this to orientate policies
properly.
When is a good time? The assessment of potential output is key to orientate
policies.HerethereareindeeddiﬀerentviewsbetweenthetwosidesoftheAtlantic.
It seems wrong, from the view point of policy responses, to wait until growth
rateshaverevertedtotheirpre-crisislevels(andthismayneverhappen)ortowait





ments can be activated very quickly and on a discretionary basis, and for ﬁscal
authorities,whohavetodealwithmuchmorecomplexinstrumentsanddecideon
policy, despite extraordinary conditions, once a year while preparing the budget.
Ontheﬁscalpolicysidethekeyissueisnotthebudget2010.Hereweallknow
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thatbyandlargethebudgetatthegloballevelwillremainexpansionary.
Despite diﬀerent ﬁscal spaces (unfortunately, some countries, given the
completelackofﬁscalspace,willhavetoaccepttocontinuetobepro-cyclical),in
2010 ﬁscal stances will remain by and large expansionary. The key issue here is
2011.Whilepreparingthebudgetfor2011,giventheextraordinaryaccumulationof
public debt that we are witnessing, ﬁscal policies will have to turn restrictive. This
doesnotmeanthat(herewegobeyondthemantraofthestatecontingency)ﬁscal
policy will be completely locked into a restrictive mode. One possibility could be
that while starting to adjust structural budget balances we are prepared with







In europe the degrees of coordination resides in the surveillance imple-
mentationoftheStabilityandgrowthPact.
My ﬁnal point is on the actual meaning of ‘exit’. ‘exit strategy’ seems to me
almostamisnomerbecausewhatweare,orshouldbe,talkingaboutisnotonlythe
withdrawal of what has been put in place and spotting the right time to do it in a
coordinatedway,butalsoastrategythattacklesthelegacyofthecrisis(andthisis
crucial for market expectations and conﬁdence). These two elements must be
combined. While considering how to withdraw the stimulus in the short-term we








While there are many areas where we can ﬁnd a convergence of views, the
degree of coordination will vary. I think the g20 has been very useful in providing
political traction to policy intentions. I hope that Pittsburgh will result in the same
momentumaslondondidonIFIﬁnancing.
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Daveramsden
My comments today reﬂect my responsibilities as Chief economic Advisor to the




because of both the improvement of global economy relative to earlier in the
yearandtherecentreturninconﬁdence.Iamcautiousbecausethebasisfor
that improvement is very fragile and signiﬁcant global challenges remain,
includingonbanks,thelabourmarketandcommodityprices.
• On asset prices, I understand from market participants that the markets are
getting the message that policy makers mean what they say in securing
recoveryintheg20andelsewhere.
• Ontherealeconomy,wedoseemtohavereachedthetrough,allowingforthe
margins of error in statistics. But a lot of this is driven by weak imports, the
stockscycleandgovernmentintervention.
I think we can have more conﬁdence than a year ago that policy can make a
diﬀerence and that policy makers have risen, individually and collectively, to the
challenges posed by the crisis, although there is much more work to be done on


















Drawing on this kind of analysis, one area where I think there is more of a
transatlantic diﬀerence is in the importance attached to the supply side and the
impactthatthecrisishashadonpotentialoutput.HereIﬁndmysympathieslying
with the european type analysis suggesting that there has been a lasting impact
onpotentialsupply.
Surveillanceandtheglobalrecovery




the necessary changes to surveillance to achieve the beneﬁts it can potentially
bring, as set out in the analysis by the IMF and others. We have made real strides
in just the past year, in g20 and beyond. Closer collaboration could bring real










Also, if the optimists are right and growth is quicker than has recently been
forecast, then the ﬁscal adjustment could be faster. In the uK case, as the output
gap starts to close, the pace of consolidation increases. I agree with IMF analysis
thatthemajorityofﬁscalconsolidationisanissuebeyond2010,butduring2010
itisimportanttostayontherighttrackinlinewithpre-announcedplans.
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Finally,wehavetorecognisetheinter-linkagesbetweenmonetary,ﬁscaland
ﬁnancial policy. Two examples of this in practice: ﬁrst, ﬁscal consolidation at the
appropriatetimeallowsmonetarypolicytodoitsjob.Second,thescaleandvariety
of the ﬁnancial interventions implemented in the uK, as in many other countries,
is great and all these interventions were underwritten by the ﬁscal authority. So
there will need to be a lot of coordination between authorities to ensure the




This conference was structured to compare and contrast the european and uS
responses to the global economic and ﬁnancial crisis of 2007-09. This was
principallyadevicetogetatlessonstobelearned.Fiftyyearsfromnow,economists




In that spirit, my contribution is in two parts: ﬁrst, I present my ex-ante views
on the topics considered in the four main sessions of the conference. Second, I





origins. The crisis was not caused by a single, speciﬁc sin of commission but by
yearsanddecadesofsinsofomissionbythepublicandprivatesectors.
Onthepublicsectorside,Iamintheminoritythatplacesrelativelymoreblame,
by a small margin, for the crisis on macroeconomic policies than on ﬁnancial and





Inattentive macroeconomic policies contributed to benign economic and
ﬁnancial conditions that were too good to be true and to an associated relaxation
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oflending,credit,andﬁnancingstandards.regulationandsupervisioninallthese




Once the crisis broke in August 2007, a process of deleveraging and macro-
economic slowdown in the industrial countries took 14 months to reach the full
crisis stage in the second phase of the crisis. The lehman bankruptcy was a key
date, but that decision by itself, right or wrong, was not a prime contributor to the
second phase of global deleveraging. The collapse of AIg and the run on other uS
ﬁnancial institutions were already well under way. I think that there is some
recognitionofthisdynamicintheunitedStates,butmuchlessappreciationofthis











Initially there was reluctance to use policy to repair the macro economy in
europe because the perception was, ﬁrst, that the crisis was not going to aﬀect
europeaneconomiesadverselyand,second,thattheeuropeaneconomywasina
dilemma situation, facing rising inﬂation. In the united States, there was less
reluctance on both the ﬁscal and monetary side. However, policymakers on both
sides of the Atlantic were prompt to begin to address market issues in ways that




with respect to structural repair of the ﬁnancial system, reﬂecting in large part
institutionaldiﬀerences.Inallthreedimensions,onbothsidesoftheAtlantic,path
dependence constrained policies. The policymaking game generally does not
permitmulligansordo-overs.
1833 Oceans_8.3.11.qxp:oceans apart book  9/3/11  16:06  Page 334OCeANSAPArT335
DiﬀerencesemergedonthepolicyapproachesonthetwosidesoftheAtlantic
with respect to the size and force of actions, methods of structural repair,
approaches to toxic assets, transparency, resolution strategies, and their
importance. Authorities on both sides of the Atlantic failed adequately to take
account of the cross-border implications of their actions in the heat of the battle.
looking ahead before the start of this conference, I was troubled by four
concerns.
First, the focus of macro-prudential regulation has been almost entirely on
institutionsthatbecometoobig,complex,orinterconnectedtofailand,therefore,
a threat to macroeconomic stability or on institutions or practices that in com-
bination threaten the macro economy. Too little attention is being paid to the
implications of macroeconomic policies creating conditions for lax lending and
creditconditionsincludingwithrespecttointernationalcapitalﬂows.
Second, everyone agrees that pro-cyclicality in regulatory policies should be






imbalances (including again capital ﬂows) in causing and propagating the crisis
impededappreciationoftheirpotentialroleincrisispreventioninthefuture.
Theconferencepresentations
How did what we heard at this conference aﬀect my views of the crisis and
transatlanticdiﬀerences?
Withrespecttotheﬁrstsessiondealingwiththeunderlyingforcesbehindthe
crisis, I was gratiﬁed that gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti’s analysis supported my view
that global imbalances shared a common cause with the ﬁnancial crisis –
macroeconomicpolicies–buttheywerenotthecause.garrySchinasidisputedthis
view,thusvalidatingmysenseofalackofconsensus.
I was enlightened by, and agreed with, Milesi-Ferretti’s emphasis on gross
capital ﬂows, in particular the relative importance of those across the Atlantic, in
contrastwithnetcapitalﬂows.HisanalysisimpliesthattherewasasingleAtlantic
ﬁnancial nexus of the crisis. He was right to diﬀerentiate the emerging market
countriesinthisregard,buttherewereexceptionssuchasKorea.
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IwasalsogratiﬁedthatrandallKroszner,whowasontheinside,downplayed











from this conference is that there were transatlantic diﬀerences in emphasis, but
cooperationwasrelativelyeasybecausealltheauthoritieswereessentiallyonthe
samepage.
However, when it comes to exit strategies, there appears to be less of a
consensus. First, we do not agree on the appropriate macroeconomic targets;
traditionally uS policymakers have thought about potential growth in level terms
and european policymakers have thought about potential growth in growth-rate








major problem. In my view, the confused thinking on this topic rivals the lack of
agreementaboutthecausesofthecrisis.
The discussion of exit strategies should cover three broad categories of
governmentpolicies:monetarypolicies(conventionalandunconventional),ﬁscal
policies (automatic stabilisers and discretionary), and structural policies mostly
appliedtotheﬁnancialsystemanditsinstitutionsbutalsoinvolvingnon-ﬁnancial
institutionssuchasmajormanufacturingﬁrms.
Beyond the question of whether talking about exit strategies is really about
whethermorestimulusshouldbeappliedisthequestionofwhatwemeanbyexit
orreducingstimulusandsupport.Someprogrammeswillwinddownautomatically,
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suchasautomaticstabilisersandsomespecialcentralbankprogrammeslikeswap
arrangements.Ofcoursetheycouldbeextended,butthenwearetalkingaboutnot
exiting not about the timing of any exit. An exit policy strictly deﬁned, in my view,
involves the reversal of a policy: raising interest rates, cutting expenditures and
raising taxes, or disposing of ownership stakes in ﬁnancial institutions. However,
inthediscussionbelow,Iamlessstrict.
Two broad considerations also seem to be missing from the discussion. First,
the circumstances of individual countries diﬀer in terms of their own economies,
ﬁnancialsystems,andlonger-termstructuralproblems.Toignorethosediﬀerences
in the name of simultaneous and parallel action or inaction by each country
oversimpliﬁes the analysis. Policy responses to the crisis were largely pointed in
the same direction. They were not always perfectly coordinated, and they were
diﬀerentiated.Thatdiﬀerentiationcontributedtosomeofthetransatlanticdisputes,
for example about ﬁscal stimulus programmes, in the run-up to the london g20
summit.
Second and related, what really matters to the global economy and ﬁnancial
system is the positive and negative spillovers (externalities) associated with
reversingstimulusandsupportprogrammes.Heretoo,circumstancesmatter.What
Chile does may be important to Chile and its immediate neighbors but not to the
system as a whole. What the united States and germany do matters to the entire
globaleconomicandﬁnancialsystem.
let’susethisframeworkofactionsorinactions,circumstances,andspillovers
to think, at least preliminarily, about the exit strategies in the three categories of
governmentpolicies:structural,ﬁscal,andmonetary.
Withrespecttostructuralpolicies,theoverridingquestionformanycountries




direct government involvement in the economy. In the united States, we pledge
allegiancetotheprincipleoflimitedgovernmentinvolvementeventhoughwehave
many exceptions including in the ﬁnancial sector – see Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac!However,viewsontheeuropeansideoftheAtlanticare,ingeneral,muchmore
tolerant of government intervention in the economy. These diﬀerences promise
conﬂictstoberesolved.
When it comes to spillovers, some argue that sales of stakes in ﬁnancial
institutions should be internationally coordinated because the ﬁrst mover has a
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competitivepriceadvantageandwillbringpressureonothergovernmentstofollow
suit even if their institutions are not yet suﬃciently strong to be fully privatised. I
aminclinedtoseetheproblemtheotherwayaround,governmentsthatmaintain
theirstakes,inparticularstakesthatinvolvesubstantialinﬂuenceifnotfullcontrol,
will tend to distort the level playing ﬁeld, putting private sector institutions at a
competitive disadvantage. Thus, I would say the principle should be that
governmentsshouldselltheirstakes–thesoonerthebetter.Ifgettingahigherprice




and policy preferences. In particular, in continental europe there was greater
reliance on automatic stabilisers and discretionary actions were relatively more
frontloaded.TheunitedStatesplacedlessrelianceonautomaticstabilisersandits




timing, and composition of ﬁscal policies may not matter much in the aggregate,
but there are the cross-border spillovers. Continued ﬁscal stimulus in the united
Statesanddiminishedﬁscalstimulusin,say,europemeansthateuropereceives
apositivespillovereﬀectfromtheunitedStates,ineﬀectfreeridingonuSpolicies,
and the united States receives a negative spillover eﬀect from europe. The most
importantspilloversinvolvenotsomuchthenatureoftherecoverybutthenature
of the expansion. This is all the more relevant when it comes to questions of
reversing ﬁscal policies via discretionary actions to reduce ﬁscal deﬁcits. For
countries like germany, China, and Japan that before the crisis relied on growth
models emphasising external demand rather than domestic demand, the a priori
case for withdrawal or reversal of ﬁscal stimulus is weaker, everything else being
equal, because of the global imperative that they boost their domestic demand.





various facilities run oﬀ or are not extended, for example guarantee facilities, this
alsoisnotmybiggestworry.
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My biggest worry is the timing of central bank actions with respect to
conventional monetary policy, in other words raising nominal interest rates. We
heard at this conference about the Federal reserve’s ability to pay interest on
reserves, but this tool does not come into play until the Federal Open Market
Committee(FOMC)beginstoraiseinterestratesanditisanuntestedpolicy.Onthe
one hand, such actions could have spillover eﬀects tending to strengthen the
currencyofthecountryorarea,butonecannotbecertainofsizeoreventhesignof















concern is that the political authorities who are also the ﬁscal authorities will
pressure central banks to be too easy for too long in the name of sustaining the










achieve. A case in point is the locus of responsibility for the supervision and
regulationofforeignbanksintheunitedStates.Threedecadesagothestateshad
principal responsibility, but after several crises involving foreign institutions,
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responsibilitywastransferredinseveralstepstotheFederalreserve.Ontheother
hand,IwouldnotethatthiscrisisisnotlikelytoproduceachangeinuSsupervision










of macro-prudential regulation, as was emphasised by Klaus regling. We have
monetary policy in the model but not in a role that protects the ﬁnancial system.
IinterpretgarrySchinasi’spaperasnotentirelyconsistentwiththeseconcerns
thoughhisoraldiscussionwasmoresympathetic.Hepointsto‘systemicrisks’,but
they operate independent of macroeconomic policies. It is the importance of this
two-way link that, in my view, argues for placing much of the macro-prudential
functionincentralbanks,whichItooktobePetergarber’sargument.
On my other two concerns, home-host supervisory diﬀerences and global
imbalances, we heard little or nothing, which is bad news and good news. Home-
host supervision and tensions were mentioned, but largely were swept under the
rug as far as europe itself is concerned and as far as transatlantic cooperation is
concerned. (garry Schinasi did touch on these issues a bit, but they were not
highlighted). This is likely to become a big problem operationally, politically, and
fortheinternationalﬁnancialinstitutionsthemselves.Onthereemergenceofglobal
imbalances, I am thankful that this topic did not dominate this conference, aside
from some indirect references in the Milesi-Ferretti’s presentation, but it will
dominatefutureconferences.
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